Cinematic motion is, I argue, a genuine and intrinsic property of some cinematic works and not just a matter of how things look to us. It is an event—an item's change of position—happening prior and external to our sensory responses to movies. I therefore defend against common-sense illusionism a minority opinion within cinema studies: that movie viewing normally occasions veridical perceptions of a kind of objective displacement. I also dispute another version of anti-illusionist realism about cinematic motion, (...) the implication that cinematic motion, like colour, is a response-dependent property. The impression of motion, I contend, is not produced by the visual system's operations. It is a sensory representation of a physical property of a particular type of external object. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the pioneering research on electronic noise—the current fluctuations in electronic circuit devices due to their intrinsic physical characteristics rather than their defects—in Germany and the U.S. during the 1910s–1920s. Such research was not just another demonstration of the general randomness of the physical world Einstein’s work on Brownian motion had revealed. In contrast, we stress the importance of a particular engineering context to electronic noise studies: the motivation to design and improve high-gain thermionic-tube (...) amplifiers for radio and wired communications. Engineering scientists’ endeavors to understand electronic noise started in 1918, when Walter Schottky at Siemens formulated a theory of “shot noise,” current fluctuations owing to the random emissions of discrete electrons in a tube. Schottky’s theory was revised and experimentally tested at Siemens, General Electric, and AT&T during the 1920s, leading to the discoveries of several other types of noise and an increasing interest in the thermal fluctuations in electronic circuits. In 1925–1928, J.B. Johnson and Harry Nyquist at Bell Labs developed a theory of thermal noise for any electrical resistor at a non-zero temperature. Although these studies were initiated to chart the fundamental performance limit of electronic technology, they ended up assisting the empirical determination of individual electronic components’ characteristics. (shrink)

Tractatus Logico-Pilosophicus, the only book published during Ludwig Wittgenstein's lifetime , has since attracted the imagination of generations of philosophers as a work of great philosophical genius. Nonetheless, even today, more than eighty years later, philosophers are struggling to reconcile its diverse themes within a single, coherent picture. The present work is an attempt to meet this challenge. ;Wittgenstein considered the single proposition as a concrete model for the fact. The challenge is to show how a system of propositions can (...) serve as a model of reality. My work concentrates on three pillars of the logic of the Tractatus: the picture theory, negation as "reversal of sense," the independence of elementary propositions. Using a simple scenario of the ordering of objects or letters on a line, I examine the conflict generated by the attempt to adequately accommodate all three themes and offer my own solution. My solution brings implications to the problem of negation and to the Tractatus's thesis that the possibilities of logical space are spanned by the possible configurations of the ultimately simple objects. One such implication, which stands in contrast to the common reading, is that in atomic facts we have 'complex objects' as constituents. ;The resolution offered, furthermore, exposes an intrinsic difficulty in the Tractatus, for which I have reserved the term arbitrary choice. The difficulty is manifested in the lack of assurance---from the perspective of logic---that a concept-word will preserve its 'standard' meaning when it is reapplied or when its scope of application varies. In this I uncover the seed of central themes in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, e.g. the rule-following argument, as present already in the Tractatus. ;In the concluding chapter, I suggest a new account for the nature of the proposition by connecting the analysis offered in the Tractatus with the subject of time and motion. The picture with which the work concludes then considers language not as corresponding to reality, but as engaged or synchronized with reality---if you will, it is a picture of language and reality in a dance. (shrink)

The arena of the philosophy of time has been largely concerned with deciding whether tense distinctions reflect absolute metaphysical distinctions or not. After bringing the debate over the metaphysical status of instantaneous velocity to bear on the debate over the nature of temporal passage, I argue that we should further investigate whether aspectual distinctions reflect objective and absolute metaphysical distinctions too. I conclude that those who think that being realist about tense uniquely makes room for the idea that time passes (...) should be realist about the progressive too. (shrink)

One of the most efficient predator-prey models with spatial effects is the one with ratio-dependent functional response. However, there is a need to further explore the effects of spatial motion on the dynamic behavior of population. In this work, we study a ratio-dependent predator-prey model with diffusion terms. The aim of this work is to investigate the changes in predator’s distribution in space as the prey populations change their mobility. We observe that the frequency diffusion of the prey gives (...) rise to the sparse density of the predator. Moreover, we also observe that the increasing rate of the conversion into predator biomass induces pattern transitions of the predator. Specifically speaking, Turing pattern of the predator populations goes gradually from a spotted pattern to a black-eye pattern, with the intermediate state being the mixture of spot and stripe pattern. The simulation results and analysis of this work illustrate that the diffusion rate and the real intrinsic factor influence the persistence of the predator-prey system mutually. (shrink)

When the German mathematician Hermann Minkowski first introduced the space-time diagrams that came to be associated with his name, the idea of picturing motion by geometric means, holding time as a fourth dimension of space, was hardly new. But the pictorial device invented by Minkowski was tailor-made for a peculiar variety of space-time: the one imposed by the kinematics of Einstein’s special theory of relativity, with its unified, non-Euclidean underlying geometric structure. By plo tting two or more reference frames (...) in relative motion on the same picture, Minkowski managed to exhibit the geometric basis of such relativistic phenomena as time dilation, length contraction or the dislocation of simultaneity. These disconcerting effects were shown to result from arbitrary projections within four-dimensional space-time. In that respect, Minkowski diagrams are fundamentally different from ordinary space-time graphs. The best way to understand their specificity is to realize how productively ambiguous they are. (shrink)

The late scholastic philosopher Francisco Suárez articulates and defends an extraordinarily detailed account of efficient causation. Some of the most interesting and difficult questions connected with this account concern the particular types of efficient causation he acknowledges. This paper clarifies one of the most fundamental distinctions Suárez employs in the course of his treatment of efficient causation—namely, that between motion or change, on the one hand, and creation ex nihilo, on the other. The paper shows that, although motion (...) and creation differ in systematic and important ways, they nevertheless can both be captured by Suárez’s general theoretical model of efficient causation. Moreover, the paper shows that creation serves as a kind of limit case of efficient causation, and accordingly that it informs how Suárez understands motion or change as well. (shrink)

If an object changes its spatial position over time, or moves from one place to another, we say that the object is in motion. But in Mādhyamika Buddhist philosophy reality of motion has been questioned. Nāgārjuna, the renowned philosopher in Mādhyamika school, has argued that motion is an absurd concept—it is _empty_. In the second chapter of _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ (_Gatāgata-parikṣā_) Nāgārjuna examined the notion of motion and showed that motion exists neither in past, nor in present, (...) and nor in future—the notion of motion is paradoxical. This paper intends to critically examine those arguments from a realist point of view, and tries to demystify the paradox analyzing its nature and origin. Nāgārjuna’s arguments on motion have two different interpretations, and the paper shows that it is possible to counter both of the interpretations from the Nyāya point of view. The paradox does not arise in the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika ontology. The paper also tries to find out why the paradox arises in Nāgārjuna’s theoretical framework. This paper also examines Nāgārjuna’s refutation of the commencement and cessation of motion and shows how these arguments could be answered from a realist point of view. In this context the paper also examines a modern interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s arguments offered by Westerhoff (J Indian Philos 36(4):455–479, 2008). Nāgārjuna argues that motion and mover are mutually interdependent, hence have no intrinsic nature—they are empty and absurd. He uses this argument as an argument template to refute other notions like _pramāṇa_ and _prameya_. This paper analyzes that argument template and shows that the argument from mutual interdependence can also be countered. Time is an important presupposition for an account of motion. Nāgārjuna refutes the reality of Time which implies that there cannot be any motion. But the Naiyāyikas have refuted this position and presented arguments in favour of the reality of time. It supports the claim that motion exists—it is not an absurd concept. (shrink)

