Can existential themes, such as anxiety, the will to die, or our simultaneous will to live forever be logically described? Does a literary language or philosophical and psychiatric term exist that can express phenomena nonreferential to the external world? In short, does a genre exist that can redefine the relationships between symbol and meaning? Drawing upon various theoretical perspectives developed by Michel Foucault, Ludwig Binswanger, Gaston Bachelard, and Karl Jaspers, this paper discusses the ability to depict life as we are (...) living it, whether it is a product of mental illness or a matter of normal schizophrenic imaginings. (shrink)

This study aims to develop guidelines of key concepts and specific considerations to make the research more ethical when conducting neurological examinations and treatment interventions in mentally ill patients. We analyzed guideline development theory and literature, previous issues, and discussions with specialists of philosophy, medicine, sociology, and bioethics. The selection of research participants, drafting of intervention plans, and informed consent process were examined with reference to the dual burden; the minimal risk as a general rule of ethical allowance (...) levels, assent and dissent to assess the individual’s judgment capacity for consent, relational autonomy for personal consent with assistance by the proxy, and risk/benefit assessments. When conducting studies, this guideline requires that these three processes be set up appropriately on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

Mental and substance use disorders have been identified as the leading cause of global disability, and the global burden of mental illness is concentrated among those experiencing disability due to serious mental illness. Music has been studied as a support for SMIs for decades, with promising results; however, a lack of synthesized evidence has precluded increased uptake of and access to music-based approaches. The purpose of this scoping review was to identify the types and quantity of research at intersections of (...) music and SMIs, document evidentiary gaps and opportunities, and generate recommendations for improving research and practice. Studies were included if they reported on music's utilization in treating or mitigating symptoms related to five SMIs: schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorder. Eight databases were searched; screening resulted in 349 included studies for data extraction. Schizophrenia was the most studied SMI, with bipolar disorder studied the least. Demographics, settings, and activity details were found to be inconsistently and insufficiently reported; however, listening to recorded music emerged as the most common musical activity, and activity details appeared to have been affected by the conditions under study. RCTs were the predominant study design, and 271 unique measures were utilized across 289 primary studies. Over two-thirds of primary studies reported positive results, with 2.8% reporting worse results than the comparator, and 12% producing indeterminate results. A key finding is that evidence synthesis is precluded by insufficient reporting, widely varied outcomes and measures, and intervention complexity; as a result, widespread changes are necessary to reduce heterogeneity, increase replicability and transferability, and improve understandings of mechanisms and causal pathways. To that end, five detailed recommendations are offered to support the sharing and development of information across disciplines. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSince 2004 in Australia, there has been a significant amount of interest in the issues of lawyers and mental illness. As a result there is now a substantial body of literature that examines...

The question "What is mental illness?" raises many issues in many contexts, personal, social, legal, and scientific. This chapter reviews mental health problems as they appear to the person with the problems, and to family and friends-before the person attends the clinic and is given a diagnosis-a time in which whether there really is a problem, as opposed to life's normal troubles and variations, is undecided, as also the nature of the problem, if such it be, and the related matter (...) what kind of expert advice should be sought. Once at the clinic, a diagnosis may be given-using criteria well-worked-out in the diagnostic manuals. The chapter discusses the conceptualizations of mental disorder in the diagnostic manuals, their rationale, and what can and cannot be reasonably expected of them. There are more position statements than definitions, and while they signal many dilemmas, they do not resolve them. Attempts to do so in the surrounding literature on the concept of mental illness are reviewed in the chapter, with conclusions favoring the features emphasized in the diagnostic manuals: distress and impairment. Finally the chapter considers how far the science may help draw boundaries around mental illness. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the idea that physician-assisted death might come into question in the cases of psychiatric patients who are incapable of making autonomous choices about ending their lives. I maintain that the main arguments for physician-assisted death found in recent medical ethical literature support physician-assisted death in some of those cases. After assessing several possible criticisms of what I have argued, I conclude that the idea that physicianassisted death can be acceptable in some cases of psychiatric (...) patients who lack autonomy ought to be taken into account in assessing the moral and legal acceptability of physician-assisted death. (shrink)

Evidence-based practice (EBP), a derivative of evidence-based medicine (EBM), is ascendant in the United States’ mental health system; the findings of randomized controlled trials and other experimental research are widely considered authoritative in mental health practice and policy. The concept of recovery from mental illness is similarly pervasive in mental health programming and advocacy, and it emphasizes consumer expertise and self-determination. What is the relationship between these two powerful and potentially incompatible forces for mental health reform?This paper identifies four attempts, (...) in the mental health literature, to delineate the role of “evidence” in recovery. One is the strong version of evidence-based practice—an applied science model—and three others address weaknesses in the first by limiting the authority of probabilistic findings. The paper also offers a fifth version, based on the concept of communicative accountability, which is derived from Habermas’ work on communicative action. The fifth version responds to the other four and emphasizes learning, disclosure and respect in clinical and other helping relationships. (shrink)

