In the following essay, I attempt to reactualize some of Kant’s most fundamental conceptions of a state’s sovereignty and the legitimacy of the cosmopolitan order. To this end, I provide what appears as a viable solution to Kant’s “sovereignty dilemma”; that is, the reconciliation between state sovereignty and the international enforceability of laws. I consider that a key component of the overall Kantian cosmopolitan project is the role played by the transcendental notion of an “originally united will” (...) in its validation of constituencies. I emphasize the view that for Kant state-citizens are also, as he says, “citizens of the world” or “citizens of the earth”. I argue, furthermore, that a state’s sovereignty must comply with a number of different constitutional wholes. I then proceed by confronting the Kantian notion of a general united will with the Habermasian conception of “double sovereignty.” I conclude by suggesting a fusion/synthesis between the two views, one which would require endorsing the idea of cosmopolitan constitutionalism as a meta-framework for interpreting the legitimacy of member states’ compliance with policy indications of transnational constituencies. (shrink)

Habermas’ theory of popular sovereignty has received comparatively little sustained critical attention in the Anglo-American literature since initial responses to Between Facts and Norms. In light of subsequent work on group agency, this paper argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty—in its denial of the normative force of collective citizen action—is best understood as a renunciation of the doctrine. The paper is structured in three sections. Section 1 examines Habermas’ treatment of popular sovereignty prior to Between Facts (...) and Norms as both (i) a principle of constitutional legitimacy or normative justification for the modern Rechtsstaat and (ii) a concept of legitimation for the rule of the ascendant liberal bourgeoisie. Section 2 then argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty in Between Facts and Norms, by discounting the role of collective citizen agency in the justification of the modern constitutional state, empties the doctrine of its core normative content. The final section briefly elaborates on this claim by reference to Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. (shrink)

We live in a time of turbulent change when many of the frameworks that have characterized our societies over the last few centuries – such as the international order of sovereign nation-states – are being called into question. In this new volume of essays and interviews, Habermas focuses his attention on these processes of change and provides some of the resources needed to understand them. What kind of international order should we seek to create in our contemporary global age? How (...) should we understand the political project of Europe and how can the democratic deficit of the EU be overcome? How should we understand the relation between democracy as popular sovereignty, which has become the defining principle of political legitimacy in the modern world, and the idea of basic human rights embodied in the rule of law? Habermas brings his formidable powers of analysis and his distinctive theoretical perspective to bear on these and other key questions of the modern age. His analysis is shaped throughout by his commitment to informed public debate and his powerful advocacy of a postnational renewal of the project of constitutional democracy. _Time of Transitions_ will be essential reading for all students and scholars of sociology and politics, and it will be of interest to anyone concerned with the key social and political questions of our time. (shrink)

The “global success” of nation states is currently brought into play by the new requirements of multicultural differentiation and globalization. After commenting on the common concepts of “state” and “nation” and discussing the formation of nation states, the author explains the particular achievement of the national state and the tension between republicanism and nationalism built into it. The challenges that arise from the multicultural differentiation of civil society and from trends towards globalization throw light on the limitations of this historical (...) type. (shrink)

Habermas s’en prend ici à la thèse conservatrice de la continuité de la «nation» allemande par une critique du concept même d’État-nation. Contribuant au débat des historiens, il expose les limites de l’État-nation dans le contexte de la globalisation. En effet, l’importance de 1989 repose sur l’idée de restauration de la nation allemande telle qu’elle se présentait à partir de l’empire guillaumien. Or,l’État national ne serait plus à la hauteur du défi qu’impose la globalisation des interactions sociales, politiques, culturelles et (...) systémiques. Il lui faut, de l’avis de Habermas, se départir d’un reliquat d’ethnicité et de nationalisme pour épouser pleinement la dimension républicaine qui, elle, n’admet que le processus démocratique de délibération publique pour l’intégration sociale des individus. L’Union européenne, dans la mesure oú elle restreint la souveraineté des nations qui la composent, permet justement d’accorder plus d’importance à l’héritage républicain au détriment du nationalisme allemand.In this article, Habermas challenges the conservative thesis of the continuity of the German “nation” through a critique of the very concept of Nation-State. Further pursuing the historian debate, he exposes the limits of the Nation-State in the context of globalization. Indeed, the importance of1989 lies in the idea of the restoration of the German nation as it exists since the Wilhelmine empire. Habermas suggests that the national State would no longer be up to the challenge imposed by globalization of social, political, cultural and systemic interactions. It must do away with a remainder of ethnicity and nationalism if it is to embrace fully the republican dimension, which only admits democratic process of public deliberation for the social integration of individuals. The European Union, insomuch as it restricts the sovereignty of its members, allows precisely to put more importance on the republican heritage than on German nationalism. (shrink)

This article is a translation of Eine politische Verfassung für die pluralistische Weltgesellschaf which is published in Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion: philosophische Aufsäze (2005). The article deals with the project of forming a cosmopolitan order and a harmonization of national policies by agreeing upon and implementing shared global politics which require an intergovernmental coordination. This project has its origin from Hobbes and Kant, and Habermas discuss Kant"s concept of a world republic and a constitution which apply to all the citizens (...) in the world. Habermas argues that the Kantian project must be understood in the international political situation today, and that we have to substitute the traditional and Kantian cosmopolitan ideal of a world republic by the project of a "constitutionalizationâ€? of international law. Habermas suggest that the world community need a political constitution for an emerging world society which allows for global governance without a global government. This solution Habermas denotes as a global extension of domestic politics. A presupposition for this argument is that it has been a shift that has taken place from the former national to the present post-national constellation. In order to realize this international coordination and transnational harmonization, the national states has to perceive themselves as members of an international community and to act accordingly. Such an arrangement requires first a change in the conception of state-sovereignty. Then citizens will enjoy, in addition to their national citizenship, the status of world-citizens. (shrink)