Here I reexamine Duhem's question of the continuity between medieval dynamics and early modern conservation theories. I concentrate on the heavens. For Aristotle, the motions of the heavens are eternally constant (and thus mathematizable) because an eternally constant divine Reason is their mover. Duhem thought that impetus and conservation theories, by extending sublunar mechanics to the heavens, made a divine renewer of motion redundant. By contrast, I show how Descartes derives his law of conservation by extending Aristotelian celestial dynamics (...) to the earth. Descartes argues that motion is intrinsically linear, not circular. But he agrees that motion is mathematically intelligible only where divine Reason moves bodies in a constant and eternal motion. Descartes strips bodies of active powers, leaving God as the only natural mover; thus both celestial and sublunar motions are constant, and uniformly mathematizable. The law of conservation of the total quantity of motion is an attempt to harmonize the constancy derived a priori with the phenomenal inconstancy of sublunar motions. (shrink)

Mere exposure, generally, entails influences of familiarity manipulations on affective dependent variables. Previously (Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005), we have argued that familiarity corresponds intrinsically to positive affect, and have extended the correspondence to novelty and negative affect. Here, we present two experiments that show reverse effects of affective manipulations on perceived familiarity. In Experiment 1 affectively valenced exteroceptive cues of approach and avoidance (e.g., apparent movement) modulated recognition bias of neutral targets. This finding suggests that our correspondence hypotheses can be (...) generalised to an important aspect of emotion, namely approach and avoidance tendencies. In Experiment 2 participants? emotional mood was manipulated within the Jacoby?Whitehouse paradigm and a pattern of results was obtained as if consciousness was manipulated. We interpret the latter results within the affective modulation framework (AMF), which postulates facilitation of nonconscious processing by positive affect and an enhancement of conscious processing by negative affect. (shrink)

This chapter examines questions having to do with whether and how things persist through change and how things do so If they do persist. Next, assuming that intrinsic change does take place, the chapter examines two principal views about how things persist through change of intrinsic properties, Substratism and Replacementism. It focuses on the specific but very important case of motion, or change of location. There are three major theories: Intrinsic Motion; Bertrand Russell's At/At Theory, (...) and an Aristotelian theory (Motion Intervalism). The chapter also considers the problem of the persistence of composite objects, including objects that can gain or lose parts. Replacementists might consider taking on board a metaphysically fundamental genidentity relation. Substratists have an explanation for the reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity of genidentity, something that Classical Genidentity Theorists have to posit as a brute metaphysical necessity. This provides the Substatists with an advantage in terms of Ockham's Razor. (shrink)

This essay argues that moral self-cultivation as described in the Confucian tradition involves the cultivation of the body. Preparing the body in certain ways, perhaps by making it healthy, is a necessary part of moral self-cultivation. This claim includes: (a) nourishing the body in a proper way is a first step in moral self-cultivation, and the bodily care is instrumentally valuable to one’s flourishing life; (b) making and keeping a healthy body is partly constitutive of a moral well-being and hence (...) bodily care is also intrinsically valuable to a flourishing life. This perspective on embodied virtue is established through a discussion of qi. The body as the storehouse of qi is not only a passive reservoir of knowledge that serves as moral guidance, but also actively plays an indispensable and integral role in activities related to one’s moral transformation. A well-cared for body provides a moral agent with the temporal and spatial possibility for moral refinement and an enhanced good life. (shrink)

In his epic Paradise Lost, John Milton aims at a philosophically and theologically sound theodicy in order to “justify the ways of God to men”1. Milton’s approach has been criticised for creating an unsolvable tension between God’s foreknowledge and man’s free will and responsibility. The article wants to show that this criticism turns out to be unjustified if the philosophical basis behind the epic is thoroughly examined. Milton draws heavily on St. Augustine’s ontology: Every kind of being depends on its (...) intrinsic goodness insofar as it really is what it is by nature. God himself is the ultimate goodness: Therefore he is not subject to change, but transcends space and time. In his perfection, he cannot lack any kind of knowledge, but knows all things in an atemporal manner, without depriving men and women of their capability of free choice and action, for these are the distinct features that constitute the goodness of human nature. The crucial question of the article is why, according to Augustine and Milton, God’s foreknowledge should not at all be confused with fated determinism. (shrink)

Our starting point is the question ‘What is mass’, what in particular enables mass to constitute duration: so that mass can be regarded as moving as well as at rest (the kinematic principle of relativity). In a thought experiment, this question is attacked here not from the perspective of mass itself, but from that of a standing light wave. In this model, mass-analogous structures can be re- constructed that can be in relative motion to each other. The (empirically known) (...) constancy of the speed of light in every reference system is not as- sumed here. However, it can be shown that the speed of light is identical in all systems constituted by mass-analogous structures that move uniformly relative to each other and that the speed of light moreover is the limiting speed of mo- tions. This indepence of the motion of light from the system of reference, this character of absoluteness, and the relativity of mass motions thus prove to be contrary but inextricably linked moments of the kinematic principle of relativi- ty: an interesting perspective concerning a philosophy of relativity theory. - The mathematical relationships are explained in more detail in the appendix. (shrink)

Protein structure is dynamic: the intrinsic flexibility of polypeptides facilitates a range of conformational fluctuations, and individual protein chains can assemble into complexes. Proteins are also dynamic in evolution: significant variations in secondary, tertiary and quaternary structure can be observed among divergent members of a protein family. Recent work has highlighted intriguing similarities between these structural and evolutionary dynamics occurring at various levels. Here we review evidence showing how evolutionary changes in protein sequence and structure are often closely related (...) to local protein flexibility and disorder, large‐scale motions and quaternary structure assembly. We suggest that these correspondences can be largely explained by neutral evolution, while deviations between structural and evolutionary dynamics can provide valuable functional insights. Finally, we address future prospects for the field and practical applications that arise from a deeper understanding of the intimate relationship between protein structure, dynamics, function and evolution. (shrink)

Intrinsic gait variability, i.e., fluctuations in the regularity of gait patterns between repetitive cycles, is inherent to the sensorimotor system and influenced by factors such as age and pathology. Increased GV is associated with gait impairments in individuals with cerebral palsy and has been mainly studied based on spatiotemporal parameters. The present study aimed to describe kinematic GV in young people with CP and its associations with clinical impairments [i.e., passive range of motion, muscle weakness, reduced selective motor (...) control, and spasticity]. This retrospective study included 177 participants with CP representing 289 clinical gait analyses [n = 172 for unilateral CP vs. 117 for bilateral CP ]. As variability metrics, Root Mean Square Deviation for nine lower-limb kinematic parameters and Gait Standard Deviation – as composite score of the kinematic parameters – were computed for the affected and most affected side, respectively, as defined by clinical scores. GaitSD was then computed for the non/less-affected side for between leg comparisons. Uni- and multivariate linear regressions were subsequently performed on GaitSD of the affected/most affected side with all clinical impairments as independent variables. Highest RMSD were found in the transverse plane, for distal joints in the sagittal plane and for foot progression. GaitSD was not different between uCP and bCP but higher in the non-affected vs. affected side in uCP. GaitSD was associated with age, gait deviation index, muscle weakness, selectivity, and pROM. After adjustment for age and GDI, GaitSD remained associated with muscle weakness and selectivity. Kinematic GV can be expressed as global indicator of variability in young people with CP given the strong correlation of RMSD for lower-limb kinematic parameters. In terms of asymmetry, increased variability of the non-affected vs. affected side may indicate contralateral compensation mechanisms in uCP. Notably muscle weakness and selectivity – but not spasticity – were associated with GaitSD. Further studies need to explore the clinical relevance of kinematic GV in CP to support the interpretation of clinical gait analyses and therapeutic decision-making. (shrink)

