Let the chain antichain principle (CAC) be the statement that each partial order on $\mathbb{N}$ possesses an infinite chain or an infinite antichain. Chong, Slaman, and Yang recently proved using forcing over nonstandard models of arithmetic that CAC is $\Pi^1_1$-conservative over $\text{RCA}_0+\Pi^0_1\text{-CP}$ and so in particular that CAC does not imply $\Sigma^0_2$-induction. We provide here a different purely syntactical and constructive proof of the statement that CAC (even together with WKL) does not imply $\Sigma^0_2$-induction. In detail we show using (...) a refinement of Howard's ordinal analysis of bar recursion that $\text{WKL}_0^\omega+\text{CAC}$ is $\Pi^0_2$-conservative over PRA and that one can extract primitive recursive realizers for such statements. Moreover, our proof is finitary in the sense of Hilbert's program. CAC implies that every sequence of $\mathbb{R}$ has a monotone subsequence. This Bolzano-Weierstraß}-like principle is commonly used in proofs. Our result makes it possible to extract primitive recursive terms from such proofs. We also discuss the Erdős-Moser principle, which—taken together with CAC—is equivalent to $\text{RT}^2_2$. (shrink)

The Erdős–Moser ([Formula: see text]) theorem says that every infinite tournament admits an infinite transitive subtournament. We study the computational behavior of the [Formula: see text] theorem with respect to the arithmetic hierarchy, and prove that [Formula: see text] instances of [Formula: see text] admit low[Formula: see text] solutions for every [Formula: see text], and that if a set [Formula: see text] is not arithmetical, then every instance of [Formula: see text] admits a solution relative to which [Formula: see (...) text] is still not arithmetical. We also provide a level-wise refinement of this theorem. These results are part of a larger program of computational study of combinatorial theorems in Reverse Mathematics. (shrink)

The thin set theorem for n-tuples and k colors states that every k-coloring of $[\mathbb {N}]^n$ admits an infinite set of integers H such that $[H]^n$ avoids at least one color. In this paper, we study the combinatorial weakness of the thin set theorem in reverse mathematics by proving neither $\operatorname {\mathrm {\sf {TS}}}^n_k$, nor the free set theorem imply the Erdős–Moser theorem whenever k is sufficiently large. Given a problem $\mathsf {P}$, a computable instance of $\mathsf {P}$ is (...) universal iff its solution computes a solution of any other computable $\mathsf {P}$ -instance. It has been established that most of Ramsey-type problems do not have a universal instance, but the case of Erdős–Moser theorem remained open so far. We prove that Erdős–Moser theorem does not admit a universal instance. (shrink)

This article contains criticisms of various interpretations of Mill's argument for Utilitarianism. An attempt is made to explain how Mill conceived the rationality of his proof, and how his justification of the Principle of Utility differs from a justification of fundamental moral principles on the basis of the logic of ethical discourse.

This chapter outlines different ethical approaches of relevance for a normative assessment of nano-release. We elaborate on traditional risk assessment and the well-known notion of a Precautionary Principle in order to demonstrate that these accounts need to be complemented to provide ethical guidance with regard to environmental influence of emerging technologies. We conclude that it is obligatory to engage in what they call an “eco-centric evaluation” of nano-release.

SummaryThis paper defends the philosophical importance of analyticity against the influential objections raised by W. V. Quine. It characterizes analyticity in a way that is nonepistemic, avoids Quine's objections and fits his general strictures, and explains the epistemological importance of analyticity. It also explains why even proponents of Quine's naturalized epistemology should value the epistemological importance of analyticity, in connection with questions about the correctness of their epistemic principles. Given these considerations, this paper may be regarded as having rescued analyticity (...) from the throes of suspicion and myth, as set by “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.”. (shrink)

As a result of contemporary environmental problems, scientists are focusing their interests on developing a greater understanding of nature. Described in this paper is a view of life and the environment as a case of complex systems analysis; this analysis results in a series of general principles which are manifested in life and bioprocesses. These ‘eco-principles’ will be very useful as guidelines for the eco-restructuring of technology as well as the reorientation of human activities towards a sustainable lifestyle which includes (...) the economy, society, management of industry, the university and even the church. The goal is a society which will be in harmony with the laws of nature. (shrink)

We study the formal first order system TIND in the standard language of Gentzen's LK . TIND extends LK by the purely logical rule of term-induction, that is a restricted induction principle, deriving numerals instead of arbitrary terms. This rule may be conceived as the logical image of full induction.

