This essay discusses various representations of Eichmann's mind that were fashioned on the occasion of his trial in Jerusalem in 1961. Gideon Hausner the prosecutor presented the defendant as demonic. Hannah Arendt, the German-born American Jewish philosopher portrayed him as banal or thoughtless. Limiting themselves to the issue of mens rea in their judgment, the Israeli Supreme Court justices described Eichmann's mind as controlled by criminal intent. While these views have been widely discussed in the literature, much of this (...) essay focuses on a hitherto little noted perspective on Eichmann's mind that was formulated by the mental health experts who examined Eichmann for the prosecution. As compared to the inclusionist, confictual, and complex picture these experts presented of Eichmann's mind, Arendt's and Hausner's views appear similar in their reductionism, rather than diametrically opposed, while the approach of the Supreme Court justices to Eichmann's mind can be regarded as restrictive. Methodological problems involved in all these different perspectives are discussed, and it is argued that even though the psychological outlook declares itself to be non-judgmental, it does, in fact, entail a dimension of moral judgment. Finally, Eichmann 's recently declassified memoirs are adduced and interpreted as lending some support to the psychological, inclusionist perspective on Eichmann's mind. (shrink)

This article reviews professional mental health publications before and after the Eichmann trial. Psychiatrists rejected the massive denial of survivors' emotional reactions that was prevalent in Israeli society at the time. The Eichmann trial permitted the opening up of survivors' experiences in public. Legal procedure enabled the witnesses to speak about what they had hidden until then. The judge's presence gave legitimacy and power to the accusations, transforming the survivors from outlaws to partners in justice. The audience came (...) to support this stronger survivor identity. Through a slow process, it became a valid issue for psychotherapy, allowing the weaker aspects of the survivors' personalities to be addressed. This article reviews professional mental health publications before and after the Eichmann trial. Psychiatrists rejected the massive denial of survivors' emotional reactions that was prevalent in Israeli society at the time. The Eichmann trial permitted the opening up of survivors' experiences in public. Legal procedure enabled the witnesses to speak about what they had hidden until then. The judge's presence gave legitimacy and power to the accusations, transforming the survivors from outlaws to partners in justice. The audience came to support this stronger survivor identity. Through a slow process, it became a valid issue for psychotherapy, allowing the weaker aspects of the survivors' personalities to be addressed. (shrink)

The Eichmann trial has been one of the most important formative events in the short history of the State of Israel. The echoes of its impact on how Israelis as individuals and as a public perceive themselves reverberate even today in the most profound and existential of ways. In the public consciousness the trial was, and still is, fundamentally identified with its prosecutor then Attorney General Gideon Hausner. However the trial was not a one-man show as the (...) public tended to perceive it. Behind the scenes were numerous people working and preparing for the trial and influencing the prosecution's case against Eichmann: the investigators in the special police unit Bureau 06 established to conduct the investigation and prepare the criminal file; the Holocaust survivor organizations and institutions; and all echelons of the political sphere. This paper will trace some of the stages in the preparation of the prosecution of Eichmann and the people involved, as well as the matter of the scope of the bill of indictment and of the historical narrative tolls at the trial and the fact that it emerged to he one of the most important trials in the history of the twentieth century. (shrink)

This article takes as its focus the question, raised by Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub in their 1995 book Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History, of what it means for an event to be constituted by the collapse of its witness. The discussion centres on a reading of the moment Yehiel Dinoor, a writer also known as K-Zetnik and one of the few eyewitnesses at the 1961 Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, falls out of the stand and (...) into a coma while attempting to provide his testimony. By rethinking this historical trauma as a ‘collapse of witnessing’, I suggest Felman and Laub shift the focus from a purely cognitive or epistemological question — a problem of knowing and not-knowing — to a question of communicating to others: a problem of address. It is the circumstance of having ‘no one to whom one could say Thou’, as Laub puts it, that constitutes the Holocaust, for the victims, as what the authors call an ‘event without a witness’. (shrink)

This paper explores the Eichmann trial in its dimension as a living, powerful event, whose impact is defined and measured by the fact that it is "not the same for all." I examine this legal event from two perspectives: Hannah Arendt's and my own. I pledge my reading against Arendt's, in espousing the State's vision of the trial, but in interpreting the legal meaning of this vision us one that exceeds its own deliberateness and distinct from the State's (...) ideology. I use Nietzsche's terms to contrast "critical history" with "monumental history." Whereas the official State vision of the trial is, I propose, precisely one of "monumental history, " Arendt's vision offers a substitutive "critical history." I analyze, one against the other, what I call the monumental legal vision of the Eichmann trial and the critical vision offered by Arendt. Exploring thus the monumental versus the critical as two opposed but non-exclusive and, in fact, profoundly complementary perspectives, I examine, side by side, the Eichmann trials' monumental focus on the victims and Arendt's critical objections to this focus: her objections, I show, are based in a jurisprudential conservatism coexisting with a historiographical radicalism. The Eichmann trial, in my view, is on the contrary and diametrically, historiographically conservative, but jurisprudentially revolutionary. I argue that Arendt failed to see the way in which the trial in effect did not simply repeat the victim's story, but historically created it for the first time. I submit, in other words, that the Eichmann trial legally created a radically original and new event: not a rehearsal of a given story, but a groundbreaking narrative event that is itself historically and legally unprecedented. Examining the trial's transformation of victims into prosecution witnesses, I analyze the victim-oriented focus of the trial as s legal process of translation of private traumas into public ones and as a public scene of the recovery of language and legal subjecthood by victims who were formerly defined by the oppressor's language and who were, therefore, not just injured, but essentially robbed of a language in which to articulate their injury and name their victimization. I argue that the Eichmann trial expanded the space available for moral deliberation in creating a new legal language: the trial was the victim's trial only insofar as it was now the victims who, against all odds, were precisely writing their own history. To enable such a writing, the Eichmann trial had to enact not simply memory, but memory as change. It had to dramatize upon its legal stage before the audience nothing less than a conceptual revolution in the victim. And this, in fact, is what the trial did This historically unprecedented revolution in the victim that was operated in and by the Eichmann trial is, I suggest, the trial's major contribution not only to Jews, but to history, to law, to culture - to humanity at large. I further argue that as a singular legal event, the Eichmann trial calls for a rethinking - and sets in motion a transvaluation - of the structures and the values of conventional criminal law. I submit that the quintessence of the Eichmann trial is the acquisition of semantic authority by victims. It was the newly acquired semantic and historical authority of this revolutionary story that, for the first time, created what we know today as the Holocaust: a theme of international discussion and world conversation designating the experience of the victims and referring to the crime against the Jewish people independently from the political and military story of the Second World War. (shrink)