This paper aims at tracking down, by looking at late medieval and early modern discussions over the ontological status of artifacts, the main steps of the process through which nature became theorized on a mechanistic model in the early 17th century. The adopted methodology consists in examining how inventions such as mechanical clocks and automata forced philosophers to modify traditional criteria based on an intrinsic principle of motion and rest for defining natural beings. The paper studies different strategies (...) designed in the transitional period 1300–1600 for making these inventions compatible with classical definitions of nature and artifacts. In the first part of the paper, it is shown that, even if virtually all medieval philosophers acknowledged an ontological distinction between artifacts and natural beings, these different strategies demonstrate a growing concern about the consistency of the art/nature distinction. The next part of the paper studies how mechanical clocks, even before the Scientific Revolution, served as theoretical models for applying mechanistic views to different objects (be they cosmological, physical or biological). The epistemological function of clocks appears to stem from different factors (like the specific manufacturing of late medieval clocks as well as the evolution of 16th-century mechanics) that are listed in this second part of the paper. These factors, combined with the definitional issues raised by automata, explain that clocks became the symbol of a new approach to natural philosophy, characterized by the collapse of the art/nature distinction and the “mechanization of nature”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. In his Letters on the motion impressed by a moving mover, Gassendi offers a theory of the motion of composite bodies that closely follows Galileo’s. Elsewhere, he describes the motion of individual atoms in very different terms: individual atoms are always in motion, even when the body that contains them is at rest; atomic motion is discontinuous although the motion of composite bodies is at least apparently continuous; and atomic motion is grounded (...) in an intrinsic vis motrix, motive power, while composite bodies simply persist in their state of motion or rest in the absence of outside intereference. Gassendi does not make much effort to explain how his accounts of atomic and composite motion fit together, and it’s difficult to see how they could possible be integrated. My goal is to explain, given this difficulty, why he accepted both the Galilean theory of the motion of composite bodies and the Epicurean theory of atomic motion. (shrink)

Not all symmetries are on a par. For instance, within Newtonian mechanics, we seem to have a good grasp on the empirical significance of boosts, by applying it to subsystems. This is exemplified by the thought experiment known as Galileo’s ship: the inertial state of motion of a ship is immaterial to how events unfold in the cabin, but is registered in the values of relational quantities such as the distance and velocity of the ship relative to the shore. (...) But the significance of gauge symmetries seems less clear. For example, can gauge transformations in Yang-Mills theory—taken as mere descriptive redundancy—exhibit a similar relational empirical significance as the boosts of Galileo’s ship? This question has been debated in the last fifteen years in philosophy of physics. I will argue that the answer is ‘yes’, but only for a finite subset of gauge transformations, and under special conditions. Under those conditions, we can mathematically identify empirical significance with a failure of supervenience: the state of the Universe is not uniquely determined by the intrinsic state of its isolated subsystems. Empirical significance is therefore encoded in those relations between subsystems that stand apart from their intrinsic states. (shrink)

This dissertation is a critical examination of dialetheism, the view that there are true contradictions. Dialetheism's proponents argue that adopting the view will allow us to solve hitherto unsolved problems, including the well-known logical paradoxes. ;Dialetheism faces three kinds of challenge. Challenges of the first kind put in doubt the intrinsic coherence of dialetheism. It can be claimed, for example, that it is incoherent for a claim to be both true and false; that claims known to be false cannot (...) be accepted; that claims known to be false cannot be rationally accepted; and that dialetheism entails the falsity of some of its own theoretical claims. The second kind of challenge concerns the use of paraconsistent logics, which dialetheists must adopt on pain of accepting the truth of every proposition. I examine a number of paraconsistent logics, and conclude that either they come at an unacceptably high price or they do not support the dialetheist project. ;I devote most attention to the third kind of challenge, according to which dialetheism fails to provide the promised solutions to the paradoxes and other previously intractable problems, and so we lose the major motivation for the theory. Proponents claim that dialetheism allows for the solution of numerous problems, particularly in metaphysics, law, and logic. In the case of metaphysics, it is claimed that dialetheism allows us to deal with puzzles involving change, vagueness, and motion. However, I argue that the proposed solution does not eliminate the old metaphysical problems, and in fact gives rise to new ones. In the case of law, it is claimed that dialetheism can allow us to deal with legal contradiction. I argue there are more plausible means of solving such conflicts. The strongest case for dialetheism is that it allows us to solve logical and semantic paradoxes of self-reference, some of which have endured for well over two thousand years. I construct a paradox that the dialetheist cannot accommodate, and which shows that dialetheism never provided a solution to the paradoxes at all, even in their more familiar forms. (shrink)

To explain consciousness as a physical process we must acknowledge the role of energy in the brain. Energetic activity is fundamental to all physical processes and causally drives biological behavior. Recent neuroscientific evidence can be interpreted in a way that suggests consciousness is a product of the organization of energetic activity in the brain. The nature of energy itself, though, remains largely mysterious, and we do not fully understand how it contributes to brain function or consciousness. According to the principle (...) outlined here, energy, along with forces and work, can be described as actualized differences of motion and tension. By observing physical systems, we can infer there is something it is like to undergo actualized difference from the intrinsic perspective of the system. Consciousness occurs because there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo a certain organization of actualized differences in the brain. (shrink)

This paper is the first of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some scholars ? including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber ? take Descartes to be a `partial' Occasionalist, who thinks that God alone is the cause of all natural motion. Contra this interpretation, I agree with literature that links Descartes to the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. This paper surveys this literature, and argues that it has failed to provide an interpretation of Descartes's view that both (...) distinguishes his position from that of his later, Occasionalist followers and is consistent with his broader metaphysical commitments. I provide an analysis that tries to address these problems with earlier `Concurentist' readings of Descartes. On my analysis, Occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. As I read him, Descartes thinks that bodies have active causal powers that are partly grounded in their intrinsic natures. But I argue ? pace a recent account by Tad Schmaltz ? that Descartes also thinks that God immediately causes all motion in the created world. On the picture that emerges, Descartes's position is both continuous with, and a subtle departure from, the Thomisitic theory of divine concurrence. (shrink)