Failure to follow prescribed treatment has devastating consequences for those who are seriously and persistently mentally ill. Nurses, therefore, try to get clients to take psychotropic medication on a long-term basis. The goal is either compliance or adherence. Although current nursing literature has abandoned the term compliance because of its implications of coercion, in psychiatric nursing practice with patients suffering from serious long-term mental illness compliance and adherence are in fact different goals. The ideal goal is adherence, which (...) requires the patient to be an active participant in the team. This goal is consistent with nurses’ ethical values, but for such patients this is frequently unrealistic. If the person is severely psychotic, treatment may be involuntary and the goal compliance. Psychiatric nurses participate in involuntary treatment and thus should acknowledge the ethical implications of compliance as a goal and not obscure the issue by calling compliance adherence. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness, with each chapter exploring different philosophical issues. Chapter one delineates the central concept around which the rest of the work revolves: the stigma of mental illness. It provides an outline of the stigma mechanism, how it applies to mental illness, why it is such a large public health concern and what has been done so far to combat it. Chapter two is concerned with the application of recent (...) literature in the philosophy of implicit bias to the topic of mental illness. It suggests that we have hitherto been preoccupied with explicit formulations of the stigma mechanism, but argues that there are distinctive issues involved in combatting forms of discrimination in which the participants are not cognisant of their attitudes or actions, and that anti-stigma initiatives for mental illness should take note. Chapter three applies the philosophical literature concerning the ethics of our epistemic practices to the stigma of mental illness. It contains an analysis of how epistemic injustice- primarily in the forms of testimonial injustice and stereotype threat- affects those with mental illnesses. The fourth chapter brings in issues in the philosophy of science to explore the possibility of intervening on the stigma process to halt the stigma of mental illness. The first candidate is discounted, and the second is tentatively endorsed. The fifth chapter is concerned with how language facilitates the stigma of mental illness. It suggests that using generics to talk about mental illness is deeply problematic. In the former, it conveys insidious forms of social stereotyping. In the latter, it propagates misinformation by presenting the category as a quintessential one. (shrink)

A sociological conceptualisation of space moves beyond the material to the relational, to consider space as a social process. This paper draws on research that explored the reproduction of legitimated knowledge and power structures in intensive care units during encounters, between patients, who were experiencing mental illness, and their nurses. Semi‐structured telephone interviews with 17 intensive care nurses from eight Australian intensive care units were conducted in 2017. Data were analysed through iterative cycling between participants' responses, the literature and (...) the theoretical framework. The material and relational aspects of space in this context constitute a dynamic process that is concerned with the reproduction of everyday life, the preservation of the biomedical authority of intensive care, and the social othering of people experiencing mental illness. The work of theorists such as Löw, Harvey and Foucault underpins the exploration of space as a multi‐dimensional, malleable social process that both produces and is the product of social interaction and the social world. In this paper, we argue that the performative work of knowledge and power production and reproduction, considered here in relation to intensive care spaces, enables ongoing othering and disenfranchisement of people experiencing mental illness. (shrink)

Medical accounts of the absence of conscience are intriguing for the way they seem disposed to drift away from the ideal of scientific objectivity and towards fictional representations of the subject. I examine here several contemporary accounts of psychopathy by Robert Hare and Paul Babiak. I first note how they locate the truth about their subject in fiction, then go on to contend that their accounts ought to be thought of as a “mythos,” for they betray a telling uncertainty about (...) where “fact” ends and “fantasy” begins, as well as the means of distinguishing mental health from mental illness in regard to some social roles. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Should Clinicians’ Views of Mental Illness Influence the DSM?Elizabeth H. Flanagan (bio) and Roger K. Blashfield (bio)Keywordsclinicians, DSM, values, psychopathology, scienceThe relationship between clinicians and the DSM is complex. Clinicians are the primary intended audience of the DSM. However, as Widiger (2007) pointed out in his commentary, there is a tension associated with trying to meet the clinical goals of the DSM and also trying to optimize the scientific (...) goals of the DSM. Most commentators would agree that the recent editions of the DSM (from the DSM-III onward) have favored scientific values (e.g., Sadler 2005). Some commentators have taken sides and aligned themselves with either clinicians or with the science of classification. For instance, Garb (2005) has argued that clinicians should receive incentives to align themselves more closely with the science of the DSM. In contrast, Westen and Shedler (1999) have favored a clinician-based approach to the DSM and have argued that an ideal classification should be based on the prototypes that clinicians use to conceptualize diagnostic categories. Perhaps an extreme suggestion on how to deal with this tension between the values of clinicians and the values of scientists is to adopt the ICD-10 solution and create two versions of the next DSM. One version would be written for clinicians and another for researchers (Phillips et al. 2003).Widiger (2007) wondered whether the two of us as authors are on the fence about how the views of clinicians should affect the DSM. As clinical psychologists who are both clinicians and researchers, we understand his comment, especially in light of our attempt in our article not to overgeneralize from the time-consuming, labor-intensive, yet methodologically limited study we reported in our major paper.Nonetheless, our answer to the question asked in the title of this response, “Should clinicians’ views of mental illness influence the diagnostic manual?” is a clear and unequivocal yes. In our view, too much of the research literature stimulated by the recent DSMs has primarily used the diagnostic criteria in these DSMs to specify patient samples and then perform various experiments to study the DSM categories. We favor a different approach to research which is consistent with a comment once made by the philosopher of science, Karl Popper: “scientific theories originate from myths, and... a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories” (1963, 39). We believe that clinicians, with their years [End Page 285] of experience dealing with the ambiguities, the emotionality, and the chaos of psychopathology, have formed complex conceptual systems to try to understand the mysteries of abnormal behavior. We strongly support increased research attempts that will use clinicians as subjects and that will attempt to understand how clinicians use diagnostic concepts to understand patients.Although research on clinicians has not attracted a large amount of attention in the field, there is a long history of such research studies. For instance, in the 1970s, Overall used multivariate techniques to create graphical maps of how clinicians represented relationships among diagnoses (Overall et al. 1977). Widiger has used a similar strategy in some of his research (Widiger et al. 1987). In the early 1980s, a view of concept formation from cognitive psychology was used by Cantor et al. (1980) to look at psychiatric diagnoses as representing prototypes. Horowitz and colleagues extended this research. Blashfield and his colleagues had a grant to use the prototype model to study personality disorders and performed research investigating both case histories (Blashfield et al. 1985) and analyses of diagnostic criteria (Blashfield and Breen 1989; Davis, Blashfield, and McElroy 1993). Westen and colleagues have attempted to reconceptualize DSM personality disorder categories using the prototype model (Westen and Shedler 1999). Ahn and her colleagues (Ahn et al. 2006; Kim and Ahn 2002) have taken more recent applications of ideas from cognitive psychology to study how clinicians use and understand diagnostic categories. Finally, Flanagan and colleagues (Flanagan and Blashfield 2006; Flanagan, Keeley, and Blashfield, in press; Flanagan, Miller, and Davidson, submitted) have used qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques to try to understand the diagnostic concepts held by experienced clinicians.Besides empirical studies of how clinicians use diagnostic concepts, we also support the increased interest in... (shrink)

