This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Disentangling the Social The Definition of Relativism The Confusion of Relativism and Idealism The Confusion Between Relativism and Subjectivism The Confusion Between Relativism and Particularism Are All Truths Absolute Truths? Propositions Concept Satisfaction Rules The Naturalistic Framework Verbum Sat Sapienti References.

This paper presents a particularist and naturalist response to epistemic relativism. The response is based on an analysis of the source of epistemic relativism, according to which epistemic relativism is closely related to Pyrrhonian scepticism. The paper starts with a characterization of epistemic relativism. Such relativism is explicitly distinguished from epistemological contextualism. Next the paper presents an argument for epistemic relativism that is based on the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. It then considers a (...) response to the problem of the criterion proposed by Roderick Chisholm, which is based on epistemological particularism. After sketching Chisholm’s approach, a response to epistemic relativism is presented which combines Chisholm’s particularism with epistemic naturalism and reliabilism. A number of objections to the position are then considered. The paper ends with remarks about the relationship between particularism and the naturalistic response proposed to epistemic relativism. (shrink)

Universalism can be defined as the belief in the universal application of certain knowledge, world-views and value-views. Universalism has often been confused with Occident-centrism, due to the fact that the latter was used to justify the former, which confused the content of a thought with the social condition that gave rise to the thought. For many years, clarifications of this confusion have been made in sociology of knowledge, relativism and skepticism. Yet, the particularistic conclusion thus reached has led (...) to more confusion, namely, that between the intrinsic criterion for truth and the practical application of thought. China, with its long tradition of Sino-centrism, has recently shown a movement towards particularism, characterized by a search for national and cultural superiority by "returning to the source". In today's academic circles, some particularist themes are taken for granted, and believed to be true, but cannot be proved with rational examination. The particularistic claims to the "self grounded", "self-featured" and "self-located" tradition of Chinese culture jointed with the post-modernism, neo-leftist movement of anti-globalization in the West, are not only harmful in practice, but also impotent in theory. The propaganda against the hegemony of Western discourse should be analyzed with questioning which hegemony and whose discourse. /// 普遍主义是—种相信某些知识、世界观和价值观具有普适性的立场。西方学 者曾经用西方中心论为普遍主义辩护，混淆了思想的内容和产生思想的社会条件这 两个不同的问题，因而遭到来自知识社会学、相对主义和怀疑主义等方面的正当批 评。但是，这些批评所导致的特殊主义，又混淆了真理的内在标准和思想的适用范 围这两个不同的问题。中国自古不乏华夏中心论的传统，现在则有以 "回归起源" 为特点的民族和文化优越感。当今学术界有一些已经习以为常、信以为真的提法， 反映出各种特殊主义观点和立场。与后现代主义和新左派的反全球化主义结合在一 起的关于中国传统文化的 "三本主义" (本位、本色、本土化)主张，不仅在实践上 是有害的，在理论上也是无效的。反"西方话语霸权"的口号，经不起"什么话语、 谁的霸权"的理性推敲。. (shrink)