The aim of this paper is to show how Has Jonas arrived to develop a completely new concept of responsibility by operating a sort of reversion of the classic theories of responsibility. If in the past the holder of power obligated the subjected to justify himself, in Jonas' conception it is the fragile and the vulnerable being that becomes the instance of justification for the powerful in face to which he has to respond. Thus, in The Principle of Responsibility (...) the power relations are reversed in a way that the more power one holds, the more responsibility he has in regard to the fragile and the weak. (shrink)

This paper deals with an approach to the integration of science (with technology and economics), ethics (with religion and mysticism), the arts (aesthetics) and Nature, in order to establish a world-view based on holistic, evolutionary ethics that could help with problem solving. The author suggests that this integration is possible with the aid of “Nature’s wisdom” which is mirrored in the macroscopic pattern of the ecosphere. The corresponding eco-principles represent the basis for unifying soft and hard sciences resulting in “deep (...) sciences”. Deduction and induction will remain the methodology for deep sciences and will include conventional experiments and aesthetic and sentient experiences. Perception becomes the decisive factor with the senses as operators for the building of consciousness through the subconscious. In this paper, an attempt at integrating the concepts of the “true”, the “right” and the “beautiful” with the aid of Nature’s wisdom is explained in more detail along with consequences. (shrink)

The will theory of rights has so far been considered incapable of capturing individual rights under criminal law. Adherents of the will theory, therefore, have defended the claim that criminal law does not assign rights to individuals. In this article I argue first, that criminal law does assign individual rights and second, that the will theory of rights may enhance our understanding of these rights. The two major implications of the account are: a volenti non fit iniuria principle for (...) criminal law, and a theoretical framework for an idea of punishment as restitution. (shrink)

This book collects fifteen of Audi's papers on the theory of knowledge, justification, and epistemic rationality. Its main parts are: the foundationalism-coherentism controversy; knowledge and justification; epistemic principles and skepticism; and rationality. Audi prepared two of the papers specially for this collection: "The Foundationalism-Coherentism Controversy: Hardened Stereotypes and Overlapping Theories," and "The Old Skepticism, the New Foundationalism, and Naturalized Epistemology." In addition, he contributes a forty-five-page introductory overview, "The Grounds of Justification and the Epistemic Structure of Rationality." The fifteen papers (...) are unified by Audi's versions of moderate non-Cartesian foundationalism, fallibilist rationalism, and causal epistemic internalism. An emphasis on conceptual clarity and a guarded resistance to skepticism pervade the collection. (shrink)

We consider a weak version of Schindler’s remarkable cardinals that may fail to be ${{\rm{\Sigma }}_2}$-reflecting. We show that the ${{\rm{\Sigma }}_2}$-reflecting weakly remarkable cardinals are exactly the remarkable cardinals, and that the existence of a non-${{\rm{\Sigma }}_2}$-reflecting weakly remarkable cardinal has higher consistency strength: it is equiconsistent with the existence of an ω-Erdős cardinal. We give an application involving gVP, the generic Vopěnka principle defined by Bagaria, Gitman, and Schindler. Namely, we show that gVP + “Ord is not (...) ${{\rm{\Delta }}_2}$-Mahlo” and ${\text{gVP}}$ + “there is no proper class of remarkable cardinals” are both equiconsistent with the existence of a proper class of ω-Erdős cardinals, extending results of Bagaria, Gitman, Hamkins, and Schindler. (shrink)