A compelling and incisive book that questions the overuse of mental health terms to describe universal human emotions Public awareness of mental illness has been transformed in recent years, but our understanding of how to define it has yet to catch up. Too often, psychiatric disorders are confused with the inherent stresses and challenges of human experience. A narrative has taken hold that a mental health crisis has been building among young people. In this profoundly sensitive and constructive book, psychologist (...) Lucy Foulkes argues that the crisis is one of ignorance as much as illness. Have we raised a 'snowflake' generation? Or are today's young people subjected to greater stress, exacerbated by social media, than ever before? Foulkes shows that both perspectives are useful but limited. The real question in need of answering is: how should we distinguish between 'normal' suffering and actual illness? Drawing on her extensive knowledge of the scientific and clinical literature, Foulkes explains what is known about mental health problems-how they arise, why they so often appear during adolescence, the various tools we have to cope with them-but also what remains unclear: distinguishing between normality and disorder is essential if we are to provide the appropriate help, but no clear line between the two exists in nature. Providing necessary clarity and nuance, Losing Our Minds argues that the widespread misunderstanding of this aspect of mental illness might be contributing to its apparent prevalence. (shrink)

This paper explores why ethical issues associated with mental illness have been generally neglected in the literature and texts of the discipline of bioethics. I argue that the reasons for this are both philosophical and structural, involving the philosophical framework of principlism in bioethics, in particular the privileging of the principle of autonomy, and the institutional location and disciplinary boundaries of bioethics as a profession. Other contributing factors include developments outside of bioethics, in medicine and law and in the (...) delivery patterns and funding sources of mental health services, and above all the pervasive stigma that attaches to mental illness. My goal is to show both how the attention bioethics could bring would benefit this neglected area of health care, and why attending to the issues surrounding mental illness would benefit bioethics in meeting its professional obligations as the public voice on matters of ethical significance in health care. (shrink)

Recent literature has suggested that generics can harbor and propagate worrying ideologies in a manner which is often not appreciated by speakers. In this article, I argue that the use of generics to convey information about mental illness is unhelpful, whether the knowledge structure conveyed by the generic is 'accurate' or not. Inaccurate generics contribute to insidious forms of social stereotyping and stigma by encouraging us to simplistically generalize characteristics found in very few category members to other members of (...) that kind.Yet, even where the knowledge structure underlying the generic is accurate, generics remain an unhelpful way of talking about mental illness. This is because... (shrink)

Mental disorder (earlier entitled “illness” or “disease”) is ascribed to deviations from normal thoughts, reasoning, feelings, attitudes, and actions that are considered socially or personally dysfunctional and apt for treatment. Schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder are core examples. The concept of mental disorder plays a role in many domains, including medicine, social sciences such as psychology and anthropology, and the humanities, including literature and philosophy. Philosophical discussions are the primary focus of the present entry, which differs from the entry (...) on Philosophy of Psychiatry in noting several different approaches—not only those of the philosophy of science and mind, but also those arising from phenomenology and social theory. -/- Mental disorder is a widely contested concept and there are longstanding debates on whether disorders are biological or social in nature. Even uncontroversial disorders, such as those listed above, were not always regarded as disorders in the past (Porter 2002). Moreover, the status of mental disorder has frequently indicated ethical, as much as other deficiency (Irwin 2013). Such reminders direct our attention to contemporary medical psychiatry’s sometimes uncompromisingly neurobiological, and avowedly value-free “medical model”, with its incumbent analogies and assumptions, and to the general question of how the taxa of psychiatric classifications are to be viewed as objects of natural science. This model has received intensive philosophical scrutiny, including arguments that deny these conditions are deficiencies at all. Along with issues arising from cognitive psychology and the neurosciences, such foundational matters make up much of the following entry. Because of their focus on issues central to the philosophy of mind and ethics (e.g., the mind-body problem, moral responsibility, agency and identity), analyses of mental disorder have extensive implications for those fields. As clinical phenomena, they also reflect an inescapable, everyday, social reality, giving theoretical inquiries additionally urgent practical, moral, and legal implications. (shrink)