Commentators often note that there are contradictions, or at least inconsistencies, in Arendt’s work. On the one hand, Arendt is accused of theoretical inconsistencies, insofar as she makes claims in her later work that seem incompatible with claims she made earlier. On the other hand, Arendt has been accused of contradicting herself morally, with some commentators claiming that Arendt should not have written Eichmann in Jerusalem the way she wrote it. Both views place the treatment of the 1961 Eichmann (...) class='Hi'>trial at the center of Arendt’s thought, and cast it as representing a radical shift from Arendt’s earlier work. This article shows that both views fail to acknowledge the importance of what I call the “archetype of non-contradiction” in Arendt’s work. I argue that, viewed in perspective, her treatment of the Eichmann trial is simply another instance of Arendt attempting to follow the archetype of non-contradiction, practicing tentative and fluid thinking, and maintaining her friendship with herself. (shrink)

Commentaries on Eichmann in Jerusalem are of two kinds. The first confronts the historical relevance of Arendt's `report' and attempts to ascertain whether her ironical presentation of Eichmann's trial matches reality, namely, the incommensurable suffering of the Jewish people. The second focuses on the meaning of her expression `the banality of evil', and places Arendt in a long tradition of moral and political philosophy concerned with the problem of evil and, accordingly, of judging evil. The argument of this paper (...) is that both paths of research miss Arendt's intention, and that her `report' has to be read in light of Walter Benjamin's conceptions of history and storytelling. On the one hand, Eichmann in Jerusalem was not intended to reflect reality objectively because, as Arendt claimed, the objectivity of scientific historiography may serve only to condone the genocide. Throughout her entire work, Arendt aimed at avoiding the neutrality of historicism, the `tradition of sine ira et studio', which, according to her, represents a renunciation of responsibility. On the other hand, Arendt emphasized that she did not attempt to write about the nature of evil but to faithfully describe a phenomenon. Therefore the questions to be answered are: What did Arendt mean by a `report'? What does it mean to describe Eichmann's trial non-objectively but faithfully? In this paper, I show that her report should be understood in the light of a new methodological experiment inherited from Benjamin, which can be broken down into two steps: 1. To reveal the truth of history in stories rather than seek historical `objectivity' through theories; and 2. To look at events from forgotten standpoints, which are assumed to represent the experienced `inside' of history. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eichmann, Empathy, and LolitaLeland de la DurantayeISometime in late 1960 or early 1961 Adolf Eichmann, jailed and awaiting trial in Jerusalem, was given by his guard a copy of Vladimir Nabokov's recently published Lolita, as Hannah Arendt puts it, "for relaxation." After two days Eichmann returned it, visibly indignant: "Quite an unwholesome book"—Das ist aber ein sehr unerfreuliches Buch—he told his guard. 1 Though we are not privy (...) to, and nor does Arendt speculate upon this officer's intentions, it is difficult to imagine that they were limited to procuring Eichmann a little "relaxation." The tale of a homicidal madman writing under observation and awaiting a trial that will consign him either to death or prolonged imprisonment—which fate spares him by felling him with a heart attack—could hardly have been very relaxing for someone at that moment writing his own memoirs and himself awaiting a trial with similar stakes.We might imagine other intentions on the part of Eichmann's guard. Could the gesture have been ironic? Or was it motivated by a dark curiosity—something of the order of an experiment? The sulphurous halo of Nabokov's book was still burning brightly in the popular consciousness of 1960. 2 Might Eichmann's guard have seen Lolita as a sort of litmus test for radical evil, and wanted to see whether the real-life villain—he who impassively organized the transport towards certain death of countless innocents—would coldly, even gleefully, approve the various and vile machinations of Nabokov's creation?This is all only speculation. In Arendt's account, she congratulates Eichmann for his indignation and moves on to other matters. In any event, given Eichmann's radical conventionality one could hardly imagine him liking—or even very well understanding—much of the book. As [End Page 311] Eichmann himself avowed, during his adult life he had read only two books, one of them being Theodor Herzl's The Jewish State. But whatever the motivations of Eichmann's guard, whatever Eichmann's degree of comprehension, and whatever congratulations Eichmann might have deserved for his disgust, the incident raises a question for the study of Nabokov's finest work which has yet to be answered.IIBefore turning to this question, let us remain with Arendt and her notorious reader for a moment. Arendt notes elsewhere that it appeared to her that Eichmann was nearly "aphasic." She comments that, "when he did succeed in constructing a sentence of his own, he repeated it until it became a cliché," and that, "his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else." Arendt offers here nothing less than a definition of thought itself. "To think" is glossed ("... namely") by Arendt as, "to think from the standpoint of someone else." Though as a definition of thought, it is hardly impressive, it nevertheless expresses something essential about Arendt's conception of thought and thinking. (3) In her view, thought is to be placed under the sign of intellectual empathy, under the sign of living in the strangeness and wonder of another's world. (Though Arendt does not mention the connection, both the language she wrote Eichmann in—English—and her native one—German—make special provision for such a sense, as he or she who is "thoughtless" is not her or she who is incapable of some form of cognition or calculation, as "thoughtless" people can indeed be very clever and very clever people have been capable of great "thoughtlessness.")Thought is thus a communal, not individualistic, thing. 4 This point is important as, though Adolf Eichmann was unlikely to have seen much of himself in the irreverent and urbane genius of Nabokov's Humbert Humbert, nor in the latter's strange eloquence, Eichmann the man and Humbert the character of the first part of the novel (to leave the repenting Humbert of the book's last pages out for the moment), share an essential trait. What Eichmann the man shares with Nabokov's literary creation is the inability or unwillingness "to think from the standpoint of somebody else." The evil they share is the... (shrink)

