Results for ' PROBABILITY'

936 found
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  1. Isaac Levi.on Indeterminate Probabilities - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen, Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications. D. Reidel. pp. 233.
     
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  2. Paolo legrenzi.Naive Probability - 2003 - In Maria Carla Galavotti, Observation and Experiment in the Natural and Social Sciences. Springer Verlag. pp. 232--43.
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  3. Philippe Mongin.Nonaddittve Probability - 1994 - In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl, Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala: Papers From the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 49.
     
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  4. Hermann Vetter.Logical Probability - 1970 - In Paul Weingartner & Gerhard Zecha, Induction, physics, and ethics. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 75.
     
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  5.  10
    ma: tMlW)(D.What Remains Of Probability - 2010 - In Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Marcel Weber, Dennis Dieks & Friedrich Stadler, The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 373.
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    Jon Williamson.Probability Logic - 2002 - In Dov M. Gabbay, Handbook of the logic of argument and inference: the turn towards the practical. New York: Elsevier. pp. 397.
  7. A Primer of Probability Logic.Ernest Wilcox Adams - 1996 - Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
    This book is meant to be a primer, that is, an introduction, to probability logic, a subject that appears to be in its infancy. Probability logic is a subject envisioned by Hans Reichenbach and largely created by Adams. It treats conditionals as bearers of conditional probabilities and discusses an appropriate sense of validity for arguments such conditionals, as well as ordinary statements as premisses. This is a clear well-written text on the subject of probability logic, suitable for (...)
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  8. Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):1-22.
    How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can be used to (...)
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  9. (1 other version)Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Mind 62 (245):86-99.
     
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  10.  57
    Theory of Probability.Harold Jeffreys - 1939 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
    Another title in the reissued Oxford Classic Texts in the Physical Sciences series, Jeffrey's Theory of Probability, first published in 1939, was the first to develop a fundamental theory of scientific inference based on the ideas of Bayesian statistics. His ideas were way ahead of their time and it is only in the past ten years that the subject of Bayes' factors has been significantly developed and extended. Until recently the two schools of statistics were distinctly different and set (...)
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  11. The Emergence of Probability: A Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference.Ian Hacking - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (3):417-435.
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  12. My Basic Conceptions of Probability and Induction, PA Schilpp ed.Rudolf Carnap - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp, The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill.,: Open Court.
  13.  63
    Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.
  14. Framing human inference by coherence based probability logic.Niki Pfeifer & Gernot D. Kleiter - 2009 - Journal of Applied Logic 7 (2):206--217.
    We take coherence based probability logic as the basic reference theory to model human deductive reasoning. The conditional and probabilistic argument forms are explored. We give a brief overview of recent developments of combining logic and probability in psychology. A study on conditional inferences illustrates our approach. First steps towards a process model of conditional inferences conclude the paper.
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  15. Non-Archimedean Probability.Vieri Benci, Leon Horsten & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2013 - Milan Journal of Mathematics 81 (1):121-151.
    We propose an alternative approach to probability theory closely related to the framework of numerosity theory: non-Archimedean probability (NAP). In our approach, unlike in classical probability theory, all subsets of an infinite sample space are measurable and only the empty set gets assigned probability zero (in other words: the probability functions are regular). We use a non-Archimedean field as the range of the probability function. As a result, the property of countable additivity in Kolmogorov’s (...)
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  16. Dynamic Rationality: Propensity, Probability, and Credence.Wesley C. Salmon - 1988 - In James H. Fetzer, Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon. Springer: Netherlands. pp. 3--40.
     