Mental disorder (earlier entitled “illness” or “disease”) is ascribed to deviations from normal thoughts, reasoning, feelings, attitudes, and actions that are considered socially or personally dysfunctional and apt for treatment. Schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder are core examples. The concept of mental disorder plays a role in many domains, including medicine, social sciences such as psychology and anthropology, and the humanities, including literature and philosophy. Philosophical discussions are the primary focus of the present entry, which differs from the entry (...) on Philosophy of Psychiatry in noting several different approaches—not only those of the philosophy of science and mind, but also those arising from phenomenology and social theory. -/- Mental disorder is a widely contested concept and there are longstanding debates on whether disorders are biological or social in nature. Even uncontroversial disorders, such as those listed above, were not always regarded as disorders in the past (Porter 2002). Moreover, the status of mental disorder has frequently indicated ethical, as much as other deficiency (Irwin 2013). Such reminders direct our attention to contemporary medical psychiatry’s sometimes uncompromisingly neurobiological, and avowedly value-free “medical model”, with its incumbent analogies and assumptions, and to the general question of how the taxa of psychiatric classifications are to be viewed as objects of natural science. This model has received intensive philosophical scrutiny, including arguments that deny these conditions are deficiencies at all. Along with issues arising from cognitive psychology and the neurosciences, such foundational matters make up much of the following entry. Because of their focus on issues central to the philosophy of mind and ethics (e.g., the mind-body problem, moral responsibility, agency and identity), analyses of mental disorder have extensive implications for those fields. As clinical phenomena, they also reflect an inescapable, everyday, social reality, giving theoretical inquiries additionally urgent practical, moral, and legal implications. (shrink)

Foreward by Pramod K. Nayar -- Prologue -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- The dys-abled players of Samuel Beckett's Endgame -- The circumcised body of Franz Kafka's select letters -- 'Connoisseurship ... of disease' and Thomas Mann's Death in Venice -- 'Undiscovered countries' with Virginia Woolf's On being ill -- 'Connect nothing with nothing' in T.S. Eliot's The wasteland -- Epilogue -- Pathography -- Index.

People with mental illness are subjected to stigma and discrimination and constantly face restrictions in the exercise of their political, civil and social rights. Considering this scenario, mental health, ethics and human rights are key approaches to advance the well-being of persons with mental illnesses. The study was conducted to review the scope of the empirical literature available to answer the research question: What evidence is available regarding human rights and ethical issues regarding nursing care to persons with mental (...) illnesses? A scoping review methodology guided by Arksey and O’Malley was used. Studies were identified by conducting electronic searches on CINAHL, PubMed, SCOPUS and Hein databases. Of 312 citations, 26 articles matched the inclusion criteria. The central theme which emerged from the literature was “Ethics and Human Rights Boundaries to Mental Health Nursing practice”. Mental health nurses play a key and valuable role in ensuring that their interventions are based on ethical and human rights principles. Mental health nurses seem to have difficulty engaging with the ethical issues in mental health, and generally are dealing with acts of paternalism and with the common justification for those acts. It is important to open a debate regarding possible solutions for this ethical dilemma, with the purpose to enable nurses to function in a way that is morally acceptable to the profession, patients and members of the public. This review may serve as an instrument for healthcare professionals, especially nurses, to reflect about how to fulfil their ethical responsibilities towards persons with mental illnesses, protecting them from discrimination and safeguarding their human rights, respecting their autonomy, and as a value, keeping the individual at the centre of ethical discourse. (shrink)

The title Expert-by-Experience has been used frequently in mental health literature and policy making in recent years. The implication is that by virtue of suffering from a mental disorder, the person has access to a unique form of knowledge that would separate them from others, affording them the status of an expert. In this article, the concept is put under philosophical scrutiny. I use Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument and Ryle's work on introspection to show that personal experience could not (...) be a basis for expertise. Personal experience and introspection could not be a basis for knowledge underpinning expertise. (shrink)

Environmental ethicists and experts in human health have raised concerns about the effects of hydraulic fracking to access natural oil and gas resources found deep in shale rock formations on surrounding ecosystems and communities. In this study, we analyzed the prevalence of discourse on brain and mental health, and ethics, in the peer-reviewed and grey literature in the five-year period between 2016 and 2022. A total of 84 articles met inclusion criteria for analysis. Seventy-six percent (76%) mentioned impacts on (...) brain (e.g., neural tube defects, neurological symptoms), and mental health (e.g., negative psychological effects, stress, depression) briefly; 11 reports dedicated substantive discourse to either or both together. References to safety (77%) dominated the ethics context. Discussion of environmental injustices as fracking sites disproportionately affect vulnerable communities appeared in 38% of the papers. We examine the findings through the lens of environmental neuroethics that brings human-made changes to the environment, brain and mental health, and ethics together into three interwoven lines of inquiry. (shrink)