The eminent philosopher and political theorist Hannah Arendt once attended a similar trial with a similar plea: the 1961 trial of the mid‐level Nazi official Adolf Eichmann. She portrayed him as an exemplar of what she termed the banality of evil. After his capture in 1960, Eichmann was tried on charges including war crimes and crimes against humanity. Eichmann was an exemplary case of the thoughtlessness and lack of self‐reflection that goes into setting unthinkable atrocities into motion. Like (...) Eichmann, Mao doesn't cut the figure of a hardline fanatic, blinded by ideology. Mao's unwillingness to place the cause ahead of his own desires should indicate that he isn't wholly blinded by fanaticism, as Dresden is. In her characterizations of Eichmann, Arendt noted his odd lack of imagination, his inability, in other words, “to think from the standpoint of someone else.”. (shrink)

This essay examines the Kastner trial and the Eichmann trial as constitutive moments in the development of Israeli collective identity. This aspect of the trials is explored by comparing the intervention of two intellectuals, Nathan Alterman and Hannah Arendt, in the two trials respectively. Both social critics challenged the terms of the collective identity that was reinforced by the trials. During the Kastner trial, the Israeli poet Alterman set out to challenge the "two paths" conception of heroism (...) and cowardice that shaped the court's - and society's - understanding of the Holocaust. The first part of the essay examines Alterman's critical intervention and the public controversy that followed in its wake. In the second part, I examine Arendt's criticism of the Eichmann trial as an attempt to construct Israeli collective identity around opposition to the demonic Nazi In this context, I discuss the famous controversy between Arendt and Gershom Scholem over the terms of her criticism. The two episodes come together in the third part of the essay, where I discuss the surprising continuities and affinities between the controversies. The two controversies offer a fascinating tale about the role of the law in the construction of collective identities and the role of the social critic in the development of a liberal society. (shrink)

During her lifetime Hannah Arendt's provocative writings attracted a strong group of admirers who drew inspiration from them. She also provoked some sharp controversies, especially in regard to her notion of the "banality of evil," which is elaborated in her report of Eichmann's trial. But Arendt's "independent thinking" never fit easily with conventional academic philosophy and political science. Was she an occasional thinker responding to the events of her time, or can one detect a more systematic endeavor in her (...) varied writings? (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's political philosophy, focused on her works "The Human Condition", "Origins of Totalitarianism" and "Eichmann in Jerusalem", provides a theoretical framework for understanding the shattering and reconstruction of the public sphere in the face of the totalitarian experiences of the 20th century. The aim of this research is to present a legal-philosophical analysis of the trials of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, revealing Arendt's perceptions of the public sphere as a space of plurality, (...) reconciling it with responsibility and justice in the protection of human dignity. Finally, we discuss the consequences for the creation of the International Criminal Court as a permanent criminal institution. (shrink)

Theater requires artifice, justice demands truth. Are these demands as irreconcilable as the pejorative term “show trials” suggests? After the Second World War, canonical directors and playwrights sought to claim a new public role for theater by restaging the era’s great trials as shows. The Nuremberg trials, the Eichmann trial, and the Auschwitz trials were all performed multiple times, first in courts and then in theaters. Does justice require both courtrooms and stages? In Staged, Minou Arjomand draws on a (...) rich archive of postwar German and American rehearsals and performances to reveal how theater can become a place for forms of storytelling and judgment that are inadmissible in a court of law but indispensable for public life. She unveils the affinities between dramatists like Bertolt Brecht, Erwin Piscator, and Peter Weiss and philosophers such as Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin, showing how they responded to the rise of fascism with a new politics of performance. Linking performance with theories of aesthetics, history, and politics, Arjomand argues that it is not subject matter that makes theater political but rather the act of judging a performance in the company of others. Staged weaves together theater history and political philosophy into a powerful and timely case for the importance of theaters as public institutions. (shrink)