The simultaneous recording of brain activity in two or more people, termed hyperscanning, is an emerging field of research investigating the neural basis of social interaction. Hyperscanning studies of adult–infant dyads have great potential to provide insights into how social functions develop. In particular, taking advantage of functional near-infrared spectroscopy for its spatial resolution and invulnerability to motion artifacts, adult–infant fNIRS may play a major role in this field. However, there remains a problem in analyzing hyperscanning data between adult (...) and young populations. Namely, there are intrinsic differences in hemodynamic time latencies depending on age, and the peak latency of the hemodynamic response function is longer in younger populations. Despite this fact, the effects of such differences on quantified synchrony have not yet been examined. Consequently, the present study investigated the influence of intrinsic hemodynamic differences on wavelet coherence for assessing brain synchrony, and further examined the statistical removal of these effects through simulation experiments. First, we assumed a social signal model, where one counterpart of the dyad sends a social signal to the other, which eventually results in simultaneous brain activation. Based on this model, simulated fNIRS activation sequences were synthesized by convolving boxcar event sequences with HRFs. We set two conditions for the event: synchronized and asynchronized event conditions. We also modeled the HRFs of adults and infants by referring to previous studies. After preprocessing with additional statistical processing, we calculated the wavelet coherence for each synthesized fNIRS activation sequence pair. The simulation results showed that the wavelet coherence in the synchronized event condition was attenuated for the combination of different HRFs. We also confirmed that prewhitening via an autoregressive filter could recover the attenuation of wavelet coherence in the 0.03–0.1 Hz frequency band, which was regarded as being associated with synchronous neural activity. Our results showed that variability in hemodynamics affected the analysis of inter-brain synchrony, and that the application of prewhitening is critical for such evaluations between adult and young populations. (shrink)

According to comparativist theories of quantities, their intrinsic values are not fundamental. Instead, all the quantity facts are grounded in scale-independent relations like "twice as massive as" or "more massive than." I show that this sort of scale independence is best understood as a sort of metaphysical symmetry--a principle about which transformations of the non-fundamental ontology leave the fundamental ontology unchanged. Determinism--a core scientific concept easily formulated in absolutist terms--is more difficult for the comparativist to define. After settling on (...) the most plausible comparativist understanding of determinism, I offer some examples of physical systems that the comparativist must count as indeterministic although the relevant physical theory gives deterministic predictions. Several morals are drawn. In particular: comparativism is metaphysically contingent if true, and it is most natural for a comparativist to accept an at-at theory of motion. (shrink)

Contemporary Complex Cinema. Complex conditions: the resurgence of narrative complexity ; Complex cinema as brain-candy for the empowered viewer ; Narrative taxonomies: simple, complex, puzzle plots -- Cognitive Approach to Contemporary Complex Cinema. Why an (embodied-)cognitive approach? ; Various forms of complexity and their effects on sense making ; Problematizing narrative linearity ; Complicating narrative structures and ontologies ; Under-stimulation and cognitive overload ; Contradictions and unreliabilities ; A cognitive approach to classifying complexity ; Deceptive unreliability and the twist film (...) ; Disorienting but solvable puzzle films ; Impossible puzzle films -- Narrative Complexity and Dissonant Cognitions. The concept of cognitive dissonance ; Cognitions in dissonance: from social psychology to narrative engagement ; Types of dissonance in narrative comprehension ; Narrative incongruities ; Narrative impossibilities ; Cognitive access to impossible storyworlds: immersed and reflected operations ; 'Impossibilities' and embodied cognition ; Disrupting viewers' reliance on image schemas by perceptual impossibility ; Disrupting viewers' reliance on image schemas by formal impossibility -- Taming Dissonance: Cognitive Operations and Interpretive Strategies. Cognitive dissonance versus narrative coherence ; Reducing dissonance: interpretation and naturalization ; Foregrounding ; Narrating agency and authorship ; Artefact emotions and metareflexive appreciation ; Interpretation as dissonance reduction ; Coping with dissonance: frame-switches and poetic and aesthetic readings ; Frame-switching as hermeneutic play in impossible puzzle films ; Switching between narrative and symbolical readings: Enemy and Mulholland Drive ; Cognitive hesitation and the fantastic -- Impossible Puzzle Films: Between Art-Cinema and (Post-) Classical Narration. From art-cinema to puzzle films ; Art-cinema as a narrative mode ; Dissonance in modernist art-cinema ; Art-cinema as a cognitive reception frame ; Narrative complexity and meaning-making in art-cinema ; Impossible puzzle films and (post-)classical narration ; High degree of tellability ; Identification with goal-oriented characters ; Strong reliance on classical genre elements ; Adherence to classical narrative cohesion devices ; Inclusion of quasi-rational frames of naturalization -- Wallowing in Dissonance: The Attractiveness of Impossible Puzzles. Hermeneutic play and interpretive multiplicity ; Orientation, navigation, mapping ; Game logic and the fascination in failure ; Effort justification ; Diegetization of decoupling ; Fascination in infinity ; Destabilized ontological certainty ; Eudaimonic motivations and intrinsic needs. (shrink)

It will be shown in this article that an ontological approach for some problems related to the interpretation of Quantum Mechanics could emerge from a re-evaluation of the main paradox of early Greek thought: the paradox of Being and non-Being, and the solutions presented to it by Plato and Aristotle. More well known are the derivative paradoxes of Zeno: the paradox of motion and the paradox of the One and the Many. They stem from what was perceived by classical (...) philosophy to be the fundamental enigma for thinking about the world: the seemingly contradictory results that followed from the co-incidence of being and non-being in the world of change and motion as we experience it, and the experience of absolute existence here and now. The most clear expression of both stances can be found, again following classical thought, in the thinking of Heraclitus of Ephesus and Parmenides of Elea. The problem put forward by these paradoxes reduces for both Plato and Aristotle to the possibility of the existence of stable objects as a necessary condition for knowledge. Hence the primarily ontological nature of the solutions they proposed: Plato's Theory of Forms and Aristotle's metaphysics and logic. Plato's and Aristotle's systems are argued here to do on the ontological level essentially the same: to introduce stability in the world by introducing the notion of a separable, stable object, for which a principle of contradiction is valid: an object cannot be and not-be at the same place at the same time. So it becomes possible to forbid contradiction on an epistemological level, and thus to guarantee the certainty of knowledge that seemed to be threatened before. After leaving Aristotelian metaphysics, early modern science had to cope with these problems: it did so by introducing "space" as the seat of stability, and "time" as the theater of motion. But the ontological structure present in this solution remained the same. Therefore the fundamental notion `separable system', related to the notions observation and measurement, themselves related to the modern concepts of space and time, appears to be intrinsically problematic, because it is inextricably connected to classical logic on the ontological level. We see therefore the problems dealt with by quantum logic not as merely formal, and the problem of `non-locality' as related to it, indicating the need to re-think the notions `system', `entity', as well as the implications of the operation `measurement', which is seen here as an application of classical logic on the material world. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to give a brief survey the implications of the theories of modern physics for the doctrine of determinism. The survey will reveal a curious feature of determinism: in some respects it is fragile, requiring a number of enabling assumptions to give it a fighting chance; but in other respects it is quite robust and very difficult to kill. The survey will also aim to show that, apart from its own intrinsic interest, determinism is (...) an excellent device for probing the foundations of classical, relativistic, and quantum physics. The survey is conducted under three major presuppositions. First, I take a realistic attitude towards scientific theories in that I assume that to give an interpretation of a theory is, at a minimum, to specify what the world would have to be like in order for the theory to be true. But we will see that the demand for a deterministic interpretation of a theory can force us to abandon a naively realistic reading of the theory. Second, I reject the “no laws” view of science and assume that the field equations or laws of motion of the most fundamental theories of current physics represent science’s best guesses as to the form of the basic laws of nature. Third, I take determinism to be an ontological doctrine, a doctrine about the temporal evolution of the world. This ontological doctrine must not be confused with predictability, which is an epistemological doctrine, the failure of which need not entail a failure of determinism. From time to time I will comment on ways in which predictability can fail in a deterministic setting. Finally, my survey will concentrate on the Laplacian variety of determinism according to which the instantaneous state of the world at any time uniquely determines the state at any other time. The plan of the survey is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the fragility of determinism by means of a Zeno type example. Then sections 3 and 4 survey successively the fortunes of determinism in the Newtonian and the special relativistic settings.. (shrink)