Habermas s’en prend ici à la thèse conservatrice de la continuité de la «nation» allemande par une critique du concept même d’État-nation. Contribuant au débat des historiens, il expose les limites de l’État-nation dans le contexte de la globalisation. En effet, l’importance de 1989 repose sur l’idée de restauration de la nation allemande telle qu’elle se présentait à partir de l’empire guillaumien. Or,l’État national ne serait plus à la hauteur du défi qu’impose la globalisation des interactions sociales, politiques, culturelles et (...) systémiques. Il lui faut, de l’avis de Habermas, se départir d’un reliquat d’ethnicité et de nationalisme pour épouser pleinement la dimension républicaine qui, elle, n’admet que le processus démocratique de délibération publique pour l’intégration sociale des individus. L’Union européenne, dans la mesure oú elle restreint la souveraineté des nations qui la composent, permet justement d’accorder plus d’importance à l’héritage républicain au détriment du nationalisme allemand.In this article, Habermas challenges the conservative thesis of the continuity of the German “nation” through a critique of the very concept of Nation-State. Further pursuing the historian debate, he exposes the limits of the Nation-State in the context of globalization. Indeed, the importance of1989 lies in the idea of the restoration of the German nation as it exists since the Wilhelmine empire. Habermas suggests that the national State would no longer be up to the challenge imposed by globalization of social, political, cultural and systemic interactions. It must do away with a remainder of ethnicity and nationalism if it is to embrace fully the republican dimension, which only admits democratic process of public deliberation for the social integration of individuals. The European Union, insomuch as it restricts the sovereignty of its members, allows precisely to put more importance on the republican heritage than on German nationalism. (shrink)

In this introduction the author outlines his approach to philosophy of law taken in Between Facts and Norms. In particular, he briefly discusses topics such as the form and function of law, the relation between law and morality, the relation between human rights and sovereignty, and the notion of democracy.

The article analyses Habermas' interpretation of Foucault in the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and argues that the former misunderstands the Foucaultian project of genealogy fundamentally. While Habermas assumes that Foucault aims at a strictly scientific approach to the writing of history it can be shown that Foucaultian genealogy is strongly characterised by rhetorical aspects, creating a hybrid model of critique that stands in between science and literature. The essay goes on arguing that this misreading can be explained with reference to (...) Habermas' reconstruction of Nietzsche's philosophy in the Philosophical Discourse. On the basis of this clarification the article analyses what a Habermasian position vis-à-vis genealogy including the rhetorical element would look like. Making use of Habermas' remarks on Derrida in the Philosophical Discourse the essay concludes that, counter-intuitively, a rhetorically understood genealogy has to be considered a valid philosophical approach even on Habermas' own terms. (shrink)

O texto busca compreender e avaliar as influências das filosofias políticas de Rousseau e Kant no pensamento habermasiano. Ele se atém sobretudo à ideia fundamental de Direito e democracia, segundo a qual há uma cooriginariedade lógica entre direitos humanos, interpretados como direitos fundamentais de liberdade individual, e a soberania popular, interpretada como direitos políticos de participação e comunicação, no processo de formação pública da opinião e vontade. Defende-se que a crítica habermasiana a Rousseau e a Kant se deve ao projeto (...) de radicalização da democracia, para o qual as contribuições dos dois filósofos apresentam ainda alguns obstáculos. Porém, ao mesmo tempo, pode-se dizer que, segundo Habermas, a contribuição de um serve para sanar os problemas presentes na contribuição do outro. This text analyzes and evaluates the influence of the political philosophies of Rousseau and Kant in Habermasian thought. It stresses the fundamental idea of Faktizität und Geltung, according to which there is a logical co-originality of human rights, interpreted as fundamental rights of individual liberty, and popular sovereignty, understood as political rights of participation and communication in the process of public formation opinion and will. It is argued that Habermas' critique of Rousseau and Kant is due to Habermas' project of the radicalization of democracy, to which the contributions of the two philosophers present some obstacles. Nevertheless, it may be said that, according to Habermas, the contribution of each one serves to solve the problems in the contribution of the other. (shrink)

While theorists of cultural pluralism have generally supported tribal sovereignty to protect threatened Native cultures, they fail to address adequately cultural conflicts between Native and non-Native communities, especially when tribal sovereignty facilitates illiberal or undemocratic practices. In response, I draw on Jürgen Habermas' conceptions of dis-course and the public sphere to develop a universalist approach to cultural pluralism, called the 'intercultural public sphere', which analyzes how cultures can engage in mutual learning and mutual criticism under fair conditions. This (...) framework accommodates cultural diversity within formally universalistic parameters while avoiding four common criticisms of universalist approaches to cultural pluralism. But this framework differs from that of Habermas in two ways. First, it includes 'subaltern' publics, open only to members of cultural subgroups, in order to counter relations of 'cultural power'. Second, it admits 'strong' publics, democratic institutions with decision-making powers. Finally, I show how the subaltern, strong institutions of tribal sovereignty contribute to the fair discursive conditions required for mutual learning and mutual critique in an intercultural public sphere. Key Words: Habermas • Kymlicka • Native peoples • sovereignty • tribal. (shrink)

This article explores the tensions between cosmopolitanism and sovereignty as a means to conceptualize the ethics of European foreign policy. It starts by discussing the claim that, in order for the EU to play a meaningful role as an international actor, a definition of the common ethical values orienting its political conduct is required. The question of a European federation of states and its ethical conceptualization emerges clearly in some of the philosophical writings of the 17th and 18th centuries. (...) I seek to provide an outline of the main arguments presented by authors such as Saint Pierre, Rousseau and Kant regarding the implications of the emerging difference between cosmopolitanism and the law of nations in the ethics of international relations. The article focuses on the normative significance of the concept of sovereignty as it emerges in modern political philosophy and highlights its tensions with the ideas of moral and political cosmopolitanism. This exploration serves a double function: theoretical and practical. From the theoretical perspective it leads to a better understanding of the tensions involved in conceptualizing a common ethical orientation for the states of Europe. From the practical standpoint it sheds light on some persistent difficulties the European Union faces in trying to move beyond an intergovernmental political arrangement in the field of foreign policy. (shrink)

rgen Habermas' response to the European Union democratic deficit calls for a minimal threshold of democratic legislation through an explicit constitutional founding. He defends a model of freedom as autonomous self-determination by proposing to tie basic rights in the EU to a univocal form of European-wide popular sovereignty. Instead of constructing a common European political identity, I appeal to the novel democratic potential of institutions in the EU such as the Open Method of Coordination for mediating overlapping sovereignties in (...) accord with freedom as non-domination. The concluding example of basic rights to effective participation for immigrants and permanent minorities illustrates the strengths of Iris Young's and James Bohman's republican views of non-domination over Habermas' call for a European-wide collective willing. Key Words: James Bohman • democratic deficit • European Union • freedom • Jurgen Habermas • non-domination • Open Method of Coordination • republicanism • sovereignty • Iris Young. (shrink)