In 5, Tait identifies a set of reflection principles called equation image-reflection principles which Peter Koellner has shown to be consistent relative to the existence of κ, the first ω-Erdős cardinal 1. Tait also defines a set of reflection principles called equation image-reflection principles; however, Koellner has shown that these are inconsistent when m > 2, but identifies restricted versions of them which he proves consistent relative to κ 2. In this paper, we introduce a new large-cardinal property, the α-reflective (...) cardinals. Their definition is motivated by Tait's remarks on parameters of third or higher order in reflection principles. We prove that if κ is ℶκ + α + 1-supercompact and 0 < α < κ then κ is α-reflective. Furthermore we show that α-reflective cardinals relativize to L, and that if κ exists then the set of cardinals λ < κ, such that λ is α-reflective for all α such that 0 < α < λ, is a stationary subset of κ. We show that an ω-reflective cardinal satisfies some restricted versions of equation image-reflection, as well as all the reflection properties proved consistent in 2. (shrink)

In their recent paper, Brandon Rickabaugh and Derek McAllister object to Paul Moser’s rejection of natural theology on the grounds that Moser is committed to a principle, Seek, which commits Moser to another principle, Access. Access in turn can be rationally motivated for at least some nonbelievers only by the arguments of natural theology. So Moser is in fact committed to the epistemic usefulness of natural theology. In this paper, we show that Seek by (...) itself does not commit one to Access, and that even if Moser is committed to Access, he is not thereby committed to the epistemic usefulness of natural theology for all nonbelievers. While we find this argument offered by Rickabaugh and McAllister lacking, we do not deny their conclusion that natural theology is epistemically useful to all nonbelievers. (shrink)

We study various aspects of the size, including the cardinality, of closed unbounded subsets of [λ]<κ, especially when λ = κ+n for n ε ω. The problem is resolved into the study of the size of certain stationary sets. Relative to the existence of an ω1-Erdös cardinal it is shown consistent that ωω3 < ωω13 and every closed unbounded subsetof [ω3]<ω2 has cardinality ωω13. A weakening of the ω1-Erdös property, ω1-remarkability, is defined and shown to be retained under a large (...) class of Easton-like forcings applied to ω1-Erdös cardinals. A class of reverse-Easton forcings preserving α-Erdösness is also described, with special attention to the establishment of □-principles. Article Outline. (shrink)

The broad aim of this paper is to track the evolution of adult literacy policy in the UK across three decades, highlighting convergences between policy phases and the promotion of democratic learning spaces. It is anchored onto the argument that, although it is generally accepted that democratic learning spaces are perceived as beneficial to adult literacy learners, policy has often deterred its promotion and, therefore, implementation. The paper identifies three block phases of adult literacy development: the seventies to mid-eighties, the (...) mid-eighties to mid-nineties and the mid-nineties to the Moser Committees. The features of each of these phases are highlighted to map out convergences and divergences to the ethos of democratic learning spaces. The paper argues that, with the evolution of policy in adult literacy, the ethos of democratic learning space continuously diminished, such that as policy evolved year on year, the principle of democratic learning space found itself at counterpoint to policy. We draw on two theoretical frameworks, the NLS view of literacy and Bourdieu’s capital framework to explain these divergences and conclude that the dominant perception of literacy and the prioritised capital in the context of policy appear to limit the vestiges of democratic learning spaces. Keywords: Adult literacy, policy, democratic learning spaces, cultural dissonance, human capital, social capital. (shrink)