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  17. Evidentialism, Inertia, and Imprecise Probability.William Peden - 2024 - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (4):797-819.
    Evidentialists say that a necessary condition of sound epistemic reasoning is that our beliefs reflect only our evidence. This thesis arguably conflicts with standard Bayesianism, due to the importance of prior probabilities in the latter. Some evidentialists have responded by modelling belief-states using imprecise probabilities (Joyce 2005). However, Roger White (2010) and Aron Vallinder (2018) argue that this Imprecise Bayesianism is incompatible with evidentialism due to “inertia”, where Imprecise Bayesian agents become stuck in a state of ambivalence towards hypotheses. Additionally, (...)
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  18.  50
    Probability matching in choice under uncertainty: Intuition versus deliberation.Derek J. Koehler & Greta James - 2009 - Cognition 113 (1):123-127.
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  19. Transitivity in coherence-based probability logic.Angelo Gilio, Niki Pfeifer & Giuseppe Sanfilippo - 2016 - Journal of Applied Logic 14:46-64.
    We study probabilistically informative (weak) versions of transitivity by using suitable definitions of defaults and negated defaults in the setting of coherence and imprecise probabilities. We represent p-consistent sequences of defaults and/or negated defaults by g-coherent imprecise probability assessments on the respective sequences of conditional events. Moreover, we prove the coherent probability propagation rules for Weak Transitivity and the validity of selected inference patterns by proving p-entailment of the associated knowledge bases. Finally, we apply our results to study (...)
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  20.  77
    Conditionals, Causality and Conditional Probability.Robert van Rooij & Katrin Schulz - 2018 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 28 (1):55-71.
    The appropriateness, or acceptability, of a conditional does not just ‘go with’ the corresponding conditional probability. A condition of dependence is required as well. In this paper a particular notion of dependence is proposed. It is shown that under both a forward causal and a backward evidential reading of the conditional, this appropriateness condition reduces to conditional probability under some natural circumstances. Because this is in particular the case for the so-called diagnostic reading of the conditional, this analysis (...)
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  21. From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability.Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.
    We generalize the Kolmogorov axioms for probability calculus to obtain conditions defining, for any given logic, a class of probability functions relative to that logic, coinciding with the standard probability functions in the special case of classical logic but allowing consideration of other classes of "essentially Kolmogorovian" probability functions relative to other logics. We take a broad view of the Bayesian approach as dictating inter alia that from the perspective of a given logic, rational degrees of (...)
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  22.  18
    Phonotactic probability influences speech production.Matthew Goldrick & Meredith Larson - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1155-1164.
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  23. Probability and Evidence.Lorraine Daston - 1998 - In Daniel Garber & Michael Ayers, The Cambridge history of seventeenth-century philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1108--1144.
  24. Objective probability as a guide to the world.Michael Strevens - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):243-275.
    According to principles of probability coordination, such as Miller's Principle or Lewis's Principal Principle, you ought to set your subjective probability for an event equal to what you take to be the objective probability of the event. For example, you should expect events with a very high probability to occur and those with a very low probability not to occur. This paper examines the grounds of such principles. It is argued that any attempt to justify (...)
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  25. Philosophical Essay on Probability (selection).Pierre Simon de Laplace - 1998 - In N. Scott Arnold, Theodore M. Benditt & George Graham, Philosophy Then and Now: An Introductory Text with Readings. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  26. A Quantum Probability Account of Order Effects in Inference.Jennifer S. Trueblood & Jerome R. Busemeyer - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (8):1518-1552.
    Order of information plays a crucial role in the process of updating beliefs across time. In fact, the presence of order effects makes a classical or Bayesian approach to inference difficult. As a result, the existing models of inference, such as the belief-adjustment model, merely provide an ad hoc explanation for these effects. We postulate a quantum inference model for order effects based on the axiomatic principles of quantum probability theory. The quantum inference model explains order effects by transforming (...)
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  27. (3 other versions)Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 35 (3):646-647.
     
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  28. The conditional in mental probability logic.Niki Pfeifer & Kleiter & Gernot - 2010 - In Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater, Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thought. Oxford University Press.
  29.  89
    In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5099-5113.
    Many philosophers think that part of what makes an event lucky concerns how probable that event is. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic probability account of luck successfully resists recent arguments that all theories of luck, including probability theories, are subject to counterexample (Hales 2016). I argue that an event is lucky if and only if it is significant and sufficiently improbable. An event is significant when, given some reflection, the subject would regard the event as (...)
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  30. A note on cancellation axioms for comparative probability.Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas F. Icard - 2016 - Theory and Decision 80 (1):159-166.
    We prove that the generalized cancellation axiom for incomplete comparative probability relations introduced by Rios Insua and Alon and Lehrer is stronger than the standard cancellation axiom for complete comparative probability relations introduced by Scott, relative to their other axioms for comparative probability in both the finite and infinite cases. This result has been suggested but not proved in the previous literature.
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  31.  39
    Surprisingly rational: Probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment.Fintan Costello & Paul Watts - 2014 - Psychological Review 121 (3):463-480.
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  32. Theory and decison.Richard G. Brody, John M. Coulter, Alireza Daneshfar, Auditor Probability Judgments, Discounting Unspecified Possibilities, Paula Corcho, José Luis Ferreira & Generalized Externality Games - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54:375-376.
     
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  33.  66
    The Everett Interpretation: Probability.Simon Saunders - 2022 - In Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics. London, UK: Routledge.
    The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics divides naturally into two parts: first, the interpretation of the structure of the quantum state, in terms of branching, and second, the interpretation of this branching structure in terms of probability. This is the second of two reviews of the Everett interpretation, and focuses on probability. Branching processes are identified as chance processes, and the squares of branch amplitudes are chances. Since branching is emergent, physical probability is emergent as well.
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  34. Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesian Epistemology.Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V..
    In this chapter we draw connections between two seemingly opposing approaches to probability and statistics: evidential probability on the one hand and objective Bayesian epistemology on the other.
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  35. James H. Fetzer, ed., Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon Reviewed by.Patrick Maher - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8 (10):390-393.
  36. Kolmogorovian Censorship Hypothesis For General Quantum Probability Theories.MiklÓs RÉdei - 2010 - Manuscrito 33 (1):365-380.
    It is shown that the Kolmogorovian Censorship Hypothesis, according to which quantum probabilities are interpretable as conditional probabilities in a classical probability measure space, holds not only for Hilbert space quantum mechanics but for general quantum probability theories based on the theory of von Neumann algebras.
     