Does Habermas have the conceptual resources to not only rationally reconstruct the political shape of the European Union as a supranational democracy with a “shared sovereignty” between European citizens and member states, but to also rationally reconstruct the economic practices and processes? My answer will be in the affirmative, and my argument takes the form of an exemplary sketch how such a reconstruction might look like. It is, however, nothing more than a sketch because both rational reconstructions are so (...) far-reaching that they amount to reconstructive revolutions. Obviously, some presuppositions need to be addressed. My question is triggered by an asymmetry in Habermas’ writings on Europe, an asymmetry I will explicate together with the methodological premises of those writings. Hence, I will first turn to the method of rational reconstruction which Habermas uses for his analysis of the European Union. My third step will be to suggest that the economy is unnecessarily excluded from these considerations and I will present one possibility how a rational reconstruction of economic practices might look like – and where it gets a footing in those practices even if we strive to uphold the distinction between system and lifeworld. Finally, I will answer two obvious objections. (shrink)

Domestic sovereignty and international sovereignty have both been eroded in recent years, but the former to a much greater extent than the latter. An oppressed people's right to fight for liberal democratic reforms in their own country is treated as axiomatic, as the international responses to the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya illustrate. But there is a reluctance to accept that foreign intervention is always justified in the same circumstances. Ned Dobos assesses the moral cogency of this (...) double standard and asks whether intervention can be consistently and coherently opposed given our attitudes towards other kinds of political violence. His thought-provoking book will interest a wide range of readers in political philosophy and international relations. (shrink)

This paper is a short introduction to Habermas’s life and philosophy. It outlines his views on society, religion, morality and politics. It begins with his ‘methodological pragmatism’ which emphasizes the performative and intersubjective role of language. This rejects the “philosophy of consciousness” and sees society as a medium in which we live. Society is not an aggregate of individuals or a unity but a complex, multifarious, intersubjective structure with many different overlapping spheres. Habermas is essentially a social scientist and (...) his concern about society refers to the problem of how a social order and integrity can be maintained in a modern democratic and secular society. He believes that religion will survive a long time and is unsure whether philosophy will ever triumph over religion but is convinced that it can deal with our religious heritage with more sensitivity than hitherto. Habermas proposes a moral discourse theory based on the universalizability of social norms. In his political system, he combines the ideal of liberal democracy based on human rights with the ideal of republicanism based on popular sovereignty. He is nevertheless critical of some aspects of liberalism. Overall, Habermas foresees the danger to modern society to social groups that feel themselves to be alienated and marginalized from the mainstream. (shrink)

Habermas endorses democracy as a way to rescue modern life from the economic and bureaucratic compulsion that Weber saw as an inescapable condition of modernity. This rescue mission requires that Habermas subordinate democracy to people's true interests, by liberating their political deliberations from incursions of money or power that could interfere with the formation of policy preferences that clearly reflect those interests. But Habermas overlooks the opaque nature of our interests under complex modern conditions, and the difficulty of even knowing (...) what the modern state is doing—let alone judging whether what it is doing serves our interests well. These overlooked sources of public ignorance buttress Weber's more pessimistic understanding of democracy, and like the theatrics surrounding popular sovereignty, public ignorance both enables and masks the autonomy that allows state officials and non‐state opinion leaders to shape public policy undemocratically. (shrink)

Habermas and Nino see human rights not as an external constraint on popular sovereignty, but rather as a key ingredient of true democracy. Yet, Habermas asserts that democratic deliberation involves moral, ethical, pragmatic, and negotiated matters, while Nino reduces democracy to moral deliberation. Habermass theory thus is more complex and takes more seriously the possibility that deliberative democracy may vary across societies. All the same, Habermas excessively limits the extent of legitimate variability inasmuch as he shares with Nino the (...) conviction that moral reasons are universal and ultimately decisive. Habermas and Nino converge, more fundamentally, when they exclude the non-deliberative (and non-dialogic) aspects of the democratic process. It is a mistake to disregard these elements or to characterize them as oblique manifestations of deliberation. By taking these features into account, a picture of democracy gains in plausibility and opens up additional space for diversity in democratic theory and practice. (shrink)

In Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas points out an ambiguity in the Kantian concept of autonomy that would lead to an antagonism between human rights and popular sovereignty. He charges Kant of introducing this concept from the private point of view of the individual subject who judges morally and of elucidating it from the point of view of the discursive and democratic political formation of the will. Against this reading, Ingeborg Maus argues that Kant develops human rights and (...) popular sovereignty in the closest reciprocal complementarity. Nonetheless, she agrees with Habermas’s critique of the monological character of the Kantian principle of morality and reaffirms the ambiguity of the concept of autonomy. The aim of this article is to to shed light on Kant’s conceptions of Enlightenment and “public use of reason” developed in his political writings, in order to suggest that far from devaluating the political formation of the will, Kant establishes it as a fundamental step towards the realization of morality and, therefore, of the autonomy of the will. First, I will argue that in explaining the principle of autonomy with the idea of self-legislation of the will, Kant does not introduce ambiguity in this concept. On the contrary, it establishes a common normative structure between the domains of moral and right. Finally, I will return to the Doctrine of Right to argue that for Kant, interaction and communication between citizens is not lateral to the legitimation of right, since the members of the political community must consent and be convinced by reason. (shrink)

"Habermas introduces the concept of “reconstructive science” with a double purpose: to place the “general theory of society” between philosophy and social science and reestablish the rift between the “great theorization” and the “empirical research”. The model of “rational reconstructions” represents the main thread of the surveys about the “structures” of the life-world (“culture”, “society” and “personality”) and their respective “functions” (cultural reproductions, social integrations and socialization). For this propose, the dialectics between “symbolic representation” of “the structures subordinated to (...) all worlds of life” (“internal relationships”) and the “material reproduction” of the social systems in their complex (“external relationships” between social systems and environment) has to be considered. This model finds an application, above all, in the “theory of the social evolution”, starting from the reconstruction of the necessary conditions for a phylogeny of the socio-cultural-life forms (the “hominization”) until an analysis of the development of “social formations”, which Habermas subdivides into primitive, traditional, modern and contemporary formations. This paper is an attempt, primarily, to formalize the model of “reconstruction of the logic of development” of “social formations” summed up by Habermas through the differentiation between vital world and social systems (and, within them, through the “rationalization of the life-world” and the “growth in complexity of the social systems”). Secondly, it tries to offer some methodological clarifications about the “explanation of the dynamics” of “historical processes” and, in particular, about the “theoretical meaning” of the evolutional theory’s propositions. Even if the German sociologist considers that the “ex-post rational reconstructions” and “the models system/environment” cannot have a complete “historiographical application”, these certainly act as a general premise in the argumentative structure of the “historical explanation”.". (shrink)