This paper addresses the strength of Ramsey's theorem for pairs ($RT^2_2$) over a weak base theory from the perspective of 'proof mining'. Let $RT^{2-}_2$ denote Ramsey's theorem for pairs where the coloring is given by an explicit term involving only numeric variables. We add this principle to a weak base theory that includes weak König's Lemma and a substantial amount of $\Sigma^0_1$-induction (enough to prove the totality of all primitive recursive functions but not of all primitive recursive functionals). In (...) the resulting theory we show the extractability of primitive recursive programs and uniform bounds from proofs of $\forall\exists$-theorems. There are two components of this work. The first component is a general proof-theoretic result, due to the second author, that establishes conservation results for restricted principles of choice and comprehension over primitive recursive arithmetic PRA as well as a method for the extraction of primitive recursive bounds from proofs based on such principles. The second component is the main novelty of the paper: it is shown that a proof of Ramsey's theorem due to Erdős and Rado can be formalized using these restricted principles. So from the perspective of proof unwinding the computational content of concrete proofs based on $RT^2_2$ the computational complexity will, in most practical cases, not go beyond primitive recursive complexity. This even is the case when the theorem to be proved has function parameters f and the proof uses instances of $RT^2_2$ that are primitive recursive in f. (shrink)

We present a new proof of the existence of Morley sequences in simple theories. We avoid using the Erdős–Rado theorem and instead use only Ramsey’s theorem and compactness. The proof shows that the basic theory of forking in simple theories can be developed using only principles from “ordinary mathematics,” answering a question of Grossberg, Iovino, and Lessmann, as well as a question of Baldwin.

When the Canonical Ramsey’s Theorem by Erdős and Rado is applied to regressive functions, one obtains the Regressive Ramsey’s Theorem by Kanamori and McAloon. Taylor proved a “canonical” version of Hindman’s Theorem, analogous to the Canonical Ramsey’s Theorem. We introduce the restriction of Taylor’s Canonical Hindman’s Theorem to a subclass of the regressive functions, the $$\lambda$$ λ -regressive functions, relative to an adequate version of min-homogeneity and prove some results about the Reverse Mathematics of this Regressive Hindman’s Theorem and (...) of natural restrictions of it. In particular we prove that the first non-trivial restriction of the principle is equivalent to Arithmetical Comprehension. We furthermore prove that the well-ordering-preservation principle for base-$$\omega$$ ω exponentiation is reducible to this same principle by a uniform computable reduction. (shrink)

Religious thought often assumes that the principle of physical causal completeness (PCC) is false. But those who explicitly deny or doubt PCC, including William Alston, W. D. Hart, Tim Crane, Paul Moser and David Yandell, Charles Taliaferro, Keith Yandell, Dallas Willard, William Vallicella, Frank Dilley, and, recently, David Chalmers, have ignored not only the explicit but also the implicit grounds for acceptance of PCC. I review the explicit grounds, and extend the hitherto implicit grounds, which together constitute a (...) greater challenge to contemporary religious philosophy than has been realized. Religious philosophers need to find a better way around PCC than has been found, or, if PCC is unavoidable, religious philosophers need to work toward a worldview that both accepts PCC and defends strong forms of religious experience. (shrink)