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  37.  69
    Philosophical Lectures on Probability: Collected, Edited, and Annotated by Alberto Mura.Bruno de Finetti - 2008 - Springer.
    The book contains the transcription of a course on the foundations of probability given by the Italian mathematician Bruno de Finetti in 1979 at the a oeNational Institute of Advanced Mathematicsa in Rome.
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  38.  42
    Prime and probability: Causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences.Anouk van der Weiden, Henk Aarts & Kirsten I. Ruys - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1865-1871.
    Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action–outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal (...)
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  39.  23
    Probability and Utility.John M. Vickers - 1955 - In Anthony Eagle, Philosophy of Probability. Routledge. pp. 109--127.
  40.  10
    Spatial probability learning by experimentally naive cats and monkeys.J. M. Warren - 1980 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 16 (1):76-77.
  41. On the Probability of Plenitude.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (5):267-292.
    I examine what the mathematical theory of random structures can teach us about the probability of Plenitude, a thesis closely related to David Lewis's modal realism. Given some natural assumptions, Plenitude is reasonably probable a priori, but in principle it can be (and plausibly it has been) empirically disconfirmed—not by any general qualitative evidence, but rather by our de re evidence.
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  42.  88
    4. Probability and Prodigality.Daniel Greco - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:82.
    I present a straightforward objection to the view that what we know has epistemic probability 1: when combined with Bayesian decision theory, the view seems to entail implausible conclusions concerning rational choice. I consider and reject three responses. The first holds that the fault is with decision theory, rather than the view that knowledge has probability 1. The second two try to reconcile the claim that knowledge has probability 1 with decision theory by appealing to contextualism and (...)
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  43.  40
    The Interpretation of Probability in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.Malvina Ongaro - 2021 - Wittgenstein-Studien 12 (1):131-144.
    In this paper, I propose an assessment of the interpretation of the mathematical notion of probability that Wittgenstein presents in TLP (1963: 5.15 – 5.156). I start by presenting his definition of probability as a relation between propositions. I claim that this definition qualifies as a logical interpretation of probability, of the kind defended in the same years by J. M. Keynes. However, Wittgenstein’s interpretation seems prima facie to be safe from two standard objections moved to logical (...)
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  44.  30
    Evolution and the Machinery of Chance: Philosophy, Probability, and Scientific Practice in Biology.Marshall Abrams - 2023 - University of Chicago Press.
    Background on probability and evolution -- Laying the foundation. Population-environment systems ; Causal probability and empirical practice ; Irrelevance of fitness as a causal property of token organisms ; Roles of environmental variation in selection -- Reconstructing evolution and chance. Populations in biological practice: Pragmatic yet real ; Real causation in pragmatic population-environment systems ; Fitness concepts in measurement and modeling ; Chance in population-environment systems ; The input measure problem for MM-CCS chance -- Conclusion.
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  45. Hume on induction and probability.Frederick Schmitt - 2018 - In Angela Michelle Coventry & Alex Sager, _The Humean Mind_. New York: Routledge.
     
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  46.  21
    Discrete Configuration of Probability of Occurrence of Events in Wave Spaces.G. Shpenkov & L. Kreidik - 2002 - Apeiron 9 (4):91-102.
  47. Information and alterity : from probability to plasticity.Ashley Woodward - 2023 - In Natasha Lushetich, Iain Campbell & Dominic Smith, Contingency and plasticity in everyday technologies. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
     
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  48.  50
    Sampling Techniques (Probability) for Quantitative Social Science Researchers: A Conceptual Guidelines with Examples.Md Saidur Rahaman, Selajdin Abduli, Aidin Salamzadeh, Mosab I. Tabash & Md Mizanur Rahman - 2022 - Seeu Review 17 (1):42-51.
    Collecting data using an appropriate sampling technique is a challenging task for a researcher to do. The researchers will be unable to collect data from all possible situations, which will preclude them from answering the study’s research questions in their current form. In light of the enormous number and variety of sampling techniques/methods available, the researcher must be knowledgeable about the differences to select the most appropriate sampling technique/method for the specific study under consideration. In this context, this study also (...)
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  49. Epistemic Accuracy and Subjective Probability.Marcello D'Agostino & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2010 - In M. Dorato M. Suàrez, Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. pp. 95--105.
  50. Probability and the Open Future View.Alexander R. Pruss - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (2):190-196.
    I defend a simple argument for why considerations of epistemic probability should lead us away from Open Future views according to which claims about the future are never true.
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