L'ouvrage que nous propose M Tryphon Bonga présente un double intérêt. Il nous offre en effet une belle introduction à une tradition philosophique contemporaine majeure la Théorie critique de l'Ecole de Francfort tout en ouvrant de stimulantes perspectives, appliquées à un contexte social précis. La discussion théorique se double de réflexions mettant en évidence l'intérêt du travail du philosophe. La majeure partie de l'ouvrage consiste en une lecture détaillée de l'évolution de la Théorie critique au fil des trois (...) générations de l'Ecole de Francfort. Partant du marxisme d'Horkheimer et d'Adorno, l'auteur retrace la refondation de la Théorie critique qu'a proposée Jürgen Habermas sur base de l'activité de la communication. Cette discussion des thèses d'Habermas amène M Bonga à considérer, dans un troisième temps, le tournant pris par Axel Honneth chef de file de la troisième génération de l'Ecole de Francfort et l'importance donnée par ce dernier à la thématique de la lutte pour la reconnaissance. Les problèmes philosophiques abordés sont nombreux. La recherche est ample et donne lieu à une riche présentation de l'évolution des recherches majeures menées au sein de l'Ecole de Francfort. Mais l'importance de ce travail n'est pas seulement relative au spectre philosophique abordé ; elle l'est aussi au sens où les thématiques de l'émancipation humaine et de la démocratie "en acte" sont d'une actualité brûlante et ce, plus spécifiquement, dans de nombreux pays du Sud engagés dans des processus de démocratisation. Or une des grandes qualités de la recherche de M Bonga est de situer, tout au long de son développement, la discussion proprement philosophique en perspective du contexte socio-politique africain et plus précisément de celui de la R D du Congo. (shrink)

One of the most interesting features of Jürgen Habermas’s latest work on democracy is his attempt to acknowledge the problem of social complexity while remaining faithful to the core idea of the Rousseauian conception of democratic legitimacy: the idea that legitimacy is grounded on citizens’ participation in processes of opinion- and will-formation which ensure the reasonableness of collectivedecisions. The challenge for Habermas is to show how it is possible to conciliate the consequences of social complexity with this understanding of (...) legitimacy and popular sovereignty. Does Habermas’s attempt succeed? This is the question examined in the present article.L’un des aspects les plus intéressants du dernier ouvrage de Jürgen Habermas est sa tentative de reconnaître le problème de la complexité sociale tout en demeurant fidèle a I’idée centrale de la conception rousseauiste de légitimité démocratique. Cette dernière est fondée sur la participation du citoyen aux processus de formation de I’opinion publique et de la volonté populaire, qui seule peut assurer le caractère raisonnable des décisions collectives. Le défi que doit relever Habermas consiste à démontrer la possibilité de concilier les conséquences de la complexité sociale avec cette compréhension de la légitimité et de la souveraineté populaire. Peut-on considérer la tentative de Habermas comme un succès? Voilà la question qui sera abordée dans le présent article. (shrink)

How can sovereignty provide the premises to think outside of sovereignty? In other words, how is it possible to perceive of resistance to sovereignty which itself is deemed to have been caught up in the double bind of sovereignty? With a critical appraisal of theories on the ‘state of exception’ in conversation with Robert Jungk’s consideration of the ‘nuclear state’, I account for the nuclear state of exception which has acquired sovereignty in several nations (...) in the post-Second World War scenario, before going on to consider ‘spaces of exception’ to it. I then provide a critical appraisal of studies of resistance. Using the case of a public hearing on the Koodankulam nuclear power plant in south India, I account for how ways of conceptualizing contestation and challenges in the shadows of sovereignty can be pursued in what I describe as a case of ‘sovereignty without hegemony’. (shrink)

Jennifer Herdt's Putting On Virtue argues for the theological and normative superiority of noncompetitive accounts of divine and human agency. Although such accounts affirm the indispensability and sovereignty of divine grace they also acknowledge human agents as active participants in their own moral change. Indeed, Herdt contends we cannot coherently describe the human telos as entailing a transformation of character without affirming that human agents meaningfully contribute to that change. Nevertheless, a recurrent worry in Putting On Virtue is that (...) persons may view their growth in virtue as a personal achievement and that the pleasure of positive self-regard will displace disinterested—and hence truly virtuous—moral aspiration. This discussion of Herdt's volume sympathetically canvasses her argument. It then looks briefly at the reflexive structure of human agency to consider the relationship between the human telos and the transformation of character, and to encourage a more generous attitude toward positive self-regard. (shrink)

In opposing Stephen Douglas’s alleged popular right to choose a slave constitution, Abraham Lincoln developed a rudimentary conception of the normative presuppositions of democratic rights that prefigures the theory of popular sovereignty articulated by Jürgen Habermas. While Lincoln was influenced by a civic republican conception of natural rights, and referred to personal autonomy in arguing that some political choices violate the grounds of collective self-governance rights, both Lincoln—as read by Jaffa—and Habermas conceive human rights not as trans-political principles but (...) as linking moral norms with the rule of law (or coordination through political power in general). The comparison shows that Habermas’s approach to the co-originality of civil liberties and democratic rights implies that legitimate secession, revolution, and primary constituent authority must be oriented toward creation of a just legal order. This enriched linkage approach explains why the right to democracy, like the right to basic liberty, is inalienable. (shrink)