There are certain moments, such as the American founding or the Civil Rights Movement, that we revisit again and again as instances of democratic triumph, and there are other moments that haunt us as instances of democratic failure. How should we view moments of democratic failure, when both the law and citizens forsake justice? Do such moments reveal a wholesale failure of democracy or a more contested failing, pointing to what could have been, and still might be? Public Trials reveals (...) the considerable stakes of how we understand democratic failure. Maxwell argues against a tendency in the thinking of Plato, Rousseau and contemporary theorists to view moments of democratic failure as indicative of the failure of democracy, insomuch as such thinking leads to a deference to authority that unintentionally encourages complicity in elite and legal failures to assure justice. In contrast, what Maxwell calls "lost cause narratives" of democratic failure reveal the contingency of democratic failure by showing that things "could have been" otherwise-and, with public action and response, might yet be. A politics of lost causes calls for democratic responsiveness to failure via practices of resistance, theatrical claims-making, and re-narration. Maxwell makes a powerful case for the politics of lost causes by examining public controversies over trials. She focuses on the dilemmas and diagnoses of democratic failure in four instances: Edmund Burke's speeches and writings on the Warren Hastings trial in late 18th century Britain, Emile Zola's writings on the Dreyfus Affair in late 19th century France, Hannah Arendt's writings on the Eichmann trial in 1960's Israel, and Kathryn Bigelow's recent narration of (the lack of) trials of alleged terrorist detainees in Zero Dark Thirty. Maxwell marshals her subtle, historically grounded readings of these texts to show the dangers of despairing of democracy altogether, as well as the necessity of re-narrating instances of democratic failure so as to cultivate public responsiveness to such failures in the future. (shrink)

The public perception of decision‐making procedures as fair processes is a central means for establishing their legitimacy to make difficult resource allocation decisions. According to the ethical framework of accountability for reasonableness (A4R, hereafter), which specifies conditions for fair healthcare resource allocation, disagreements about what constitutes relevant considerations are a central threat to its perceived fairness. This article considers how an ethical principle grounded in the public memory of past traumatic events may become the topic of such disagreements. I demonstrate (...) this through an anthropological case study of a recent public de bate concerning an Israeli healthcare allocation committee (HAC, thereafter), which determines state subsidies for new medical technologies as part of Israel’s public healthcare system. Drawing upon ethnographic fieldwork about the HAC, I show how the public memory of Adolf Eichmann’s trial constitutes a bioethical problem for the committee’s legitimacy. Based on Arendt’s and Bauman’s writings that Nazi bureaucrats’ manner of “following orders” was an ethical transgression, some patients contended that the committee has a historical responsibility to question its strict adherence to bureaucratic procedures. Since the committee did not have a direct link to the events of the Holocaust, other considerations seemed to them more relevant. I then present an offer that can settle this disagreement and maintain the HAC’s legitimacy according to A4R. I conclude by discussing the contribution of empirical data to models of bioethical legitimacy. (shrink)

In this article, I bring together Hannah Arendt’s and Simone de Beauvoir’s respective theories of political judgment to evaluate the problems that arise from their accounts of judgment in praxis. To do so, I compare Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil on Adolf Eichmann’s trial in Israel and Beauvoir’s “An Eye for an Eye” on Robert Brasillach’s trial in France. In approaching the dilemmas of judgment in theory, both share a commitment to (...) preserving freedom by virtue of our human plurality. In practice, however, both respectively demand the death penalty for Eichmann and Brasillach. I identify three distinct failures of political judgment in praxis: from the accused, the courts, and Arendt and Beauvoir, respectively. I contend that Arendt and Beauvoir fail to appropriately judge Eichmann and Brasillach by arguing for their execution, because it constitutes a form of political violence that undermines their theoretical accounts of judgment. (shrink)

This article connects the theory of Hannah Arendt and the philosophy of Stanley Cavell to the questions of what thinking is and how it appears on film. It focuses on two theatrical trials: Adolph Eichmann’s trial (1961) and the ending sequence in Frank Capra’s Mr. Deeds Goes to Town (1936) in which the questions of thought and thoughtlessness are at stake. Whereas Arendt considers the ways that thinking poses challenges to representation (there is, she writes, a “scarcity of (...) documentary evidence”), Cavell turns to cinema and the camera’s “knowledge of the metaphysical restlessness” that becomes manifest when the mind thinks and the body fidgets. He goes so far as to argue that cinema may even “prove thinking.” Though they arrive at opposite conclusions, Cavell and Arendt share a critique of modern subjectivity that these trials bring to light: reason has replaced thinking and skepticism of the world has replaced consciousness in it. But film, as read through Cavell, may reveal a crisis of altogether different order. It is not that thinking cannot be represented, as Arendt argues; in the age of cinema, thinking cannot be concealed. If anything, thoughtlessness defies representation. (shrink)

This article compares Hannah Arendt's famous essay on Adolf Eichmann's trial in Israel in 1961 to Simone de Beauvoir's little studied piece, "An Eye for an Eye," on the trial of Robert Brasillach in France in 1945. Arendt and Beauvoir each determine the complicity of individuals acting within a political order that seeks to eliminate certain forms of otherness and difference, but come to differing conclusions about the significance of the crimes. I explain Beauvoir's account of ambiguity, on (...) which she draws in her judgment of Brasillach and elaborates in her 1948 Ethics of Ambiguity, ana measure it against Arendt's account of Eichmann's thoughtlessness and its effects on the destruction of conditions of worldly plurality. Linking the failure of ethical judgment on the part of individuals to prior systemic political conditions, Beauvoir helps us recognize struggles over the meaning of bodies and conditions of inequality as central to politics. (shrink)

It seems that the first two decades of the twenty first century demonstrate political mythology to be still functioning in the political life of the West. In this context, it is interesting to view the recent publications of Hans Blumenberg’s Nachlass: Präfiguration and Rigorismus der Wahrheit, as they reveal unpredicted complications for the interpretation of his philosophy of myth as well as of his political stances. They also evoke some more general questions concerning the role of myth in our contemporary (...) political life. The aim of this article is to present the paradoxes connected with the posthumously published Blumenberg critique of Hannah Arendt and to situate it in the wider context of twentieth century political thought, specifically the work of Sorel, Schmitt, Rosenberg and Cassirer. It is also to point to more general ethical and political ambiguities connected with the problem of political mythology in the present. (shrink)