The ability to (re)classify populations is a key component of state power, but not all new state classifications actually succeed in changing how people are categorized and governed. This article examines the French state’s partly unsuccessful project in 2005 to use a new classification—“psychic handicap”—to ensure that people with severe mental disorders received services and benefits from separate agencies based on a designation of being both “mentally ill” and “disabled.” Previous research has identified how new classifications can be impeded (...) by cultural and cognitive barriers to their adoption and struggles between professionals or administrators over their implementation. Drawing on 186 interviews, archival sources, and 13 months of observations across different French bureaucracies, I expand on this literature in two ways. First, I use the case of psychic handicap to argue that a new classification can also fail to achieve its intended effect when it constitutes a bureaucratically split personality—a combination of classifications that imply that individuals belong to two, mutually exclusive kinds of people. I show how psychic handicap embodied contradictory expectations about the behavior, characteristics, and institutional trajectory of people with mental disorders. Second, I identify how bureaucrats resolved these contradictions through mechanisms of refractory looping, outsourcing expertise, and classification by default, which in this case led to the reclassification of this population as simply “mentally ill.” This framework calls attention to how practical inconsistencies can limit the impact of new classifications, even absent overt resistance to their elaboration or implementation. (shrink)

Given the dramatic rise in the frequency of nursing research that involves eliciting personal information, one would expect that attempts to maintain the balance between the aspirations of researchers and the needs and rights of patients would lead to extensive discussion of the ethical issues arising. However, they have received little attention in the literature. This paper outlines and discusses some of the issues associated with qualitative research. The discussion converges on the specific case of phenomenological research, which involves (...) the invasion of participants’ personal worlds, and draws attention to some of the ethical issues that arise when the participants are psychiatric patients. (shrink)

Originally published in 1967 Medieval Minds looks at the Middle Ages as a period with changing attitudes towards mental health and its treatment. The book argues that it was a period that that bridged the ancient with the modern, ignorance with knowledge and superstition with science. The Middle Ages spanned almost a millennium in the history of the humanities and provided the people of this period with the benefit of this knowledge. The book looks at the promise and progress which (...) was reflected by thinkers such as Augustin and Aurelianus, Alexander of Tralles and Paul of Aegina. The book also looks at martyrs like Valentine and Dympna, and the patrons of those afflicted with illnesses such as epilepsy and insanity. Written by the psychologist Thomas Francis Graham, this book provides a distinct and unique insight into the mind of those living in the medieval period and will be of interest to academics of history and literature alike. (shrink)

This book offers an ability-based view of mental disorders. It develops a detailed analysis of the concept of inability that is relevant in the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic context by drawing on the most recent literature on the concepts of ability, reasons and harm. What is it to have a mental disorder? This book contends that an individual has a mental disorder if and only if (1) they are-in the relevant sense-unable to respond adequately to their available (apparent) reasons in (...) their thinking, feeling or acting and (2) they are harmed by the condition underlying or resulting from that inability. The author calls this the "Rehability View". This view can account for what is "mental" about mental disorders: it is the rational relations among an individual's attitudes and actions that is "disordered", and the relevant norms are the norms of reasons. This view is compatible with explanations of mental disorders in terms of biological dysfunctions, without reducing the former to the latter. The aim is not to offer just another conception of mental disorder, but to develop a systematic approach that incorporates insights from philosophy of psychiatry and adjacent philosophical disciplines. Philosophy of Mental Disorder will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of psychiatry, philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, ethics, and mental health. (shrink)

Critical psychiatry has recently echoed Szasz’s longstanding concerns about medical understandings of mental distress. According to Szaszianism, the analogy between mental and somatic disorders is illegitimate because the former presuppose psychosocial and ethical norms, whereas the latter merely involve deviations from natural ones. So-called “having-it-both-ways” views have contested that social norms and values play a role in _both_ mental and somatic healthcare, thus rejecting that the influence of socio-normative considerations in mental healthcare compromises the analogy between mental and somatic disorders. (...) This paper has two goals. Firstly, I argue that having-it-both-ways views fail to provide a compelling answer to Szasz’s challenge. The reason is that what is essential to Szasz’s argument is not that mental disorder attributions involve value judgements, but that mental attributions _in general_ do. Mental disorders are thus doubly value-laden and, _qua_ mental, only metaphorically possible. To illustrate this, I construe Szasz’s view and Fulford’s having-it-both-ways approach as endorsing two different kinds of expressivism about mental disorders, pointing out their different implications for the analysis of delusions. Secondly, I argue, against Szaszianism, that Szasz’s rejection of the analogy is relatively irrelevant for discussions about the appropriateness of medicalizing mental distress. Specifically, I draw from socio-normative approaches to the psychopathology/social deviance distinction and mad and neurodiversity literature to argue that a) it is still possible to distinguish social deviance from psychopathology once we reject the analogy; and b) that _both_ medicalizing and normalizing attitudes to mental distress can harmfully wrong people from relevant collectives. (shrink)

Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that (...) which belongs to the mental illness. I argue that no such border exists, and that attempts to find it might even render the felt ambiguity worse. Instead, any solution must be constructivist; the patient (and others) should deliberate and discuss what to identify with or not. I further argue that psychiatric patients need not see their mental illness as wholly distinct from themselves to avoid ‘identifying with their diagnoses' in a problematic way. Finally, we can excuse problematic behaviour by mentally ill people – in fact, we can do so in a more nuanced and constructive way – while rejecting the view that the mental illness is wholly distinct from the patient’s self. (shrink)

Mental Illness in Ancient Medicine: From Celsus to Paul of Aeginatraces the history of conceptions of mental disorder in Graeco-Roman medical writings, from the 1st century BCE to the 7th CE, with detailed studies of all significant authors.

The insight a patient shares into their own psychosis is fundamental to their condition - it goes to the heart of what we understand 'madness' to be. Can a person be expected to accept treatment for a condition that they deny they have? Can a person be held responsible for their actions if those actions are inspired by their own unique perceptions and beliefs - beliefs that no-one else shares? The topic of insight in schizophrenia and related disorders has become (...) a major focus of research in psychiatry and psychology. It has important clinical implications in terms of outcome, treatment adherence, competence, and forensic issues. In order to study 'insight' a broad perspective is required. This involves applying knowledge from the cognitive and brain sciences, as well as from philosophy and the social sciences. Insight and Psychosis comprises a series of in-depth, well-referenced, scholarly overviews from each of these perspectives with a strong empirical foundation - including in some cases the presentation of new data and meta-analysis of the published literature. These are integrated and synthesised by the editors, both acknowledged experts in the field. The scope is truly international and spans theoretical perspectives, clinical practice, and consumer views. The book will act as a source for students and researchers interested in pursuing any number of questions and controversies around lack of insight and awareness, and will guide clinical psychologists and psychiatrists who seek a broader view of the many facets of insight that might arise during their day-to-day work. (shrink)

This is an exploratory paper of the ethical implications for genomic research and mental illness with specific reference to Singapore. Singapore has a unique context due to its social and political systems, and although it is a relatively small country, its population is religiously and culturally diverse. The issues that we identify here, therefore, will offer new perspectives and will also shed light on the existing literature on psychiatric genomics in society. We contextualise issues such as risk and stigma (...) in the identification and diagnosis of psychosis in the way they relate to Singaporean society, and use a current study as a case example. Genomic research has the potential to change significantly he practice of clinical medicine if, as expected, fast and inexpensive sequencing becomes a reality. It will likely also change how society thinks and acts in respect to multi-factorial diseases, conditions, traits, and syndromes that have a genetic component. Genomic research already raises a number of ethical concerns relating to the privacy of individuals, including the disclosure of research results and incidental findings, surreptitious tests, third party access to data, and the re-emergence of genetic determinism. These issues are potentially exacerbated when genomics - the study of whole genomes to understand complex illness and behavioural traits - is applied to psychiatric research, because of the stigma that is often attached to mental illness. In this paper, we discuss some of the issues that have arisen in the context of a study in Singapore that is currently investigating the genomics and biomarkers of psychosis. We argue that although a genomic study rarely creates data that is directly useful to the participant, it can have incidental benefits to the individual who is identified during the study as being at high risk of developing psychosis and its related states. Understanding these potential benefits requires us to examine the implications that this type of research may have on public understandings of genomic data and risk. (shrink)

As COVID-19 spread, clinicians warned of mental illness epidemics within the coronavirus pandemic. Funding for digital mental health is surging and researchers are calling for widespread adoption to address the mental health sequalae of COVID-19. -/- We consider whether these technologies improve mental health outcomes and whether they exacerbate existing health inequalities laid bare by the pandemic. We argue the evidence for efficacy is weak and the likelihood of increasing inequalities is high. -/- First, we review recent trends in digital (...) mental health. Next, we turn to the clinical literature to show that many technologies proposed as a response to COVID-19 are unlikely to improve outcomes. Then, we argue that even evidence-based technologies run the risk of increasing health disparities. We conclude by suggesting that policymakers should not allocate limited resources to the development of many digital mental health tools and should focus instead on evidence-based solutions to address mental health inequalities. (shrink)

In the United States, when an individual commits a criminal act, there are due processes to assess their responsibility and respective punishment. However, if that individual was unable to conform to the necessary standards due to symptoms caused by a mental illness, they may be excused or exempt from standard legal punishment. While we may not want to hold certain individuals responsible, or in some courtrooms, “not guilty by reason of insanity,” how should they be punished? Should they be considered (...) not legally responsible, but still morally responsible? -/- In this chapter, I explore how to navigate legal and moral responsibility, how the insanity defense operates in a few different contexts in the U.S. legal system, and most importantly, how individuals with mental illnesses are mistreated in the U.S. justice system. I demonstrate that present practices in fact exacerbate the challenges faced by individuals with mental illnesses rather than alleviate them through rehabilitation. It is my hope to contribute to the call for action amongst scholars, clinicians, and arbitrators of the law to work towards more equitable treatment of mental illness inside and beyond the courtroom. (shrink)