In an accompanying paper Gomes, we have put forward an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on a non-relativistic, Lagrangian 3+1 formalism of a closed Universe M, existing on timeless configuration space \ of some field over M. However, not much was said there about the role of locality, which was not assumed. This paper is an attempt to fill that gap. Locality in full can only emerge dynamically, and is not postulated. This new understanding of locality is based solely on (...) the properties of extremal paths in configuration space. I do not demand locality from the start, as it is usually done, but showed conditions under which certain systems exhibit it spontaneously. In this way we recover semi-classical local behavior when regions dynamically decouple from each other, a notion more appropriate for extension into quantum mechanics. The dynamics of a sub-region O within the closed manifold M is independent of its complement, \, if the projection of extremal curves on \ onto the space of extremal curves intrinsic to O is a surjective map. This roughly corresponds to \, where \ is a linear projection. This criterion for locality can be made approximate—an impossible feat had it been already postulated—and it can be applied for theories which do not have hyperbolic equations of motion, and/or no fixed causal structure. When two regions are mutually independent according to the criterion proposed here, the semi-classical path integral kernel factorizes, showing cluster decomposition which is the ultimate aim of a definition of locality. (shrink)

Current views of the control of complex, purposeful movements acknowledge that organizational processes must reconcile multiple concerns. The central priority is of course accomplishing the actor's goal. But in specifying the manner in which this occurs, the action plan must accommodate such factors as the interaction of mechanical forces associated with the motion of a multilinked system (classical mechanics) and, in many cases, intrinsic bias toward preferred movement patterns, characterized by so-called “coordination dynamics.” The most familiar example of (...) the latter is the symmetry constraint, where spatial trajectories and/or temporal landmarks (e.g., reversal points) of concurrentlymoving body segments (limbs, digits, etc.) exhibit mutual attraction. The natural coordination tendencies that emerge through these constraints can facilitate or hinder motor control, depending on the degree of congruency with the desired movement pattern. Motor control theorists have long recognized the role of classical mechanics in theories of movement organization, but an appreciation of the importance of intrinsic interlimb bias has been gained only recently.Although detailed descriptions of temporal coordination dynamics have been provided, systematic attempts to identify additional salient dimensions of interlimb constraint have been lacking. We develop and implement here a novel method for examining this problem by exploiting two robust principles of psychomotor behavior, the symmetry constraint and the Two-Thirds Power Law. Empirical evidence is provided that the relative spatial patterns of concurrently moving limbs are naturally constrained in much the same manner as previously identified temporal constraints and, further, that apparent velocity interference is an indirect, secondary consequence of primary spatial assimilation. The theoretical implications of spatial interference are elaborated with respect to movement organization and motor learning. The need to carefully consider the appropriate dimensions with which to characterize coordination dynamics is also discussed. (shrink)

Hobbes redefines his conception of liberty in the Leviathan as the absence of external impediments to motion. Power, on the other hand, refers to the body’s intrinsic dimension, that is, to the faculties possessed by each individual. There thus appears to be a clear distinction between liberty and power in Hobbes’ political philosophy. Taking into consideration Hobbes’ Latin works, however, in which he uses two different terms to refer to power: at times potestas and others potentia, such a (...) distinction may need to be revisited. As we will argue, there is a marked relation between liberty and power when considering human sociability. In this way, the aim of the article is to discuss Hobbes’ conception of power, through the pages of the Leviathan and De Homine, trying to clarify its complex, even ambiguous relation with his conception of liberty. (shrink)

According to Whitehead, nature is disclosed to mind by an ensemble of events characterized by unobservable hidden intrinsic factors (e.g., mass, gravitation) and observable extrinsic factors (e.g., motion, density). Mass is not the substratum of dynamics. It implies spatial extension and temporal duration, which are both necessary conditions of observable natural phenomena. Therefore, an instant, deprived of duration, is immeasurable. Whitehead’s claims on mass, space, and time corroborate Verlinde’s alternative conception of quantum gravitation. Within the de Sitter space-time, (...) this conception starts from the competition of the short distance degrees of freedom of the Ryn-Takanayagi tensor with long-distance thermalized excitations. This enables the creation of a baryonic mass and a decrease in de Sitter entropy. The memory effect of the original baryon creation leads to gravitation and the production of extensive thermodynamic entropy. However, the baryon production shrinks, and the dissipating space-time transforms into a space-timeless cold sink with an accompanying strong contracting memory effect. This is equivalent to the alternate motion of a giant Carnot engine, where the heat source and sink energy exchange produce the eternal periodic dynamics of the Universe. This suggests that the Universe did not start from Big Bang but oscillated eternally as a Big Bounce Universe. (shrink)

Graham Priest has argued that changes occur at a moment of change in which objects are in a contradictory state, being in both the state changed from and the state changed to. In “Moments of Change,” the current author rejected this model on the grounds that every change would require an infinite number of other changes, and that for similar regress problems, the model is not compatible with the Leibniz Continuity Condition that Priest appeals to in the model’s support. In (...) “Contradiction and the Instant of Change Revisited,” Priest rightly points out in response that any regress can be stopped by allowing that some changes can occur without a moment of change and that there are some exceptions to the lcc in the case of change. It is argued here that while the regress can be stopped by allowing for exceptions to the rules, the more exceptions that must be allowed and the more similar the excepted cases are to cases of supposed contradiction, the less attractive both the contradictory account of change and the lcc should be. Secondly, it is argued that the intuitions that make the contradictory account of change seem appealing are likely to disappear if we adopt an eternalist model of spacetime, which we should do in any case in order to best accommodate the special theory of relativity. In particular, eternalism undermines our intuitions that there must be a moment of change in order for change to occur, that contradictory moments are required to allow for a Laplacian universe, that motion must be intrinsic to an object at a time, and that change obeys the lcc. (shrink)

In De Caelo III 2, Aristotle observes that each element is determined by an intrinsic principle to move to its proper place: earth downward, fire upward, and water and air to their respective places in the middle. However, how are we to determine the cause of elemental motion? Aristotle admits that this ranks among the most difficult problems (μάλιστα δ’ ἀπορεῖται) as it is directly related to the argument of Physics VIII 4, which defends the view that whatever (...) is in motion is moved by something. The question of how the elements move is not resolved until we are presented with his definition of inclination (ῥοπή) in De Caelo IV 1. Inclination is the nature of each element to move to its proper place. Aristotle concludes that the principle of inclination is a cause of motion continuously orienting the elements toward their proper places by activating that which is potentially heavy or potentially light. In what follows, I shall demonstrate the internal coherence of Aristotle’s natural philosophy by deploying inclination as a principle of motion and rest to define the nature of each element. This account of inclination as a principle of motion is consistent with Aristotle’s definition of nature in Physics II 1. As an active principle of motion, inclination is identified with the activity (ἐνέργεια) of the element enacting and maintaining its own end (ἐντελέχεια) by being at rest in its proper place. As a passive principle of motion, inclination is identified with the passivity of the element to be moved to its proper place by another element insofar as the respective element undergoes generation or substantial change. (shrink)