Dans son rapport sur le procès d’Eichmann, Hannah Arendt propose le concept de banalité du mal pour caractériser le comportement des fonctionnaires allemands qui ont rendu possible l’Extermination des juifs. La banalité du mal désigne la perte du sens de la responsabilité politique au profit d’un simple « sens du devoir » à l’égard de l’Etat quel qu’il soit. Pourtant, selon l’historien Raoul Hilberg, ce qui frappe dans le processus de l’Extermination c’est la remarquable autonomie des services administratifs impliqués par (...) rapport à la sphère politique. Comprendre comment cette autonomie peut se concilier avec un non-engagement politique, telle est la question philosophique ici posée.The concept of banality of evil, as proposed by- Hannah Arendt in her report on Eichmann’s trial, serves the purpose of understanding the role and attitude of german bureaucrats regarding the Extermination process. This concept relates to a sense of duty lacking of personal judgement and political responsability. However, the description Raoul Hilberg gives of the Bureaucracy of extermination reveals remarkably self-governing actions. How does this self-government and the absence of political intentions can coexist in a same person, in a same institution? (shrink)

In 1967, Hannah Arendt published an essay with the deceptively simple title “Truth and Politics”. Most scholarly discussions of her essay consider her distinction between a traditional political art of limited, deliberate, strategic lying and modern, organised, global lying and self-deception and then evaluate her qualified defence of the virtues of mendacity. This article suggests, however, that her essay has a much broader ambit: viz., to defend the political value of truth-telling. The main purpose of this article is to demonstrate (...) that she formulates her essay as an apology of the truth-teller in politics and of her own truth-telling in her controversial report of the Eichmann trial. It first surveys the personal motives of Arendt’s political defence of frank speech. It shows that in developing this defence she significantly revises her scepticism about the value of truth-telling in politics. She does so by identifying three different types of truth-teller with distinctive political roles: philosophers who exemplify the truth in their own lives, citizens who see the world from other people’s perspectives, and poets and historians whose stories reconcile citizens to the past. Finally, it argues that the tragic political perspective Arendt sought to revive requires acknowledging value of the emotions in making political judgments. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The influence by Walter Benjamin on Arendt’s notion of narrativity has been firmly established, but little research has been done to contextualize his influence. This paper fill this lacunae by showing how, like Benjamin, Arendt was concerned to deploy a form of writing history that ensures the individuality of its agents, but that as she articulated her notion of the public space, the redemptive, messianic elements in his historiography were replaced with a secular and political mode of remembrance. The (...) notion of the public space and the accompanying secularization of Benjamin’s redemptive history should not be understood as the result of a linear development, but rather as responses to contemporary political events, of which I focus on three: (1) her early writings on totalitarianism, in which she tries to come to terms with the Shoah; (2) her reflections on the Greek city state, in which she criticizes the instrumentalization of politics in post-war democracies such as West-Germany; and finally, (3) the court room as a space for storytelling and the contestation over the history of anti-Semitism during the Eichmann trial. (shrink)

Arendt claims that evil is banal and its perpetrators merely shallow. Deliberate evil she takes to be extremely rare. However, nonrare examples of deliberate evil, whose aim is to spoil one's story, abound in everyday life. Arendt also makes forgiveness personal, not requiring repentance. This prompts a consideration of certain personal relations among philosophers. Heidegger's relation to Husserl shows a betrayal of teacher by student. His seductive and philosophic power over Arendt, a betrayal of student by teacher, should not be (...) dismissed in terms of reductive Freudian notions. Faced with a real feminine predicament, Arendt made the wrong choices: in her exoneration of Heidegger, her report on the Eichmann trial, and her exculpatory doctrine of evil. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to examine the role that memory and oblivion, forgiveness and unforgiveness play in Hannah Arendt’s thought in relation to acts of violence in the political sphere. Political communities do not always decide to remember the crimes they have committed or the wrongs they have suffered, but neither can they always forget their mutual harms, even when there is already peace between them. Without striving to exhaust the entire subject matter of Arendt’s work, I would (...) like to illustrate the difficulty of understanding the role forgiveness plays in her thought as well as to indicate possible solutions when forgiveness becomes unachievable within the framework of her considerations. Her reflection can be divided into two stages. The first is a focus on the idea of radical evil and the need to forgive perpetrators for their crimes. Second, under the influence of the Adolf Eichmann trial, she developed the idea of the banality of evil. This idea points to situations so terrible that they transcend all human moral judgment, making forgiveness impossible. However, even when the moral possibility of individual forgiveness has been rejected, when the legal possibility of seeking justice has been exhausted and when victims and perpetrators in the community are still unable to live together peacefully, Arendt’s thought leads us to the possibility of political reconciliation. (shrink)

RESUMEN. La cuestión del mal ocupa un lugar central en el pensamiento de Hannah Arendt al constituir un concepto transversal que recorre todos sus trenes de pensamiento. Se somete a análisis la “naturaleza del mal” a través del estudio de su obra y de su propia experiencia vital, especialmente al cubrir el juicio de Eichmann en Jerusalén, donde ella afirmaría que éste representaba “la banalidad del mal”. Se trata de averiguar si en su particular concepción del mal influyó Voltaire, por (...) qué surge el mal, por qué se manifiesta de forma permanente en la historia y si puede ser destruido ABSTRACT. The topic of evil has a central place in Hannah Arendt’s thinking as it lies at the core of all her trains of thought. We analyze the “nature of evil” in Hannah Arendt’s philosophy through the study of her work and of her life experience, especially when she covered the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem where she pointed out that Eichmann represented “the banality of evil”. Our goal in this contribution is to understand whether the philosophy of Voltaire could have influenced Arendt’s conception of evil, why it arises, why it persists throughout history, and whether it can be destroyed. (shrink)