Madness is a complex and contested term. Through time and across cultures it has acquired many formulations: for some, madness is synonymous with unreason and violence, for others with creativity and subversion, elsewhere it is associated with spirits and spirituality. Among the different formulations, there is one in particular that has taken hold so deeply and systematically that it has become the default view in many communities around the world: the idea that madness is a disorder of the mind. -/- (...) Contemporary developments in mental health activism pose a radical challenge to psychiatric and societal understandings of madness. Mad Pride and mad-positive activism reject the language of mental 'illness' and 'disorder', reclaim the term 'mad', and reverse its negative connotations. Activists seek cultural change in the way madness is viewed, and demand recognition of madness as grounds for identity. But can madness constitute such grounds? Is it possible to reconcile delusions, passivity phenomena, and the discontinuity of self often seen in mental health conditions with the requirements for identity formation presupposed by the theory of recognition? How should society respond? -/- Guided by these questions, this book is the first comprehensive philosophical examination of the claims and demands of Mad activism. Locating itself in the philosophy of psychiatry, Mad studies, and activist literatures, the book develops a rich theoretical framework for understanding, justifying, and responding to Mad activism's demand for recognition. (shrink)

Cancer, a terminal illness, has long been a focus of attention due to its fatal nature. Its diagnosis results in distress not only to the patients and physicians, but also the families and caregivers involved. This distress is of a multifaceted nature, including psychological, financial and physical distress. The present paper aims to explore mental health issues that specifically influence cancer patients’ caregivers. However, in a country like Pakistan literature is not very rich regarding the mentioned issue. Therefore, giving (...) rise to the immense need to create awareness concerning this pressing issue. In this paper, an effort has been made to identify the types of mental health problems and variables which could potentially affect the mental health of a cancer patient caregiver. An analysis on the type of issues and associated determining variables reveals various patients’ variable, situational variable or the caregiver’s own personality which makes them susceptible to poor mental health. Furthermore, the paper tries to answer the different question regarding the prevalence rate, current status of, and awareness on the above mentioned aspect. In the end some possible recommendations have also been made in the context of the mental health issues regarding the caregivers of cancer patients discussed in the paper. (shrink)

Consumer-operated services organizations (COSOs) are independent, non-profit organizations that provide peer support and other non-clinical services to seriously mentally ill people. Mental health consumers provide many of these services and make up at least a majority of the organization’s leadership. Although the dominant conception of the COSO is as an adjunct to clinical care in the public mental health system, this paper reconceives the organization as a civic association and thereby a locus of citizenship. Drawing on empirical research on (...) COSOs in one state and the citizenship and civic democracy literatures, COSOs are analyzed here as membership organizations with democratic norms and strong ties to local communities. The suggestion is made that by embracing and enhancing their status as civic associations, COSOs may advance the goals of the social movement that spawned them and avoid predictable obstacles to further growth and development. (shrink)

BackgroundMental illness among Malaysian children is gradually reaching a fundamentally alarming point as it persistently shows increasing trend. The existing literature on the etiologies of children’s mental illness, highlights the most common cause to be ineffective or impaired parenting. Thus, efforts to combat mental illness in children should focus on improving the quality of parenting. Documented interventional studies focusing on this issue, particularly in Malaysia, are scarce and commonly report poor treatment outcomes stemming from inconvenient face-to-face instructions. Consequently, proposing (...) an accessible online and digital-assisted parenting program is expected to reach a larger number of parents, as it can overcome substantial barriers. Hence, this study aims to develop a universal digital-assisted preventive parenting intervention called DaPI, that aims to enhance mental health of children in Malaysia.MethodsA total of 200 parents of children aged 10–14 years will be recruited and randomized into two groups either intervention or waitlist-control based on a 1:1 ratio for a duration of 8 weeks. Those in the intervention group will receive eight sessions of the DaPI program that focus mainly on parenting and children’s mental health. The primary outcome of this study will essentially focus on the changes in parent-reported parenting behavior and parental self-efficacy. The secondary outcome will be changes in children’s mental health. Assessments will be arranged pre- and post-intervention as well as at the 1-month follow-up. Analyses will be conducted using a paired t-test and multivariate analysis of covariance.DiscussionThe expected outcome will be the establishment of DaPI in promoting children’s mental health by targeting changes in parenting behavior and parental self-efficacy in Malaysia. Findings from this study will be beneficial for policymakers to invest in parenting programs that could provide support to parents in enhancing their child’s overall development.Clinical trial registration[www.irct.ir], identifier [IRCT20211129053207N1]. (shrink)

While there have been forty years of active debate among philosophers of psychiatry about how to define mental disorder, there has been relatively little discussion of mental health. This is starting to change. A new literature is emerging about what it means to have mental health. While some define mental health as simply as the absence of mental disorder, others argue to the contrary that mental health is distinct from, and not reducible to, the presence or absence of mental (...) illness. In this paper we review competing accounts and develop our own account. We characterize a diverse set of dispositions, skills, habits, and capacities, associated with aspects of personality structure. These are some of the same capacities developed across many psychotherapies. Attention to the literature on personality, and clinical psychotherapy, can, in our view, illuminate one (of several) dimensions of positive mental health. (shrink)