Mach repudiated Newton's argument for absolute time. He denied there is such a thing as time itself that exists independently of any external change. In doing so, Mach failed to appreciate Newton's scientific practice. Absolute time is intrinsically related to Newton's laws of motion and the method of fluxions. Commentators have noted similarities between Mach's rejection of Newtonian time and his rejection of the independent existence of atoms. In this article, it shall be argued that the juxtaposition of absolute (...) time and the atomic theory is unsound. Mach had good reasons to question the existence of substantial time, and he went on to provide an alternative, ontologically relational account. Whereas his dismissal of atoms can be seen as a questionable form of “phenomenalism” or “positivism,” this is not the case regarding his position on time. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that the mainstream ‘Standard Story’ of action – according to which actions are bodily motions with the right internal mental states as their causal triggers (e.g., ‘belief-desire-pairs’, ‘intentions’) – gives rise to a deeply problematic conception of inter-subjective action-understanding. For the Standard Story, since motivating reasons are internal mental states and bodily motions are not intrinsically intentional, an observer must ascribe internal states to others to make rational sense of their outwardly observable bodily motions. I (...) argue this is both phenomenologically distorted and requires, on pain of infinite regress, a deeper, non-inferential, practical-perceptual form of understanding: ‘knowledge-how’, in a broadly Rylean sense. Recognizing the irreducible role of practical-perceptual knowledge-how in inter-subjective understanding, I argue, undermines core assumptions of the Standard Story concerning what an agent can directly perceive in interacting with others, and how our everyday practices of explaining actions with reasons function – and this opens the space for a radically opposed alternative view of inter-subjective action understanding. (shrink)

The processes underlying motor decision-making have recently caught considerable amount of scientific attention, focusing on the integration of empirical evidence from sensorimotor control research with psychological theories and computational models on decision-making. Empirical studies on motor decision-making suggest that the kinematics of goal-directed reaching movements are sensitive to the level of target uncertainty during movement planning. However, the source of uncertainty as a relevant factor influencing the process of motor decision-making has not been sufficiently considered, yet. In this study, we (...) test the assumption that the source of target uncertainty has an effect on motor decision-making, which can be proven by analyzing movement variability during the time course of movement execution. Ten healthy young adults performed three blocks with 66 trials of goal-directed reaching movements in each block, across which the source and level of reach target uncertainty at movement onset were manipulated (“no uncertainty”, “extrinsic uncertainty”, “intrinsic uncertainty”). Fingertip position of the right index finger was recorded using an optical motion tracking system. Standard kinematic measures (i.e. path length and movement duration) as well as variability of fingertip position across the time course of movement execution and at movement end were analyzed. In line with previous studies, we found that a high level of extrinsic target uncertainty leads to increased overall movement duration, which could be attributed to increased path length in this condition, as compared to intrinsic and no target uncertainty (all p <.001). Movement duration and path length did not show any differences between the latter two conditions. However, the time course analysis of movement variability revealed significant differences between these two conditions, with increased variability of fingertip position in the presence of intrinsic target uncertainty (Condition × Sampling point: p =.01), though considerably less than under high extrinsic target uncertainty (p ≤.001). These findings suggest that both the level and source of uncertainty have a significant effect on the processing of potential action plans during motor decision-making, which can be revealed through the analysis of the time course of movement variability at the end-effector level. (shrink)

Quantum cellular automata and quantum walks provide a framework for the foundations of quantum field theory, since the equations of motion of free relativistic quantum fields can be derived as the small wave-vector limit of quantum automata and walks starting from very general principles. The intrinsic discreteness of this framework is reconciled with the continuous Lorentz symmetry by reformulating the notion of inertial reference frame in terms of the constants of motion of the quantum walk dynamics. In (...) particular, among the symmetries of the quantum walk which recovers the Weyl equation—the so called Weyl walk—one finds a non linear realisation of the Poincaré group, which recovers the usual linear representation in the small wave-vector limit. In this paper we characterise the full symmetry group of the Weyl walk which is shown to be a non linear realization of a group which is the semidirect product of the Poincaré group and the group of dilations. (shrink)

Key representatives of the dialectical tradition, Hegel and Adorno conceived philosophy as a critical tool, directed both at the naive realism of ordinary reason and the more sophisticated realism of modern scientific discourse. For the two authors, philosophy’s main task is to question received ideas and practices and to expose their underlying contradictions, thereby enabling meaningful forms of cultural and political change. But while for Hegel this procedure takes the form of a systematic enquiry, leading from a spurious to a (...) true account of reality, Adorno rejects the idea that reason and reality can be reconciled. On the one hand, he praises Hegel for having developed a truly dialectical form of criticism, set into motion by the immanent unfolding of reality’s intrinsic contradictions. On the other hand, he views Hegel’s emphasis on systematic integration as a form of dogmatism, which must itself be criticized. Instead of a ‘positive’ or ‘closed’ dialectic, fuelled by the expectation of a final overarching synthesis, Adorno calls for a ‘negative’ or ‘open’ dialectic, radically averse to all forms of unification. In doing so, however, he is led to question the very limits of conceptual reason, leaving criticism vulnerable to new forms of attack. (shrink)

The Pauli exclusion principle is interpreted using a geometrical theory of electrons. Spin and spatial motion are described together in an eight dimensional spinor coordinate space. The field equation derives from the assumption of conformal waves. The Dirac wave function is a gradient of the scalar wave in spinor space. Electromagnetic and gravitational interactions are mediated by conformal transformations. An electron may be followed through a sequence of creation and annihilation processes. Two electrons are branches of a single particle. (...) Each satisfies a Dirac equation, but together they are a solution of the curvature condition. As two so identified electrons approach each other, the exclusion principle develops from the boundary conditions in spinor space. The gradient motion does not allow the particles to overlap. Since the spinor-gradient of the scalar wave function is odd in the coordinates, the sign of the wave function must change at the electron-electron boundary. The exclusion principle becomes geometry intrinsic and all electrons are combined into one field. Further applications are proposed including the possibility of improved numerical calculations in atomic and molecular systems. There also may be extensions to nuclear or particle physics. Implications are expected for the properties of rotating objects in a gravitational field. (shrink)

Current views of the control of complex, purposeful movements acknowledge that organizational processes must reconcile multiple concerns. The central priority is of course accomplishing the actor's goal. But in specifying the manner in which this occurs, the action plan must accommodate such factors as the interaction of mechanical forces associated with the motion of a multilinked system (classical mechanics) and, in many cases, intrinsic bias toward preferred movement patterns, characterized by so‐called “coordination dynamics.” The most familiar example of (...) the latter is the symmetry constraint, where spatial trajectories and/or temporal landmarks (e.g., reversal points) of concurrentlymoving body segments (limbs, digits, etc.) exhibit mutual attraction. The natural coordination tendencies that emerge through these constraints can facilitate or hinder motor control, depending on the degree of congruency with the desired movement pattern. Motor control theorists have long recognized the role of classical mechanics in theories of movement organization, but an appreciation of the importance of intrinsic interlimb bias has been gained only recently.Although detailed descriptions of temporal coordination dynamics have been provided, systematic attempts to identify additional salient dimensions of interlimb constraint have been lacking. We develop and implement here a novel method for examining this problem by exploiting two robust principles of psychomotor behavior, the symmetry constraint and the Two‐Thirds Power Law. Empirical evidence is provided that the relative spatial patterns of concurrently moving limbs are naturally constrained in much the same manner as previously identified temporal constraints and, further, that apparent velocity interference is an indirect, secondary consequence of primary spatial assimilation. The theoretical implications of spatial interference are elaborated with respect to movement organization and motor learning. The need to carefully consider the appropriate dimensions with which to characterize coordination dynamics is also discussed. (shrink)