Fran Brearton: Robert Graves and The White Goddess Joyce Hill: Authority and Intertextuality in the Works of Ælfric Michael Pennington: Barnardine's Straw: The Devil in Shakespeare's Detail David Womersley: Dulness and Pope Terence Cave: Montaigne Lord Moser: The Future of Our Universities Alexander Murray: The Inquisition and the Renaissance Robert Bagley: The Prehistory of Chinese Music Theory Edwin Cameron: Patents and Public Health: Principle, Politics and Paradox Mervyn King: What Fates Impose: Facing Up to Uncertainty Dominic Lieven: Empire, (...) History and the Contemporary Global Order Joan Oates: Archaeology in Mesopotamia: Digging Deeper at Tell Brak Timothy Besley: The New Political Economy Richard Gray: 'They Worship Death Here': William Faulkner, Sanctuary and Hollywood Lord Sutherland: Nomad's Progress James Piscatori: Imagining Pan-Islam: Religious Activism and Political Utopias. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Catholic Theological Ethics Past, Present, and Future: The Trento Conference Edited by James F. Keenan, and: The Social Mission of the US Catholic Church: A Theological Perspective by Charles E. CurranDaniel CosacchiCatholic Theological Ethics Past, Present, and Future: The Trento Conference EDITED BY JAMES F. KEENAN Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2011. 337 pp. $40.00The Social Mission of the US Catholic Church: A Theological Perspective CHARLES E. CURRAN Washington, (...) DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011. 196 pp. $29.95To read both Catholic Theological Ethics Past, Present, and Future and The Social Mission of the US Catholic Church is to take a whirlwind tour—theological, historical, and geographical—through the Roman Catholic ethical tradition. Both volumes present wonderfully rich material and invaluable resources for the study of Christian ethics. Charles Curran and James Keenan are two of the foremost Catholic ethicists in the United States today. Keenan’s case is to be applauded for convening the 2010 conference in Trento, which brought together some six hundred Roman Catholic ethicists from around the world. His book, which assembles that conference’s thirty-one plenary addresses, does justice to this tremendous feat. Curran, for his part, has produced a text that focuses acutely on the Church in the United States and will benefit ethicists for years to come.Keenan uses the introduction to Catholic Theological Ethics Past, Present, and Future to provide an overview of the Trento conference and its attendees and proceedings. Keenan expertly identifies a common theme among the 240 diverse papers at the conference, noting that ethicists “always begin with the premise that there is a deficit in our location, and, therefore, we need to work together to find a way to remedy it” (6). What follows in the remainder of the book boldly moves toward remedies for many of the world’s ills. A few of these essays deserve particular mention.The conference and the collection of essays share the basic organizational principle of looking to the past, the present, and the future of Catholic theological ethics. Unsurprisingly, the Council of Trent played a foundational role in understanding the “past” of Catholic moral theology. Laurenti Magesa [End Page 216] (Kenya) explains that the African experience of the Council of Trent has remained largely unchanged since the conclusion of that council: “The Catholic Church in Africa is essentially a Tridentine church” (57). This essay makes clear that in Africa, the dominant voices are Western males. The missing voices, then, are given attention by Antônio Moser (Brazil), Anne Nasimiyu-Wasike (Kenya), and Bryan Massingale (United States). Massingale’s essay was most impressive, addressing the role of racism in our culture and concluding that Catholic ethicists “need to lament, mourn, and grieve our history” (121). This, he claims, is both a fruitful way to act in the present and a hopeful way to look toward the future.In focusing on the present, the strongest subsection of the book attended to political ethics. Here David Kaulemu’s (Zimbabwe) essay, “Catholic Social Teaching at a Crossroad,” has the potential to open the eyes of any reader. He writes, “It is frustrating and discouraging to the lay faithful to be inspired by Catholic social teaching and yet receive no recognition or support by ‘official’ church structures” (177). This highlights a serious problem to which all Catholic ethicists must attend. As for the future, Julie Hanlon Rubio (United States) points to a tripartite vision for marriage in the twenty-first century that sets high standards not only within the marital unit itself but also for the impact of the spouses on the larger society. Julie Clague (Scotland) presents a wonderful essay on the burgeoning relationship between moral theology and gender.Among the wealth of positive features of this collection is the great geographical diversity of the authors. This affirms that Catholic theological ethics is very healthy throughout the entire world and that on each continent there are voices of women and men willing to contribute fresh ideas to the discipline. In a time when there is so much tension between theologians and bishops, we should also be grateful that there are two essays from members of the episcopacy (Archbishop Bruno... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 139 twenty years ago has slowly given way to an awareness that cross-cultural differences are real enough to call for different rules of behavior and different sets of values. Several possibilities are still open to the ethicist concerned with the problem of relativism. We may want to reconsider more carefully than ever before the connotations of "relative," of "action" and of "culture" in the context of those (...) anthropologists whose claims are said to be detrimental to ethics. Of these terms so crucial for what Moser calls relativism of right, only the first has been analyzed from opposite perspectives by Stevenson and Berlin. So far as I know, no one has treated "relative" as a relational term in the fruitful way suggested by Berlin.19 We may also come to realize that the issue of relativism is too much imbedded in historical and metaphysical tenets and thus is not amenable to the ahistorical treatment of the logical status of moral judgment. Thus we may want to rewrite its whole history by exploiting one of the best facets of Moser's essay. That is, a comparative study of the sociology of knowledge with the organic model of cultural anthropology. Lastly we may agree with A. Edel and consider the whole issue a closed chapter in the history of philosophy, and move on to the philosophically more fruitful investigation of the why and wherefore of moral change between generations and between historical periods. L. M. PALMER University of Delaware Ernst Cassirer: Scientific Knowledge and the Concept of Man. By Seymour W. Itzkoff. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pp. xi +286. $9.95) There is a sense in which the title of this book is misleading. To be sure, Dr. Itzkoff does deal with Cassirer and with Cassirer's neo-Kantian conception of scientific knowledge and of man. But there is more to the book than this. The first seven chapters are, in effect, a demonstration that "Cassirer left us with a difficult theoretical dilemma: the existence of two contrasting and opposed views of human nature" (p. 172). The last two chapters (pp. 172-252) are the author's attempt to bring those two views into harmony within the framework of contemporary science and philosophical analysis. The first two chapters (pp. 1-37) trace briefly the development of philosophical thought from the time of "the intellectual revolution set in motion by Galileo" to Kant's "Copernican revolution"--to the Kantian thesis, that is, that "the fundamental act of perception and the structuring of experience itseLf depend upon... 'transcendental apperception' as a 'condition of the possibility of perception itself'" (p. 27). It is the concern with "form and function" rather than with "substance and reality," which the Marburg neo-Kantians, and with them Cassirer, accepted as the lasting achievement of Kant's "critical philosophy." But Cassirer found in Kant also a "parallel concern... for humanistic disciplines" (p. 33) and, as "a central theme," the assertion of the "autonomy of human nature" (p. 35). The survey is suggestive but, in some respects, it is also inaccurate. For example, Kant's presumed "lapse into a radical subjectivism" cannot be justified by the reference, in passing, as it were, to the Opus postumum (p. 29)--although the fault is here perhaps that of Norman Kemp Smith rather than that of the author. A more ~o I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969), pp. 96-106. 140 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY serious misrepresentation of Kant may be found in the author's acceptance of T. D. Weldon's statement that "the categories... supply principles which are... essential to the existing of a unitary self-consciousness" (p. 32), for this is precisely the reverse of the Kantian position. Also, it is hardly accurate to speak of "Kant's postulation of laws of ethical behavior" (p. 36), for, surely, the various formulations of the categorical imperative are not "laws of ethical behavior" but criteria of such laws. Chapters 3 and 4 (pp. 38-98) are devoted to discussions of the nature of scientific knowledge. Kant's initial commitment to Newtonian mechanics is, of course, a wellknown fact; but Professor Itzkoff quite correctly points out... (shrink)