In this article I confront Jürgen Habermas' deliberative model of democracy with Claude Lefort's analysis of democracy as a regime in which the locus of power remains an empty place. This confrontation reveals several structural similarities between the two authors and explains how the proceduralization of popular sovereignty provides a discourse-theoretical interpretation of the empty place of power. At the same time, Lefort's insistence on the open-ended nature of the democratic struggle also points towards an unresolved tension at the (...) core of Habermas' model between the cognitive nature of deliberation on the one hand and the freedom of moral and political agents on the other. A proper solution of this tension requires a full appreciation of the ineliminable gap between actual and ideal deliberation. Because actual deliberation can never result in an ideal consensus, the actual exercise of democratic power should be understood as an unavoidable interruption of deliberation. Key Words: consensus • deliberation • democracy • empty place of power • Jürgen Habermas • Claude Lefort. (shrink)

Resumo O artigo trata da análise crítica de Jürgen Habermas a respeito das consequências do modelo neoliberal de integração global via mercado, em especial o desequilíbrio entre política e mercado, o fim do compromisso com o Estado social e o déficit democrático no nível transnacional. Para o filósofo alemão, a concepção neoliberal de sociedade desestatizada do capitalismo global atinge o nexo entre Estado nacional, democracia e justiça social, marginalizando o Estado e a política, em favor da privatização dos serviços públicos (...) e sendo insensível às questões de justiça social, aos custos sociais do crescente aumento da pobreza, desigualdade e exclusão social, mesmo em países abastados da Europa e América do Norte. Ao deslocar o fiador da integração social para além das fronteiras nacionais, o capitalismo global foge ao controle estatal e esvazia o poder dos Estados nacionais, em termos de substância democrática e de política social, e gera um déficit de legitimação, ao transferir competências nacionais para agências ou organismos transnacionais, cuja legitimação não deriva da sociedade civil ou de uma esfera pública politicamente constituída. Em contrapartida, Habermas defende um poder democrático capaz de domesticar politicamente o mercado globalizado, reconstruir a democracia estatal-social num nível transnacional, em vista de uma ordem socialmente mais equilibrada, e compensar o déficit social e de legitimação democrática, no âmbito transnacional. Depois de recapitular alguns problemas que se solucionaram nas formas de Estado nacional, o artigo descreve como a globalização econômica afeta a soberania cultural, econômica, administrativa e jurídica, política, social e trabalhista dos Estados nacionais, e quais as possibilidades de reenquadrar politicamente os mercados, estendendo a democracia estatal para além das fronteiras nacionais. Com isso, quer-se mostrar que a obra de Habermas não é cega para a relação democracia-capitalismo, para os efeitos colaterais da “colonização da política pela economia”, para a influência corrosiva da economia capitalista na despolitização da esfera pública e da política.The article presents Jürgen Habermas critical analysis of the consequences of the neoliberal model of global market integration, in particular the imbalance between politics and market, the end of the commitment to the welfare state and the democratic deficit at the transnational level. For the German philosopher, the neoliberal conception of the privatized society of global capitalism undermine the nexus between national state, democracy and social justice, marginalizing the state and politics in favour of privatization of public services and being insensitive to questions of social justice, the costs increasing poverty, inequality and social exclusion, even in wealthy countries in Europe and North America. Moving the guarantor of social integration across national borders, global capitalism is beyond the state control and exhaust the power of national states in terms of democratic substance and social policy and creates a legitimacy deficit by transferring national powers to agencies or transnational corporations whose legitimacy does not derive from civil society or from a politically constituted public sphere. In contrast, Habermas advocates a democratic power able to politically neutralize the global market, rebuild the welfare-state democracy in a transnational level in view of a more socially balanced order, and compensate the social deficit and democratic legitimacy in the transnational order. After reviewing some problems that have been solved in national state forms, the article describes how economic globalization affects the cultural, economic, administrative, juridical, political, social and labor sovereignty of the national states, and what are the possibilities of politically reframing markets, extending welfare-estate democracy beyond national borders. In this way, we want to show that Habermas’ work is not blind to the relation between democracy and capitalism, to the collateral effects of the “colonization of politics by the economy”, to the corrosive influence of the capitalist economy on the depoliticization of the public sphere and politics. (shrink)

The concept of hermeneutic science is outlined by Habermas as a reflection within the ordinary language, addressed to the dialogic dimension of intersubjective recognition and connected to the juridical guarantee. The guarantee function fulfilled by the discursive agreement towards every real dialogue is obvious: it indicates the main reference point for the regulation and coordination of social action, tracing a line of demarcation between being and having to be, facts and norms. Speech, communicative agreement and legal guarantee are mutually qualified (...) terms where the public discussion of institutional issues makes it possible to define the normative validity as non-assimilatory generality, placed beyond any populistic yearning, tracing a line of demarcation between law and power. The idea of deliberative democracy expresses the relationship and distinction between the universalism of rights and the factuality of the norm issuing, between the idea of good and the idea of right, in order to support democratic decision-making legitimacy. Combining the reasons of the markets with those of civil solidarity, through independent forms of regulation both from the obsolete state sovereignties and from the traditional international perspectives, represents a primary challenge of the Habermasian theory where the critical role of the rational public sphere appears fundamental. (shrink)

The problem of the division of competences between the constitutional court and the democratic legislator has been the subject of intense debates in the philosophy of law, especially when examined in light of Habermas' theory. This article proposes a detailed analysis of this issue, focusing on the articulation of theoretical currents that revolve around the issue of making the control of constitutionality exercised by the courts compatible with the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Our aim is to (...) examine how different theoretical approaches address this crucial problem and how their ideas relate to and contradict each other. Three points will be investigated: i) Habermas' criticism of the decision-making practice of the Constitutional Court, especially in Germany, which is based on a liberal reading of the separation of powers. This criticism highlights the expansion of the functions of justice that compete with legislation due to the evolution of the liberal rule of law to an interventionist and welfare state; ii) The debate on the indeterminacy of law focused on the jurisprudence of the values ​​of the German Constitutional Court. Here, the criticism is directed against the methodological self-understanding of this court, which equates guidance by principles with the weighing of goods; iii) The view of the Constitutional Court as protector of the democratic procedure of legislation, a perspective especially prevalent in the USA. This approach refers to the renewal of a republican understanding of the political process, emphasizing the importance of a non-instrumental political process. Habermas, therefore, is not limited to a simple dichotomy between popular democracy and judicial elitism or between tyranny of the majority and judges who guarantee rights. Instead, he offers a nuanced critique, recognizing the complexities and multiple dimensions of the judiciary's role in controlling legislation in contemporary democratic states. (shrink)

