The article analyses the reception of Hume’s moral philosophy in the lectures and manuscripts of Edmund Husserl and in the published lectures of Franz Brentano, on which Husserl originally based his views. I first present the reasons that led Brentano to appreciate Hume’s sentimentalist background in moral philosophy and to criticize Hume’s relativism. I then show how Husserl, following the critique of psychologism in his Logical Investigations, builds on this starting point and attempts to show a (...) possible contradictory nature of Hume’s moral relativism. Finally, I consider whether Hume’s doctrine contains phenomenological insights that Husserl overlooks. (shrink)

After setting out in part 1 Scotus's libertarian account of the will, I shall discuss two of the most important implications Scotus understood his account to have. First, according to Scotus, the Thomist understanding of the will as intellective appetite is inadequate to provide a libertarian account of freedom. Scotus therefore rejects that understanding and offers an alternative moral psychology. In part 2 of the paper I therefore draw attention to the passages in which Scotus offers his reasons for (...) rejecting Aquinas's account in order to show that they arise directly out of the libertarian account of the will I stated in part 1. I then ask whether Scotus is in fact justified in supposing that Aquinas's conception of will is incompatible with freedom as Scotus understood it. In parts 3 and 4 of the paper I shall argue that he is, since Aquinas's conception of possibility at best allows him to make room for diachronic alternatives, whereas Scotus insists on synchronic alternatives. -/- The second implication of Scotus's libertarian understanding of freedom is his distinctive conception of choice and of rationality in action. In part 5 of the paper I explain this conception and show why Scotus associates it with a libertarian understanding of freedom. (shrink)

Surveys of modern thought usually distinguish between different philosophical positions, for example, “liberalism,” “utilitarianism,” “universalist moral philosophy,” “German Idealism,” “Marxism,” “Critical Theory,” or “communitarianism.” A feminist perspective, however, reveals shared patterns of thinking: certain androcentric conceptions recur regularly, linking otherwise widely disparate philosophical approaches with each other. This article concerns these kinds of patterns. I shall discuss eight concepts that exemplify the masculine features of the philosophical tradition of modernity. At the same time, I aim to show that (...) the feminist critique of the canon does not rely on a unified theory. Although the critics agree largely, if not entirely, on the task of revealing women's exclusion and devaluation, views differ regarding the conclusions to be drawn from this critical reading. While some authors suggest that ideas such as “the individual,” “equality,” or “autonomy” should be discarded entirely, others seek to develop new understandings of these concepts that fully include women. These differences of position are related to the controversies that characterize contemporary philosophy generally, particularly in connection with the objections against universalist conceptions formulated in the context of so‐called “postmodern” thought and communitarianism. Since the feminist critique of the canon as a whole is so diverse, I can discuss only a few examples here. (shrink)

"In this exciting and important work, Wyschogrod attempts to read contemporary ethical theory against the vast unwieldy tapestry that is postmodernism.... [A] provocative and timely study."—Michael Gareffa, _Theological Studies_ "A 'must' for readers interested in the borderlands between philosophy, hagiography, and ethics."—Mark I. Wallace, _Religious Studies Review_.

In his Axel Hägerström Lectures, given in Sweden in 1991, Dick Hare referred to Hägerström as a pioneer in ethics who had made the most important breakthrough that there had been in ethics during the twentieth century. Although Hägerström's development of a nondescriptivist approach to ethics certainly was pioneering philosophical work, when the history of twentieth century ethics comes to be written, I believe that it is Hare's own work that will be seen as having made the most important contribution.

Some scholars have recently found commonalities between Hume's motivational psychology and Kantian understandings of reason and obligation. Although this trend corrects certain misreadings of Hume, it goes too far in other respects. This essay argues that we can understand Hume's explanation of the artificial virtue of justice in a way that avoids such mistakes. I begin by considering Stephen Darwall's argument that features of Hume's account of justice reveal an inadequacy in the empirical naturalist tradition and underlying commitments to the (...) proto-Kantian tradition. I argue that a broader understanding of Hume's ethics and reinterpreting crucial passages dissolve Darwall's 'puzzles' about Humean justice. I defend Hume against the charge of inconsistency by suggesting an alternative interpretation of his theory of the will and his arguments about the justice's development as a virtue. Finally, I argue that Hume's theory of the will can consistently account for motives to Humean justice, properly understood. (shrink)

The doctrine of hell, stated with a little care, entails that some persons never achieve their greatest good, fail to really flourish and never reach the end for which they were created. If that doctrine is true, and it is tragic that persons never achieve their greatest good, then there are tragic states of affairs whose tragedy is never overcome.

Detailed summary in vernacular field only.

The article discusses the criteria for authentic humanity within the moral paradigm of Russian philosophy. In Russian philosophy, the disciplines of ethics and anthropology are intertwined, as the question of human nature is primarily addressed from a moral perspective. The article primarily focuses on the interplay between faith and conscience, a topic that is approached and resolved differently within the context of Russian philosophy compared to Western European philosophy. For instance, the concept of “elimination (...) of the ethical,” a fundamental aspect of S. Kierkegaard’s existential philosophy, is discussed. The transcendence of ethical rationalism through a leap of faith, exemplified by Abraham’s act, forms the essence of authentic Christian ethics. It explores how faith is challenged by ethics, which requires not blind faith, but rational behavior in accordance with the widely accepted norms of social morality. The article highlights the conflict between existential faith and social ethics as the primary contradiction identified by S. Kierkegaard. The author revisits the ideas of F.M. Dostoevsky, N.A. Berdyaev, and others to illustrate that within the context of Russian philosophy, the critical situation is less about the anticipation of death and more about the moral anguish of conscience arising from the evil and falsehood prevalent in the world, a sentiment shared by diverse individuals like V.S. Solovyov and V.M. Shukshin. This perspective significantly redefines the concept of the existential in Russian philosophy, equating it with profound moral reflection. In discussing philosophical and anthropological issues under the “post-human threat,” the author introduces the concept of “conscientious faith.” This concept, serving as a fundamental anthropological unit, posits that it is the conscience, with its appeal to personal moral responsibility, that reveals the moral essence of an individual, thereby establishing human uniqueness. (shrink)