This paper offers a survey of some recent work in epistemology, including the following books: _A Priori Justification, by Albert Casullo; _Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, by Laurence Bonjour and Ernest Sosa; _New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, edited by Susana Nuccetelli; _Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public, by Alvin Goldman; _The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, edited by Steven Luper; and _Thinking About Knowing, by Jay F. Rosenberg.

The relationship between humans and non-human animals has received considerable attention recently. Animal advocates insist that non-human animals must be included in the moral community. Consequently, eating meat is, at least in most cases, morally bad. In an article entitled “In Defense of Eating Meat”, Hsiao argued that for the membership in the moral community, the “root capacity for rational agency” is necessary. As non-human animals lack this capacity, so the argument runs, they do not belong to the moral community. (...) Consequently, harming non-human animals for human nutrition can be justified. In this short comment I would like to highlight some of the most important errors of the above argument, primarily from the perspective of a biologist. I conclude that assuming the existence of a mysterious “root capacity for rational agency” is a biological nonsense. It cannot be verified, and it only obscures reality. In my opinion, the greatest problem with Hsiao’s argument is that it tries to defend anthropocentrism, a view that has presumably been the very cause of the spoiled non-human–human relationships. Perhaps adopting a vegan lifestyle is a better solution than quieting one’s conscience. (shrink)

This essay replies to the responses of Harold Netland, Charles Taliaferro, and Kate Waidler to my symposium paper, “Gethsemane Epistemology.” It contends that a God worthy of worship would not need the arguments of traditional natural theology, and that such arguments would not lead to such a God in the way desired by God. In addition, it explains why Paul’s position in Romans 1 offers no support to the arguments of traditional natural theology.

BackgroundCoaching is increasingly viewed as a dyadic exchange of verbal and non-verbal interactions driving clients' progress. Yet, little is known about how the trajectory of dyadic interactions plays out in workplace coaching.MethodThis paper provides a multiple-step exploratory investigation of movement synchrony of dyads in workplace coaching. We analyzed a publicly available dataset of 173 video-taped dyads. Specifically, we averaged MS per session/dyad to explore the temporal patterns of MS across the cluster of dyads that completed 10 sessions, and a set (...) of 173 dyadic interactions with a varied number of sessions. Additionally, we linked that pattern to several demographic predictors. The results indicate a differential downward trend of MS.ResultsDemographic factors do not predict best fitting MS curve types, and only client age and coach experience show a small but significant correlation.DiscussionWe provide contextualized interpretations of these findings and propose conceptual considerations and recommendations for future coaching process research and practice. (shrink)

This book explains how qualitative awareness-content of human moral experience can have intentional features indicating God's reality and goodness. Chapters offer a range of topics such as Moral Rapport and Inspiration from God, Experiencing God without Philosophy, Justifying Divine Ways, Co-Valuing with God, and Persons as Deciders in Dissonance.

In this book, Paul K. Moser offers a new approach to religious experience and the kind of evidence it provides. Here, he explains the nature of theistic and non-theistic experience in relation to the meaning of human life and its underlying evidence, with special attention given to the perspectives of Tolstoy, Buddha, Confucius, Krishna, Moses, the apostle Paul, and Muhammad. Among the many topics explored in this timely volume are: religious experience characterized in a unifying conception; religious experience naturalized (...) relative to science; religious experience psychologized in merely psychological phenomena; and religious experience cognized relative to potential defeaters from evil, divine hiddenness, and religious diversity. Understanding Religious Experience will benefit those interested in the nature of religion and can be used in relevant courses in religious studies, philosophy, theology, Biblical studies, and the history of religion. (shrink)

This book explores the idea that there is a certain performativity of thought connecting Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On this view, we make judgments and use propositions because we presuppose that our thinking is about something, and that our propositions have sense. Kant’s requirement of an a priori connection between intuitions and concepts is akin to Wittgenstein’s idea of the general propositional form as sharing a form with the world. Aloisia Moser argues that Kant (...) speaks about acts of the mind, not about static categories. Furthermore, she elucidates the Tractatus’ logical form as a projection method that turns into a so-called ‘zero method’, whereby propositions are merely the scaffolding of the world. In so doing, Moser connects Kantian reflective judgment to Wittgensteinian rule-following. She thereby presents an account of performativity centering neither on theories nor methods, but on the application enacting them in the first place. (shrink)

It is argued that a pure coherence theory of epistemic empirical justification fails to avoid an isolation objection according to which empirical justification has been divorced from one's total empirical evidence. Also, it is shown that several recent efforts to meet this objection either are outright failures or are irrelevant inasmuch as they diverge from epistemic coherentism. The overall moral is that we should look beyond coherentism for an adequate theory of epistemic empirical justification.