This article seeks to investigate the role that a symbol—connected to a legal event and a collective trauma—has in the construction of a past imaginary. It begins with a theoretical reflection on the role of the symbol as proposed by Juri Lotman and the function of repetition in the consolidation of collective memory. It subsequently focuses on the semiotic resonance of one specific object: the bulletproof cabin of the Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann, used during his trial in Jerusalem, in (...) 1961. I consider the ‘afterlives’ of this object, examining the different ‘remakes’ of Eichmann’s cabin in several mediatic and artistic contexts, focusing on the modalities that have anchored it to the post-1961 imaginary of the perpetrator and the legal consequences of his actions. To do so, the article proposes a typology of uses of the cabin, identifying the different nuances of its representation and how they encapsulate the thorny issues surrounding that infamous legal event. (shrink)

The well-known metaphor on the banality of evil, used by Arendt on the trial of the Nazi hierarch Eichmann in Jerusalem, can also be reviewed in the light of the so-called "affective turn" in the social sciences. Eichmann's tragic obedience to the creators of the Holocaust does not only derive from the renunciation to implement an autonomous thought, in the context of the Nazi system, but also from a deep inability to feel emotions and to develop empathic relationships. This (...) allows a process of identification with the manipulation of emotions and feelings put into practice by the regime and at the same time a process of pathological detachment towards the politically persecuted by the regime itself. Keywords: Symbolic politics; Affective Turn; Political communication La ben nota metafora sulla banalità del male, usata dalla Arendt nel processo al gerarca nazista Eichmann a Gerusalemme, può anche essere rivista alla luce della cosiddetta "svolta affettiva" nelle scienze sociali. La tragica obbedienza di Eichmann ai creatori dell'Olocausto non deriva solo dalla rinuncia ad attuare un pensiero autonomo, nel contesto del sistema nazista, ma anche da una profonda incapacità di provare emozioni e di sviluppare relazioni empatiche. Ciò consente un processo di identificazione con la manipolazione delle emozioni e dei sentimenti messa in pratica dal regime e allo stesso tempo un processo di distacco patologico nei confronti dei perseguitati politicamente dal regime stesso. Parole chiave: Politica simbolica; Svolta affettiva; Political communication. (shrink)

Kant’s rejection of rebellion as a political right seems to be problematic for his concept of duty. The paper discusses the trial of the Holocaust perpetrator Adolf Eichmann as a possible case against Kant’s political philosophy. It argues, however, that Kant in his Critique of Judgment and in his philosophy of religion has articulated a very sophisticated point of view.

What can we learn about the trial of Socrates from Plato's Dialogues? Most scholars say we can learn a lot from the Apology, but not from the rest. Plato's Trial of Athens rejects this assumption and argues that Plato used several of his dialogues to turn the tables on Socrates' accusers: they blamed Socrates for something the city had done to itself. Plato wanted to set the record straight and save his city from repeating her worst mistakes of (...) the 5th century. Plato's Trial of Athens addresses challenging questions about the historicity of Plato's Dialogues, and it traces Plato's critique of Athenian public life and polis culture from the trial in 399 up through the Laws and the Atlantis myth in the Critias and Timaeus. In the end, Ralkowski shows that what began as a bitter response to the unjust, politically-charged trial of Socrates, evolved into a pessimistic reflection on the role of philosophy in a democratic society, a theory about Athens' 5th century decline, and cautionary tale about the corrupting influences of naval imperialism. (shrink)

The immediate purpose of this article is to examine Hannah Arendtʼs analysis of Adolf Eichmann in order to point out the groundlessness of her argument that evil, whether in the person of Eichmann himself or in general, can be treated as banal. The wider purpose of this article is to divest any argument that is based on the concept that evil is banal, ordinary, or trivial of any valid grounding. To develop the immediate purpose, the article begins with a close (...) analysis of the word ‘banal’ in the context of discussions of evil to highlight the immense (and dangerous) power of language. It discusses plausible reasons for Arendt’s choice of ‘The Banality of Evil’ as part of the subtitle of her book Eichmann in Jerusalem. It then addresses two major questions: How did Arendt obtain the impression of the banality of Adolf Eichmann in the first place? What are the consequences of considering evil as trivial? The argument is made that Arendt communicated, regardless of her intention, that evil was trivial. Moreover, Arendt’s description of evil as banal and trivial directly contradicts evidence that Arendt presented in Eichmann in Jerusalem. The article then turns to address the widespread adoption of Arendt’s account in the prominent literature on Eichmann and the Holocaust as a ‘thoughtless’ move, pointing out that this is precisely the kind of perverse account of evil that such subtle and evil mind as Eichmann’s would want us to entertain. To introduce its wider purpose, the article concludes with a discussion of the pernicious consequences of equating evil with banality and of the need to abandon definitively this point of view. The argument is made that ordinariness is not and should never be an excuse for crime, for doing so is akin to inviting evil into our homes and shrugging our shoulders upon its entrance. (shrink)