Suárez's discussion of time in the Metaphysical Disputations is one of the earliest long treatises on time (extending over sixty pages), and includes detailed arguments supporting the view that physical actions take place within an absolute temporal reference frame. Whereas some previous thinkers, such as John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureole, had made tantalising suggestions that time exists independently of physical changes, their ideas were primarily negative theses in response to perceived problems with the dominant view that time was caused (...) by the celestial motion. Suárez, in contrast, provides a positive thesis based on his revision of traditional, Scholastic metaphysics. He argues that the ordering of earlier and later events can only be understood by conceiving events as existing within the embrace of a ?flowing and successive space? which he refers to as ?entirely necessary and immutable in its own flux? (omnino necessarium et immutabile in suo fluxu) - something at least very like an absolute temporal reference frame. Yet it would be simplistic to describe Suárez's work on time only in terms of its nascent absolutism, since for him there is a second kind of time, a more properly ?real? time, which is an accident of material being. This kind of time is ontologically tied to the most intimate existence of objects, creating a plurality of individual continua of time - one for each distinct being. He calls this kind of time ?intrinsic time? (tempus intrinsecum). Suárez's dualistic account of time, in which he proposes an ?intrinsic time?, linked to being, which exists within a second order absolute temporal reference frame, or ?imaginary succession?, forms a bridge between scholasticism and early modern philosophy providing a foundation for the work of later absolutists like Gassendi and Newton. (shrink)

Super-Humeanism is an even more parsimonious ontology than Lewisian standard Humean metaphysics in that it rejects intrinsic properties. There are point objects, but all there is to them are their relative positions and the change of them. Everything else supervenes on the Humean mosaic thus conceived. Hence, dynamical parameters come in on a par with the laws through their position in the best system. The paper sets out how Super-Humeanism has the conceptual means to reject van Inwagen’s consequence argument (...) not by taking the laws to depend on us, but by taking the initial values of the dynamical parameters that enter into the laws to be dependent on the motions that actually occur in the universe, including the motions of human bodies. The paper spells out the advantages of this proposal. (shrink)

The use of virtual humans holds the potential for interactive, automated interaction in domains such as remote communication, customer service, or public announcements. For signed language users, signing avatars could potentially provide accessible content by sharing information in the signer's preferred or native language. As the development of signing avatars has gained traction in recent years, researchers have come up with many different methods of creating signing avatars. The resulting avatars vary widely in their appearance, the naturalness of their movements, (...) and facial expressions—all of which may potentially impact users' acceptance of the avatars. We designed a study to test the effects of these intrinsic properties of different signing avatars while also examining the extent to which people's own language experiences change their responses to signing avatars. We created video stimuli showing individual signs produced by a live human signer, an avatar made using computer-synthesized animation, and an avatar made using high-fidelity motion capture. We surveyed 191 American Sign Language users, including Deaf, Hard-of-Hearing, and Hearing groups. Participants rated the three signers on multiple dimensions, which were then combined to form ratings of Attitudes, Impressions, Comprehension, and Naturalness. Analyses demonstrated that the Mocap avatar was rated significantly more positively than the CS avatar on all primary variables. Correlations revealed that signers who acquire sign language later in life are more accepting of and likely to have positive impressions of signing avatars. Finally, those who learned ASL earlier were more likely to give lower, more negative ratings to the CS avatar, but we did not see this association for the Mocap avatar or the Human signer. Together, these findings suggest that movement quality and appearance significantly impact users' ratings of signing avatars and show that signed language users with earlier age of ASL acquisition are the most sensitive to movement quality issues seen in computer-generated avatars. We suggest that future efforts to develop signing avatars consider retaining the fluid movement qualities integral to signed languages. (shrink)

The role of intensity in Aristotelian philosophy is obscure. The problem has historically been approached through his logic and categorical sense of motion. Scholars have largely failed to consider the role of intensity in psychology and ethics, the consideration of which greatly clarifies the situation. To this end, I identify three types of intensity present in the corpus Aristotelicum: comparative, modal, inceptive. I show that the intensity of physical contraries is primary in nature but is different from those found (...) in organic processes. I then show that the intensifications found in life, produced by the soul, are of paramount importance to Aristotle’s philosophy. Inceptive intensity is the backbone of psychical activities: concoction, sensation, pleasure, perception, effort, attention, and self-awareness. I outline two essential characteristics of these intensifications: (1) they imply an intransitive causality that is intrinsic to the entity’s nature or form; (2) that they involve an interaction of many parts which mutually amplify each other so that the whole is beyond (irreducible to) the totality of the parts. I end by comparing Aristotle’s views on intensity to contemporary ideas of emergence: feedback, holism, intentionality, and supervenience. (shrink)

Avicenna's theory of final causality stands out as one of the most profound and original achievements of Islamic philosophy. Writing mainly in Arabic in various cities of Persia from the end of the 4th/10th to the beginning of the 5th/11th centuries AH/AD, Avicenna extended the range of Aristotelian teleology to encompass not only motion but also existence; he did so by dividing the final cause into an extrinsic, kinetic end , and an intrinsic, static perfection . ;My dissertation (...) is organized to test Avicenna's hypothesis that the final cause thus extended was applicable to every subject of every science. I begin by examining how the final cause behaves in the relations between logical entities--terms, premises, definitions, quiddities--and then argue that Avicenna saw the final cause as a bridge between that world of logical entities and the sensible world, whose own relations logic is supposed to systematize. I go on to explain how Avicenna used the twin aspects of Aristotle's notion of nature--one an extrinsic agent keeping the world of natural things in order, the other an intrinsic form serving as the natural thing's source of motion--as a basis for his division of final causes into ends and perfections; I also examine how this division helped Avicenna attempt a reconciliation of chance and natural necessity. I then assess how Avicenna's medical experience--specifically his close observation of the complex teleological processes that cause an organism to exist and function--provided empirical support for his distinction between ends and perfections. Finally I argue that Avicenna viewed the relation between final and efficient causes as one of reciprocal necessitation, based on the premise that each was both cause and effect of the other; here Aristotle's notions of limit and actuality provide some of the metaphysical background to Avicenna's teleology. ;Previous studies of Avicenna's theory of causality have focused almost entirely on the efficient cause; my intention here is to prove that an understanding of Avicenna's teleology should be a prerequisite to any future such study. (shrink)