Both G.F.W. Hegel and Carl Schmitt took seriously the problem of political sovereignty entailed by liberal political theories. In Dictatorship (1919) and Political Theology (1922), Schmitt rejects liberal political theories that argue for the immediate unity of democracy and legality i.e., popular sovereignty, because he thinks they cannot secure political sovereignty. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel denounces popular sovereignty for similar reasons. Yet given Schmitt’s negative assessment of Hegel their positions are seldom related to one (...) another. I argue in this paper that Schmitt’s analysis of liberal political theories is similar to Hegel’s analysis of Rousseau’s liberal ideas. I contend, however, that Schmitt’s solution, which collapses the distinction between the executive and the legislative power in favor of the former, fails to secure political sovereignty. Contrary to Schmitt, Hegel conceives of the liberal predicament as a basic determination of any political state that rests on the division of the legislative and executive power. Hegel argues that the constitutional monarchy is a genuine instantiation of political sovereignty that can maintain not only the division of these powers, but also their unity. In this regard, I argue that Hegel’s conception of the division of powers provides a more convincing theory of the problem afflicting modern states than Schmitt’s and at least deserves to be taken more seriously by critics of Schmitt’s solution such as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, Jurgen Habermas, Andreas Kalyvas and Chantal Mouffe. (shrink)

The international community's indifferent and double standard approach to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue for 30 years forced Azerbaijan to restore its territorial integrity through military means and political negotiations on the battlefield during the Second Karabakh War, from September 27 to November 10, 2020. Although the 44-day Patriotic War ended with the victory of the Azerbaijani army under the leadership of the President of the Republic and Victorious Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev, armed clashes occasionally occurred along the borders of (...) Azerbaijan and Armenia. On September 19-20, 2023, as a result of successful localized anti-terrorism measures carried out by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan was fully restored. On October 15, President Ilham Aliyev raised the Flag of Azerbaijan in Agdara, Askeran, Khojavend, Khojaly, and Khankendi. On December 21, 2023, as part of the 1/8 finals of the Azerbaijan Cup, the football teams “Garabagh” from Agdam and “MOIK” from Baku met for the first time at the stadium in the Khankendi region, which had been liberated from occupation. The unity of the Karabakh-Army-People is the main source of our Victory. (shrink)

The Rawls–Habermas debate is having a revival. In this article I argue that both philosophers develop different freestanding conceptions of political legitimacy, and show how they diverge when it comes to how political legitimacy can be justified. Habermas is looking for a deeper justification than Rawls will allow for. I then proceed to show how the different meta-ethical positions yield two different versions of democratic theory, focusing in particular on rights and popular sovereignty. I demonstrate how both conceive of (...) the co-originality of private and public autonomy, and subsequently take issue with Habermas’ reading of Rawls. I argue that Rawls should not be understood as a natural rights theorist, that Habermas misunderstands the role of the original position, and that Rawls cannot be considered a strong constitutionalist. Thus, the real difference between Rawls and Habermas revolves around their different conceptions of political legitimacy. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to investigate the Habermasian way of problematizing the European political situation through consideration of the conceptual framework within which he develops his proposal. I begin by clarifying various conceptual difficulties that emerge when thinking about politics within the European Union. I then focus on the concept of popular sovereignty as procedure, which Habermas develops in Between Facts and Norms against the historical backdrop of the nation state. In the debate regarding European constitutionalization, the (...) concept of popular sovereignty as procedure first assumes a critical function against proponents of the no demos thesis. More recently, Habermas has advanced a concept of shared/divided sovereignty, which becomes indispensable when we consider Europe as a democratic federation. The conclusions hereby drawn disclose two problematic aspects of Habermas’s recent proposal. Respectively, these concern the viability of his approach and the questionable plausibility of this proposed federation’s ability to uphold democracy in terms of self-determination. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo discute el componente kantiano en la teoría democrática deliberativa. Parte sosteniendo que Kant no solo incorpora derechos individuales sino que también la idea de soberanía popular. Este pensador considera la democracia, pero un sistema de principios tiene prioridad normativa respecto de la práctica de autolegislación colectiva. Después, el escrito muestra que la teoría democrática habermasiana elabora un argumento similar al kantiano. Por tanto, no reconstruye el balance entre derechos y democracia como pretende sino de forma similar a (...) como lo hace Kant.: This article discusses the Kantian component in the theory of deliberative democracy. It begins claiming that Kant not only incorporates individual rights but also the idea of popular sovereignty: This author values democracy; however, a system of principles has normative priority over the practice of collective self-determination. The text later shows that Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy elaborates a Kantian justification. Thus, it does not reconstruct the balance between rights and democracy as it claims to do; it rather builds an argument similar to Kant’s. (shrink)

What is critical theory – and what is it not? This essay attempts a new answer to this old question and examines which normative convictions immanent to social reality can be used to describe, analyse and criticise contemporary, global forms of domination that form blockades of social and political participation. The analysis proceeds in a double step, referring both to the critique of society and to the critique of theory that describes society. The basis of this parallel swing is (...) an analysis in which the author makes revisions to Jürgen Habermas’s colonisation thesis and uses the example of housing to show how these revisions which refer to the global perspective, the demarcation between system and lifeworld, the language of critique and, finally, the theoretical mode of an inherent dialectical critique make possible an analysis of the financial and economic sectors as well as everyday interactions. Reading Habermas more dialectically than he probably would himself also allows the identification of potentials for transforming relations of oppression. (shrink)

The terms “morality” and “ethical life” refer to the relationship between Kant's universalistic and Hegel's “contextualised” account of morality. In this essay, the problem of universalism and contextualism will be addressed to Apel's and Habermas's positions. I will divide the theme into three main topics: 1) The historical reconstruction of the rational conditions of discourse ethics within Habermas's position: in which sense could this approach lead to a contextualism? 2) The difficulty with establishing a non-contextual justification of the discursive, rational (...) conditions. Habermas's reconstructive approach will be confronted with Apel's “strict reflectional” approach which relies on stronger universalistic presuppositions. 3) This last topic will focus on the main difference between Habermas's and Apel's perspectives. This is connected to the double function of the rational “symmetry and reciprocity” -conditions: they are seen as consensual and simultaneously meta-normative conditions. Their meta-normative character is Apel's main concern, and seen as vital to social criticism. (shrink)