In Corneille’s Horace the hero is brought to trial for having defended Rome’s integrity by killing his own sister. The fifth act of the play is devoted to this trial, but should also be read like an allegorical re-enactment of the Querelle du Cid, during which Corneille himself was put to a kind of a ‘’trial’’ by colleagues and critics scandalized by the moral and ideological audacity of this first play dedicated to a criminal hero. Our paper (...) tries to point out in detail the analogies that authorize such a reading. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt's rich and varied political thought is more influential today than ever before, due in part to the collapse of communism and the need for ideas that move beyond the old ideologies of the Cold War. As Dana Villa shows, however, Arendt's thought is often poorly understood, both because of its complexity and because her fame has made it easy for critics to write about what she is reputed to have said rather than what she actually wrote. Villa sets (...) out to change that here, explaining clearly, carefully, and forcefully Arendt's major contributions to our understanding of politics, modernity, and the nature of political evil in our century.Villa begins by focusing on some of the most controversial aspects of Arendt's political thought. He shows that Arendt's famous idea of the banality of evil--inspired by the trial of Adolf Eichmann--does not, as some have maintained, lessen the guilt of war criminals by suggesting that they are mere cogs in a bureaucratic machine. He examines what she meant when she wrote that terror was the essence of totalitarianism, explaining that she believed Nazi and Soviet terror served above all to reinforce the totalitarian idea that humans are expendable units, subordinate to the all-determining laws of Nature or History. Villa clarifies the personal and philosophical relationship between Arendt and Heidegger, showing how her work drew on his thought while providing a firm repudiation of Heidegger's political idiocy under the Nazis. Less controversially, but as importantly, Villa also engages with Arendt's ideas about the relationship between political thought and political action. He explores her views about the roles of theatricality, philosophical reflection, and public-spiritedness in political life. And he explores what relationship, if any, Arendt saw between totalitarianism and the "great tradition" of Western political thought. Throughout, Villa shows how Arendt's ideas illuminate contemporary debates about the nature of modernity and democracy and how they deepen our understanding of philosophers ranging from Socrates and Plato to Habermas and Leo Strauss.Direct, lucid, and powerfully argued, this is a much-needed analysis of the central ideas of one of the most influential political theorists of the twentieth century. (shrink)

The disastrous gas leak at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, in December 1984 displayed the law’s tragic inability to cope with the consequences of technological globalization. This essay describes the protracted efforts of the gas victims to obtain relief from courts in India and the United States and the reasons why the settlement of their legal claims did not satisfy their demands for justice. The victims’ self‐knowledge, whether scientific or social, found no traction in official medical record keeping (...) or in courts of law. Their experience highlights the structural asymmetries of technology transfer across national boundaries. Union Carbide’s technology of production moved from West to East with little hindrance and, in retrospect, with insufficient regard to conditions in Bhopal. By contrast, India’s attempts to transfer legal accountability back to the exporting country proved essentially impossible, as American courts insisted that claims be resolved by Indian judges under Indian law. (shrink)

While acknowledging Hannah Arendt's keen philosophical and political insights, Kathryn T. Gines claims that there are some problematic assertions and oversights regarding Arendt’s treatment of the "Negro question." Gines focuses on Arendt's reaction to the desegregation of Little Rock schools, to laws making mixed marriages illegal, and to the growing civil rights movement in the south. Reading them alongside Arendt's writings on revolution, the human condition, violence, and responses to the Eichmann war crimes trial, Gines provides a systematic analysis (...) of anti-black racism in Arendt’s work. (shrink)

Decisions by industry sponsors to end clinical trials early for commercial reasons have been the subject of controversy. I argue that the principal consideration in assessing these decisions ought to be the way in which the termination would affect the trial’s risk–benefit relationship. If there is not yet sufficient benefit to be gained from the study to offset the risks to which participants were exposed and it is expected that important scientific information would be obtained if the trial (...) were continued, early termination constitutes an unethical alteration of the risk−benefit relationship. This violates the grounds on which permission is given to conduct human research, patients consent to participate, and investigators agree to conduct studies. These knowable and avoidable changes in risk–benefit relationship should generally be seen as impermissible. (shrink)

Norman Kretzmann's recent analysis of the natural law slogan ``lex iniusta non est lex'' (an unjust law is not a law) demonstrates the coherence of the slogan and makes a case for its practical value, but I shall argue that it also ends up showing that the slogan fails to mark any interesting conceptual or practical division between natural law and legal positivist views about the nature of law. I argue that this is a happy result. The non-est-lex slogan has (...) been used to exaggerate the extent of disagreement about the nature of law and has diverted critics of natural law theory from recognizing that the main disagreement between natural lawyers and legal positivists centres on theories of practical reason and how they affect our understanding of the relationship between law and morality. This extends the debate about the nature of law somewhat beyond the traditional boundaries of philosophy of law, but these boundaries are due in part to the diversion created by debate over the non-est-lex slogan. Recognizing that the non-est-lex slogan fails on its own to mark any interesting practical or conceptual division between natural law theories and legal positivism should therefore focus and encourage debate on matters of genuine substance between these outlooks. The disagreement, however, may turn out to be primarily metaphysical and explanatory and not normative in nature. (shrink)

"After observing the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Hannah Arendt articulated her controversial concept of the "banality of evil", thereby one of the most chilling and divisive moral questions of the twentieth century: How can genocidal acts be carried out by non-psychopathic people? By revealing the full complexity of the trial with reasoning that defied prevailing attitudes, Arendt became the object of severe and often slanderous criticism... [This book] explores the ways in which [Arendt] "unlearned" recognized trends and patterns (...) - both philosophical and cultural - to establish a theoretical praxis all her own. Through an analysis of the social context and intellectual influences - Karl Jaspers, Walter Benjamin, and Martin Heidegger - that helped shape Arendt's process, Knott has formed a historically engaged and incisive contribution to Arendt's legacy."--Jacket. (shrink)