Our perception of where touch occurs on our skin shapes our interactions with the world. Most accounts of cutaneous localisation emphasise spatial transformations from a skin-based reference frame into body-centred and external egocentric coordinates. We investigated another possible method of tactile localisation based on an intrinsic perception of ‘skin space’. The arrangement of cutaneous receptive fields (RFs) could allow one to track a stimulus as it moves across the skin, similarly to the way animals navigate using path integration. We (...) applied curved tactile motions to the hands of human volunteers. Participants identified the location midway between the start and end points of each motion path. Their bisection judgements were systematically biased towards the integrated motion path, consistent with the characteristic inward error that occurs in navigation by path integration. We thus showed that integration of continuous sensory inputs across several tactile RFs provides an intrinsic mechanism for spatial perception. (shrink)

This article discusses Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām’s (d. 231/845) (one of the first Muʽtazilī thinkers); understanding of Allah-world relationship, his theory of nature (tab‘) and his view on miracles. In a proposal form, Muʽtazilī scholars accept that the miracle, which is the actual confirmation, must occur, since it is not possible for Allah to confirm His messenger (prophet) in a way that everyone can hear and in a direct word. Since the Prophet's message can be authenticated only by a miracle, Muʽtazilī (...) thinkers paid great attention to this issue, organized and formed natural theories about the universe in a way that miracles can occur. Naẓẓām explains a kind of miracle that occurs under the power of Allah, by his theory of nature called latency and occurrence (kumūn-ẓuhūr). His view of miracles is rooted in the Muʽtazilī classification of miracles. Naẓẓām argues that in the theory of nature, things are infinitely divided. He also argues that all qualities considered accident (aʽrāḍ) by other Muslim theologians are different objects as only motion and rest are the only accidents. According to him, the universe consists of objects and accidents of motion only. In each object in the universe, an unlimited number of opposing objects (sub-components) that have different effects on each other is located in the same space. Those objects in the same space are intervened (tadākhul) with each other. Kumūn refers to sub-components that are located inside the object in a state of passing into each other, and a state of balancing each other through the push-pull motion (i‘timād). Ẓuhūr is an outward movement of the sub-component from where it is located when an impact imposed outside the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in it. Naẓẓām says that too many opposing sub-components, such as heaviness-lightness, heat-coldness contained in the object, form an internal dynamic by providing balancing each other through inside the object with the push-pull motion. The state of balance inside the object is disrupted by an external factor affecting one of the sub-components. An external thing approaching the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in the object. Then, the affected sub-component moves out of the object and thus the state of balance inside the object is disrupted. According to the theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, change in objects occurs when the balance within the object is disturbed. The change in the balance also occurs not by the direct intervention of Allah and the creation of accidents, but by the disruption in the balance of natures within the object. Naẓẓām, who advocates the intrinsic natures in things, has been criticized for not leaving any room for Allah’s influence on objects at least through miracles. This criticism is not correct. Naẓẓām says that the nature of objects depends on God, and it is possible for God to intervene in them at any time. According to him, Allah can force opposing objects into a union that is not in their natures. In their natures, unification can separate those by applying pull and push. In this way, Naẓẓām sees the intervention of Allah as possible in the occurrence of a situation that is the opposite of what is present in the nature of objects. In Naẓẓām's theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, there are suppressed natures and sub-components that are in a weak state inside the actual object. Furthermore, they cannot go out in any way from the actual object. One of these suppressed natures found in the object is removed from the nature of the object by the intervention of Allah when a miracle occurs in the hands of theProphet. In this case, the miracle is not something new that Allah has created, but that Allah has disclosed a hidden sub-component that is hidden in that thing that has never appeared before. Naẓẓām’s view of miracle is something occurring under the power of the created, which Muʽtazilī scholars accept in the classification of miracles in relation to, the theory of sarfa. He suggests that the Qur'an, which he accepts under the power of the created, would not be a miracle, if the Arabs could dispute it. However, according to him, the Qur'an is a miracle because Allah prevents them from the dispute. In his understanding of sarfa, the miracles occur directly as an act of God’s divine intervention with human beings. This study investigates Naẓẓām’s view of miracles along with his theory of nature and his understanding of sarfa. (shrink)

In 1837 the German-born astronomer F. G. W. Struve published his famous catalogue of double stars. For Struve this was the culmination of 12 years' detailed observation of a class of celestial objects lying exclusively beyond the solar system; for historians of astronomy it poses the problem of explaining why the study of double stars became a significant part of astronomical endeavour, as it did, during the 1820s and 1830s. For, although Struve's interest was extreme, it was shared to a (...) lesser extent by several eminent contemporaries, including John Herschel, Friedrich Bessel, Johann Encke, James South and Félix Savary. Their combined efforts represented an important transition in astronomy: for the first time one of the emphases of the subject moved beyond the solar system to the so-called fixed stars. The question of the emergence of interest in double stars is of historical significance, therefore, as it is related to the problem of the origins of ‘stellar astronomy’. This essay is thus intended to offer an explanation of astronomers' interest in double stars, and to tackle the related question of whether this transition constituted a major break in the history of astronomy. Furthermore it is proposed that answers to these problems may be found by considering the practice of astronomy dominant during the first half of the nineteenth century. Astronomers in this period were overwhelmingly concerned with a refined form of positional astronomy. The problems they chose to solve were by and large related to the difficulties of the accurate reduction of observational data, and the compilation of reliable tables and star charts, which were then used as a background against which the motions of solar system objects were plotted. By assessing individuals' studies of double stars within this context it can be seen firstly that such studies were no more or less than specific examples of a general case, and secondly that the stars themselves were not usually of intrinsic interest. In general it was the positions of the stars on the. (shrink)

In addition to his famous Chinese Room argument, John Searle has posed a more radical problem for views on which minds can be understood as programs. Even his wall, he claims, implements the WordStar program according to the standard definition of implementation because there is some ‘‘pattern of molecule movements’’ that is isomorphic to the formal structure of WordStar. Program implementation, Searle charges, is merely observer-relative and thus not an intrinsic feature of the world. I argue, first, that analogous (...) charges involving other concepts (motion and meaning) lead to consequences no one accepts. Second, I show that Searle’s treatment of computation is incoherent, yielding the consequence that nothing computes anything: even our standard personal computers fail to run any programs on this account. I propose an alternative account, one that accords with the way engineers, programmers, and cognitive scientists use the concept of computation in their empirical work. This alternative interpretation provides the basis of a philosophical analysis of program implementation, one that may yet be suitable for a computational theory of the mind. (shrink)

An information-theoretic approach is shown to derive both the classical weak-field equations and the quantum phenomenon of metric fluctuation within the Planck length. A key result is that the weak-field metric $\bar h_{\mu \nu } $ is proportional to a probability amplitude φuv, on quantum fluctuations in four-position. Also derived is the correct form for the Planck quantum length, and the prediction that the cosmological constant is zero. The overall approach utilizes the concept of the Fisher information I acquired in (...) a measurement of the weak-field metric. An associated physical information K is defined as K=I−J, where J is the information that is intrinsic to the physics (stress-energy tensor Tμv) of the measurement scenario. A posited conservation of information change δI=ΔJ implies a variational principle δK=0. The solution is the weak-field equations in the metric $\bar h_{\mu \nu } $ and associated equations in the probability amplitudes φuv. The gauge condition φ v uv =0 (Lorentz condition) and conservation of energy and momentum Tv μv=0 are used. A well-known “bootstrapping” argument allows the weak-field assumption to be lifted, resulting in the usual Einstein field equations. A special solution of these is well known to be the geodesic equations of motion of a particle. Thus, the information approach derives the classical field equations and equations of motion, as well as the quantum nature of the probability amplitudes φuv. (shrink)