Following Hannah Arendt's work on totalitarianism, the first part of the paper gives an account of the historical advances of the republican nation state that was born during the constitutional revolutions in France and America at the end of the eighteenth century. This state has organised an efficient solidarity among strangers by means of democratic legislation. The European nation state was particular and universal at once. As Arendt could demonstrate on the Dreyfus affair, republicanism of a specific people was based (...) on the Jacobean patriotism of universal human rights. In the second part an explanation is laid out for the destruction of the European nation state during the first fifty years of the nineteenth century. Beginning with Arendt's thesis on the imperialist society that blurred the borders of state, this thesis is revised with reference to the sociological theory of modern society (Luhmann, Habermas). The last part then turns to the rebirth of the nation state after World War Two and the postimperialist development of globalisation at the same time. Again progress in globalising human rights and civil society is threatened by the uncontrolled expansion of capital and power. The lasting problem is to find any regional or global functional equivalent for the democratic rule of law that for so long only worked on the level of the nation state. (shrink)

On March 8, 1987, the Sandinista Liberation Front published its statement on the relation of women's struggles to the Nicaraguan revolution. The author argues that this official statement is consistent with the views of modern feminists on some key points relating to the need to eliminate women's double day, promote women's self-organization, and wage an ideological struggle against sexism if women's subordination is to be eliminated. The author believes that the Sandinista Front's emphasis on ideological struggle and political organization (...) represents an important break with more economistic, orthodox Marxist approaches to analyzing the condition of women and has important implications for Marxist feminism. (shrink)

In Sovereignty across Generations, Ferrara attempts a dual feat. He demonstrates that political liberalism needs a nuanced doctrine of constituent power to be brought in line with traditional democratic concerns. At the same time, he argues that political liberalism is capable of making constituent power safe for democracy, in reining in its unruly and unbound character. By distinguishing between ‘the people’ and the electorate, Ferrara develops a transtemporal conception of the constituent subject, allowing moderate transformation but in effect binding (...) all future time-slices of the people. In my comment, I address two issues with this. First, I ask how such accounts deal with the fact of immigration. It is not clear whether a historically indexed constituent subject has the normative power to bind new citizens arriving with quite distinct historical baggage. A second question is whether Ferrara’s Rawlsian-Michelmanian take is different from, and superior to, the Habermasian account of constituent power, especially to Habermas’s constructive views on supranational constitution-making. Both questions address whether Ferrara’s historically indexed account is sufficiently open to future developments. (shrink)

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I (...) consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self-defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth-century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the "just authority" of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near-unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions. (shrink)

There are two dominant schools of thought addressing problems of cosmopolitanism and conflict: democratic national sovereigntism, inspired by Hegel, and global constitutionalism, inspired by Kant and reformulated by Habermas. This paper develops a third position by reading Adorno's critique of both theoretical traditions. Rather than compromising between these camps, Adorno triangulates between them. Critically illuminating their respective deficiencies in view of the changing conditions of a globalized modern world has critical implications for cosmopolitics. Although largely negative, Adorno's critique provides an (...) important framework for a contestatory reformulation of cosmopolitanism, one that is better equipped to confront societal and political global conflicts insufficiently reflected in sovereigntist and global constitutionalist models. (shrink)

With Ukraine as its subtext, this pamphlet-like text considers the recent U-turns of global reality and the need for well-meant universalist (pamphilic) ends. Such ends impel reconsideration of the standard educational-philosophical view on national affect, state sovereignty and international relations. After indicating interconnections of these issues with ecological and nuclear catastrophe, I discuss the argument that post-humanist educational theory has failed to critique the full and inherent educational complicities in the current global situation. While I agree with such diagnostics, (...) I argue that, instead of essentializing educational complicities, we may explore education as open to catastrophe in its double meaning of ‘disaster’ and ‘radical turn’. (shrink)

El concepto de 'legitimidad' que introduce Weber tiene que ver con el grado de aceptación que los gobernados confieren a sus gobernantes. Filósofos, como Habermas, han contestado esta concepción señalando que la aceptación debe estar enmarcada en un sistema normativo que garantice los derechos en uso de esa comunidad y estipule las reglas que el gobernante ha de cumplir para acceder al ejercicio del gobierno. Puede discutirse si la concepción de Weber es tal como la describe Habermas o si ella (...) da cuenta de los aspectos que aquí se señalan. Pero el hecho es que el concepto de 'legitimidad' se disocia, entonces, en dos: legitimidad de origen (aceptabilidad) y legitimidad funcional (el objeto del ejercicio del poder y la manera como se accede a este). [Fragmento]. (shrink)

Resumo O autor defende uma descrição normativa fraca do constitucionalismo internacional à luz de dois factos: a contínua relevância da soberania do Estado face à hegemonia de superpotências e a necessidade imperiosa de um regime supranacional eficaz de direitos humanos. Ao defender uma institucionalização constitucional de direitos humanos, que inclui aspectos de justiça processual e material, mostra-se que, como nos casos domésticos, tal institucionalização pode e, talvez deva, incorporar um procedimento de controlo judicial que ascende ao nível de controlo constitucional. (...) De facto, o parecer do Tribunal Europeu de Justiça no caso Kadi estabeleceu um possível precedente para o controlo do Conselho de Segurança no sentido do cumprimento dos direitos humanos e outras normas peremptórias. Dada a necessidade de perícia técnico legal para a elaboração de tal controlo, um caso prima facie pode ser feito para o estabelecimento de um Tribunal Constitucional especializado ao nível internacional. Contudo, dado o impacto desempenhado pelo poder político na resolução técnica da adjudicação de casos específicos e concretos, dentro de um sistema jurídico altamente fragmentado, e dado o facto de que o controlo constitucional também toca questões mais abstractas e menos técnicos de justiça social, o autor recomenda, que a função de controlo constitucional seja disseminada por várias instituições globais, incluindo a actual Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas e na esfera pública global. O controlo constitucional pluricêntrico, bem como a institucionalização dos direitos humanos decorre do desacordo multicultural existente acerca do significado desses direitos e da ameaça da hegemonia de superpotências sobre as instituições globais. Assim antecipa-se também a realização de uma constitucionalização mais monista no Direito Internacional com o crescimento da solidariedade global entre os povos. Palavras-chave : Constitucionalização, Controlo Constitucional, Direitos Humanos, Habermas, Nações Unidades, Pluralismo LegalI defend a weakly normative description of international constitutionalism in light of two facts: the continued salience of state sovereignty in the face of superpower hegemony and the overriding need for an effective supranational human rights regime. In arguing for a constitutional institutionalization of human rights that includes aspects of procedural and substantive justice, I show that, as in the domestic case, such an institutionalization could and perhaps should incorporate a procedure for judicial review ascending to the level of constitutional review. In fact, the European Court of Justice’s review of the Kadi case establishes a possible precedent for reviewing Security Council compliance with human rights and other peremptory norms. Given the need for technical legal expertise in elaborating such review, a prima facie case can be made for establishing a specialized constitutional court at the international level. However, given the impact that political power plays in the technical resolution of concrete, case-specific adjudication within a highly fragmented legal system, and given the fact that constitutional review also touches on more abstract and less technical issues of social justice, I recommend that the function of constitutional review be dispersed in several global institutions, including the current United Nations General Assembly and a global public sphere. The pluralization of constitutional review and the accompanying interpretation and institutionalization of human rights recognizes existing multicultural disagreement on the meaning of human rights and the threat of superpower hegemony over global institutions while anticipating the realization of a more monistic constitutionalization of international law with the growth of global solidarity between peoples. Keywords : Constitutional Review, Constitutionalization, Habermas, Human Rights, Legal Pluralism, United Nations. (shrink)