Nancy Scheper-Hughes is one of the most prominent critics of markets in human organs. Unfortunately, Scheper-Hughes rejects the view that markets should be used to solve the current shortage of transplant organs without engaging with the arguments in favour of them. Scheper-Hughes’s rejection of such markets is of especial concern, given her influence over their future, for she holds, among other positions, the status of an adviser to the World Health Organization on issues related to global transplantation. Given her influence, (...) it is important that Scheper-Hughes’s moral condemnation of markets in human organs be subject to critical assessment. Such critical assessment, however, has not generally been forthcoming. A careful examination of Scheper-Hughes’s anti-market stance shows that it is based on serious mischaracterisations of both the pro-market position and the medical and economic realities that underlie it. In this paper, the author will expose and correct these mischaracterisations and, in so doing, show that her objections to markets in human organs are unfounded. (shrink)

Participants in some clinical trials are at risk of being harmed and sometimes are seriously harmed as a result of not being provided with available, relevant risk information. We argue that this situation is unacceptable and that there is a moral duty to disclose all adverse clinical trial results to participants in clinical trials. This duty is grounded in the human right not to be placed at risk of harm without informed consent. We consider objections to disclosure grounded in (...) considerations of commercial interest, and we argue that these concerns are insufficient to override the moral duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results. However, we also develop a proposal that enables commercial interests to be protected, while promoting the duty to disclose adverse clinical trial results. (shrink)

The attitudes of women patients with cancer were explored when they were invited to participate in one of three randomised trials that included chemotherapy at two university centres and a satellite centre. Fourteen patients participating in and 15 patients declining trials were interviewed. Analysis was based on the constant comparative method. Most patients voiced positive attitudes towards clinical research, believing that trials are necessary for further medical development, and most spontaneously argued that participation is a moral obligation. Most trial (...) decliners, however, described a radical change in focus as they faced the actual personal choice. Almost no one got an impression of clinical equipoise between treatments in the trials, and most patients expressed discomfort with randomisation. A patient’s choice to participate was mainly determined by whether the primary focus was on treatment effect or on adverse effects. Both knowledge about and feelings towards trials originated mostly from the media, although paradoxically the media were largely seen as untrustworthy. Mistrust was shown towards the pharmaceutical industry, and although most patients originally trusted that doctors primarily pursued the interest of patients, they did not trust the adequacy of doctors or industry in maintaining self-regulation. Thus, public control measures were judged to be essential. (shrink)

BackgroundAccurate reporting on sex and gender in health research is integral to ensuring that health interventions are safe and effective. In Canada and internationally, governments, research organizations, journal editors, and health agencies have called for more inclusive research, provision of sex-disaggregated data, and the integration of sex and gender analysis throughout the research process. Sex and gender analysis is generally defined as an approach for considering how and why different subpopulations (e.g., of diverse genders, ages, and social locations) may experience (...) health conditions and interventions in different or similar ways.The objective of this study was to assess the extent and nature of reporting about sex and/or gender, including whether sex and gender analysis (SGA) was carried out in a sample of Canadian randomized controlled trials (RCTs) with human participants.MethodsWe searched MEDLINE from 01 January 2013 to 23 July 2014 using a validated filter for identification of RCTs, combined with terms related to Canada. Two reviewers screened the search results to identify the first 100 RCTs that were either identified in the trial publication as funded by a Canadian organization or which had a first or last author based in Canada. Data were independently extracted by two people from 10% of the RCTs during an initial training period; once agreement was reached on this sample, the remainder of the data extraction was completed by one person and verified by a second.ResultsThe search yielded 1433 records. We screened 256 records to identify 100 RCTs which met our eligibility criteria. The median sample size of the RCTs was 107 participants (range 12–6085). While 98% of studies described the demographic composition of their participants by sex, only 6% conducted a subgroup analysis across sex and 4% reported sex-disaggregated data. No article defined “sex” and/or “gender.” No publication carried out a comprehensive sex and gender analysis.ConclusionsFindings highlight poor uptake of sex and gender considerations in the Canadian RCT context and underscore the need for better articulated guidance on sex and gender analysis to improve reporting of evidence, inform policy development, and guide future research. (shrink)

This article offers a political reading of Franz Kafka's posthumous work The Trial. In this novel, the main protagonist (Joseph K.) is subject to an arrest and trial conducted by the ambiguous authority of a shadowy court and its officials. This article explores Joseph K.'s experience of being subject to the Law, and relates this to our own understanding and experience of political subjectivity in modern times. K.'s doomed search for order through a ‘permanent resolution’ of his case (...) is related to the modern desire for order: Specifically, the desire for both philosophical and political frameworks that provide narratives or certainty. Here modernity is understood to be characterized by an anxiety brought about by a crisis in authorship and authority. The article then considers K.'s desire for justice and the Law, and his entanglement with the power of the court, as analogous to the modern experience of the triad of justice–law–power, which is subsumed under the banner of ‘sovereignty’. In particular, the article explores K.'s inability to locate, read, or fix the Law; a problem that is also reflected in the aporia of sovereignty as justice–law–power. K.'s experience alerts us to the contradictions in the triad justice–law–power; contradictions that occur as although each member of the triad is dependent upon the other two, each member of the triad also seeks to exclude or deny this dependency. Thus, read politically, K.'s struggle in The Trial can be seen as a reflection of the modern struggle with sovereignty as the triad justice–law–power, and the impasse that K. reaches is also the impasse that modernity has reached. (shrink)