This article examines some of the key debates and interactions between the Australian government and medical profession in relation to the mental health consequences of the policy of mandatory detention of asylum seekers. It explores how, in a series of episodes between 2001 and 2005, each side claimed to represent accurately the ‘true’ nature of the detention system through asserting superior ‘objectivity’ and commitment to ‘scientific truth’ in their representations of the mental health of asylum seekers. Placing these debates within (...) the particular political objectives of the Liberal Party during John Howard’s term as Prime Minister, the article explores how science and medical advocacy have been characterized and made to signify larger conflicts within the Australian political arena. It shows how populist political ideas of ‘elitism’ have been used by the government to represent as ‘elitist untruths’ psychiatric research which has demonstrated a direct causal links between government border control policies and mental ill-health. (shrink)

Samuel Beckett and Jorge Luis Borges have presented 20th century literature with a distinctive gallery of solitary figures who suffer from a series of physiological ailments: invalidism, decrepitude, infirmity and blindness, as well as neurological conditions such as amnesia and autism spectrum disorders. Beckett and Borges were concerned with the dynamics between illness and creativity, the literary representation of physical and mental disabilities, the processes of remembering and forgetting, and the inevitability of death. This article explores the depiction of (...) physically and mentally disabled characters in Borges' Funes the Memorious (1942)—a story about an Uruguayan gaucho who has been left paralysed after a fall from a horse which simultaneously endowed him with an infallible memory and perception—and Beckett's Trilogy: Molloy (1951), Malone Dies (1951) and The Unnamable (1953). It examines the prodigious memory of Funes and the forgetful minds of Molloy and Malone with reference to influential neuropsychological studies such as Alexander Luria's twofold exploration of memory and forgetfulness in The Mind of a Mnemonist (1968) and The Man with a Shattered World (1972). The article demonstrates that in contrast to Beckett's amnesiacs and Luria's brain-damaged patient, who are able to transcend their circumstances through cathartic writing, Borges' and Luria's mnemonic prodigies fail to achieve anything significant with their unlimited memories and remain imprisoned within their cognitive disabilities. It reveals that medical discourses can provide invaluable insights and lead to a deeper understanding of the minds and bodily afflictions of literary characters. (shrink)

This article examines the role of time as a methodological tool and pathological focus of clinical psychiatry and psychology in the first half of the 20th century. Contextualizing ‘psychopathologies of time’ developed by practitioners in Europe and North America with reference to the temporal theories implicit in Freudian psychoanalysis and Henri Bergson’s philosophy of durée, it illuminates how depression, schizophrenia, and other mental disorders such as obsessive-compulsive behaviours and aphasia were understood to be symptomatic of an altered or disturbed ‘time-sense’. (...) Drawing upon a model of temporal synthesis whereby in healthy individuals, a subjective temporal sense ( Ichzeit, durée, or personal lifetime) was perceived and understood in relation to objective time frameworks ( Weltzeit, clock-time, or quantitative time models like historical chronology), clinicians argued that mentally ill patients were unable to synthesize Ichzeit and Weltzeit, using variations in this disturbance to define specific pathological conditions. (shrink)

Co-production, in the field of mental health, aims to bring together academic and clinical researchers and those with lived experience. Often, research projects informed by this methodology involve the meeting of opposing attitudes, whether to the legitimacy of psychiatry, determinants of mental ill health, or the most appropriate interventions. This has meant that whilst some have reported positive experiences of co-production, many people with lived experience of mental ill health, sometimes referred to as ‘experts by experience’ (EbE), report harms which (...) have taken place or been perpetuated during co-produced research projects. In the literature, nearly always, this is understood as a kind of epistemic injustice in Miranda Fricker's sense. In this paper, I argue that whilst Fricker's view does provide a plausible explanation of what's at play, we can gain more insight into the structural factors which exclude EbE by applying a framework of epistemic oppression. By highlighting the systemic and structural factors which work to keep certain knowers and their contributions out of our collective epistemic resources, we begin to understand the enormity of the task required to redress injustices in our knowledge production systems. (shrink)

The number of homebound individuals in the United States is on the rise, causing health-care professionals to expand in-home health services to help meet the increased demand. Due to the prevalence of feelings of isolation and depression in this population, it is imperative that mental health professionals join this effort to increase access to mental health services. Delivering psychotherapy in clients’ homes presents many advantages to these homebound individuals, but there is a dearth of literature addressing how therapists should (...) handle unique ethical issues that arise in this type of setting. This article addresses ethical considerations and guidelines for in-home provision of mental health services. General ethical issues related to home-based psychotherapy include boundaries, confidentiality and privacy, competency, insurance coverage, and autonomy. Issues pertaining to different categories of homebound individuals, including persons with agoraphobia, chronic illnesses, and older adults, are then discussed in turn. Recommendations on how to best manage these issues by applying the American Psychological Association’s, the American Counseling Association’s, and the National Association of Social Workers’ Ethics Codes are provided. (shrink)