The development in Habermas’ political philosophy towards a greater appreciation of religion in the public sphere is already a much discussed issue. In this article, however, I argue first of all for the sustained significance of his theory of communicative action and its structural implications for a religious discourse in a modern, multicultural society. Habermas’ theory is remarkable for its double commitment to social theory and philosophical self-reflection. Thus, it claims to offer a 2nd person perspective of communicative reason (...) for which there is no alternative but discursive particularism. Though the endorsement of rational commitment to engage in a free dialogical discourse stands as a well-argued precondition for a democratic constitution, the theory of communicative action nevertheless seems negligent of some of the problematic ramifications it may have for religious believers. For one thing, the theory tends to trivialize various forms of religion by associating them collectively with the validity criterion of subjective authenticity, thus putting them in a black box of particularism. Moreover, it undermines religious holism by its distinction between form and content, thus enacting a form of discursive power that contradicts its own pretention. (shrink)

This article shows how Jürgen Habermas and Claude Lefort try to explain the relationship between universality and particularity in modern democratic societies, politics and civil society. It will demonstrate that Habermas defends a substantive kind of universality that is opposed to particular positions and thus to real politics. This article further argues that Lefort’s lesser known theory of negative universality is better at combining a universal and a particular perspective. It claims that where Habermas requires citizens to transform their particular (...) interests, Lefort emphasizes that individual actors should acknowledge their particular position and interests when invoking universal principles. The article further argues that their disagreement leads to a different interpretation of ideology, politics, power, civil society, human rights, popular sovereignty, elections and the state. (shrink)

Nietzsche has been accused by Habermas of abandoning the pursuit of emancipation and truth. Ironically, this pursuit is at the core of Nietzsche’s works, though radically transformed. The pursuit of knowledge requires emancipated sovereign individuality, a severe honesty, and the courage to follow one's most rigorous use of reason and creative insight wherever they may lead, including the most disturbing insights about truth, language and reason themselves. The first part of this paper discusses Nietzsche’s ideas of individual sovereignty and (...) the associated ideas of emancipation and transformation necessary to this. The next section entitled The Question of Truth: Beyond Universalism and the Quest for Foundations and Certainty deals with how knowledge and truth are intelligible notions in the absence of certainty and absolute standards of truth. The following section, Nietzsche, Habermas and Social Solidarity shows how Habermas’s attempt to ground morality in his discourse ethics cannot succeed once the Nietzchean insight into truth is understood. In the final part, The Irony of Sovereign Individuality, I argue that morality is inconsistent with the individuality that it is supposed to uphold. Nietzsche’s ethical ideal provides a model for concrete individuality that offers the most powerful ethical contribution to social solidarity, given the failure of any grounded morality. (shrink)

First published in Spanish in 2006, _Twenty Theses on Politics_ is a major statement on political philosophy from Enrique Dussel, one of Latin America’s—and the world’s—most important philosophers, and a founder of the philosophy of liberation. Synthesizing a half-century of his pioneering work in moral and political philosophy, Dussel presents a succinct rationale for the development of political alternatives to the exclusionary, exploitative institutions of neoliberal globalization. In twenty short, provocative theses he lays out the foundational elements for a politics (...) of just and sustainable coexistence. Dussel first constructs a theory of political power and its institutionalization, taking on topics such as the purpose of politics and the fetishization of power. He insists that political projects must criticize or reject as unsustainable all political systems, actions, and institutions whose negative effects are suffered by oppressed or excluded victims. Turning to the deconstruction or transformation of political power, he explains the political principles of liberation and addresses matters such as reform and revolution. _Twenty Theses on Politics_ is inspired by recent political transformations in Latin America. As Dussel writes in Thesis 15, regarding the liberation praxis of social and political movements, “The winds that arrive from the South—from Nestor Kirchner, Tabaré Vásquez, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Evo Morales, Hugo Chávez, Fidel Castro, and so many others—show us that things can be changed. The _people _must reclaim sovereignty!” Throughout the twenty theses Dussel engages with Latin American thinkers and activists and with radical political projects such as the World Social Forum. He is also in dialogue with the ideas of Marx, Hegel, Habermas, Rawls, and Negri, offering insights into the applications and limits of their thinking in light of recent Latin American political thought and practice. (shrink)

Giorgio Agamben’s work on the power of sovereignty has been greatly influential in recent political thought. However, it has also overshadowed the independently original contributions of his two primary theoretical sources, Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin. In this article, I argue that Agamben’s political defeatism can be traced back to a double misconception in his reception of these two authors: first a formalistic reduction of Schmitt, and second a Schmittian reduction of Benjamin. Through this reduction to juridical formalism, (...) the radicality of Benjamin’s historical materialist critique is replaced by a messianic nihilism, leading to the colonization of society by the logic of the concentration camp. Though Agamben’s theory of sovereignty and its implications for a positive political project have been contested, this origin of the decline of radical philosophy has not previously undergone a systematic critique. (shrink)