I intend to: a) clarify the origins and de facto meanings of the term relativism; b) reconstruct the reasons for the birth of the thesis named “cultural relativism”; d) reconstruct ethical implications of the above thesis; c) revisit the recent discussion between universalists and particularists in the light of the idea of cultural relativism.. -/- 1.Prescriptive Moral Relativism: “everybody is justified in acting in the way imposed by criteria accepted by the group he belongs to”. (...) Universalism: there are at least some judgments which are valid inter-culturally Absolutism: there are at least some particular prescriptions which are valid without exception everywhere and always -/- 2. The traditional proof of prescriptive moral relativism: the argument from variability: Judgments, rules, and shared values are de facto variable in time and space. The traditional counter-proof: examples of variability do not prove what skeptics contend. -/- 3. Pre-history of the doctrine -Ancient sophists: either immoralist or contractualist -Modern moral scepticism (xvii c.): variability as an historical and ethnographic fact supports a sceptical conclusion more moderate than sheer immoralism. - Voltaire, Kant, Reid counter-attack pointing at a universally shared moral sense - Romantics and idealists stage an even more moderate reformulation: instead of universally shared moral sense they point at the Spirit of a People which is: a)alternative to abstract and universal philosophical systems as far as it is lived ‘culture’; b) indivisible unity with an inner harmony and a source of normative standards; c) dynamic, in so far as it is a manifestation of the Spirit through the becoming of National cultures. -/- 4. The birth of Cultural Relativism and its ethical implications 4.1. The 18th c. doctrine was the noble savage (a non-historical doctrine: state of nature vs. social state) 4.2 Edward Tylor (1832-1817) and ethnocentric historicism Savage moral standards are real enough, but they are far and weaker than ours. 4.3 Boas and Malinowski and an holistic reaction to ethnocentric historicism -/- Franz Boas (1858-1942): a) Development of civilizations is not ruled by technical progress nor does it follow a one-way path; instead there are parallel developments (for ex. Agriculture does not follow stock-raising); b) racial characters have no relevance in development of civilization; c) we are not yet in a position to compare externally identical kinds of behaviour till we have not yet understood beliefs and intentions laying at their roots (for ex.: “From an ethnological point of view murder cannot be considered as a single phenomenon”; d) we should distinguish among different practices which are only superficially similar (fro ex. practices traditionally classified under the label “tabù”); e) there is as a fact just one normative ethic, constant in its contents but varying in its extension; f) the implication is not that we cannot judge behavior by members of other groups; it is only a recommendation of caution. -/- Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942): a) against Tylor’s and Frazer’s “magpie” methodology, field-work is required, a culture as a whole should be observed from inside; individual elements are incomprehensible; b) a culture is an organic whole; c) its elements are accounted for by their function (economy), avoiding non-observables (empio-criticism). -/- Ruth Benedict and Melville Herskovitz identify Boas’s approach with “cultural relativism”. Benedict: what is normal and abnormal is to be judged on a culture’s own standards, not on our own (“Anthropology and the Abnormal”). Herskovits: “Boas adumbrates what we have come to call cultural relativism” (The Mind, p. 10); “Judgements are based on experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own enculturation” (Man and his Works). -/- 4. How analytic philosophy understood and misunderstood the discussion 4.1. At the beginning of the 20th c., the new view in ethics was non-cognitivism (emotivist and subjectivist). Eric Westermark combines this view with an old-style ethnographic approach in support of relativity of moralities. Moralities are codes, or systems of emotive ‘disinterested’ reactions selected by evolution on their usefulness in terms of survival value for the society that is the carrier of such systems or codes. The moral relativity thesis: there are cases of disagreement that cannot be settled even after agreement about facts. 4.2 Anti-realists Brandt, Mackie, Gilbert, Harman adopt Westermark’s approach in a more sophisticated version: a) moralities are codes with an overall function and may be appraised only as wholes; b) variability is an argument for moral subjectivism; c) apparent legitimacy of deriving shift from ought is legitimized only within one institution d) morality should not be described but instead made, and existing moralities may be improved. Is it ‘real’ relativism? It is clearly subjectivism (a metaethical thesis). The normative thesis is that there better and worse codes, and survival values is the normative standard. -/- 4.3 Particularists MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, Wiggins, McDowell ‘Wittgensteinian’ prospectivist arguments bent to support weak-relativist claims MacIntyre: there is ‘incommensurability’ between different theoretical systems in both science and ethics. No argument is possible through different systems Different traditions may coexist for a long time without being able to bring their conflicts to a rational solution. -/- 4.4 Kantian universalists Baier, Gewirth, Rawls, Apel, Habermas Shared claim: justice concerns the right and is universal in so far as it may be based on minimal assumptions Other virtues are relative to context in so far as they are related to comprehensive views of the good - O’Neill criticism: a) it is an assumption shared by both alignments; b) after an alleged crisis brought about by alleged loss of metaphysical certainties, theories of justice have dropped demanding assumptions and kept universalism, virtue theories have kept demanding assumptions and dropped universalism; c) the opposition of virtue and justice has arisen in an unjustified way. O’Neill’s positive proposal: ‘constructive’ procedures may be adopted both (i) concerning all the range of virtues and (ii) across cultures once we abandon idealization and confine ourselves to abstraction from real-world cases. -/- 4.5 A metaethical relativist and anti-relativist normative ethicists: Bernard Williams Williams: vulgar relativism may be assumed to claim that: a) 'just' means 'just in a given society'; b) 'just in a given society' is to be understood in functionalist sense; c) it is wrong for one society’s members to condemn another society’s values. It is inconsistent since in (c) uses ‘just’ in a non-relative way that has been excluded in (a). William’s positive proposal: i) keep a number of substantive or thick ethical concepts that will be different in space and time; ii) admit that public choices are to be legitimized through recourse to more abstract procedures and relying on more thin ethical concepts. -/- 5. Critical remarks 5.1 The only real relativism available is ‘vulgar’ relativism (Westermark?) 5.2. Descriptive universalism (or absolutism) has a long pedigree, from Cicero on, reaching Boas himself but it is useless as an answer to normative questions 5.3. Twentieth-century philosophical discussion seems to discuss an ad hoc doctrine reconstructed by assembling obsolete philosophical ideas but ignoring the real theory of cultural relativism as formulated by anthropologists. -/- 6. A distinction between ethoi and ethical theories as a way out of confusions a)There are systems of conventions de facto existing. These may be studies from outside as phenomena or facts. b)There is moral argument and this, when studies from outside, is a fact, but this does not influence in any degree the possible validity of claims advanced. c) the difference between the above claims and Mackie’s criticism to Searle’s argument of the promising game is that promises, arguments etc. are also phenomena, but they are also communicative phenomena with a logical and pragmatic structure. -/- 7.Conclusions: a) cultural relativism, as a name for Boas’s methodology is a valuable discovery, and in this sense we are all relativists; b) ethical relativism, as an alleged implication of cultural relativism, has been argued in a philosophically quite unsophisticated way by Benedict and Herskovits; philosophers apparently discussed ethical relativism in the basis of a rather faint impression of what cultural relativism had been. c) a full-fledged ethical relativism has hardly been defended by anybody among philosophers; virtually no modern philosopher really argued a prescriptive version of the thesis; d) we may accept the grain of truth in ethical relativism by including relativist critique to ethical absolutism into a universalist normative doctrine that be careful in separating open-textured formulations of universal claims from culturally conditioned particular prescriptions. -/- . 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Universalism can be defined as the belief in the universal application of certain knowledge, world-views and value-views. Universalism has often been confused with Occident-centrism, due to the fact that the latter was used to justify the former, which confused the content of a thought with the social condition that gave rise to the thought. For many years, clarifications of this confusion have been made in sociology of knowledge, relativism and skepticism. Yet, the particularistic conclusion thus reached has led (...) to more confusion, namely, that between the intrinsic criterion for truth and the practical application of thought. China, with its long tradition of Sino-centrism, has recently shown a movement towards particularism, characterized by a search for national and cultural superiority by “returning to the source”. In today’s academic circles, some particularist themes are taken for granted, and believed to be true, but cannot be proved with rational examination. The particularistic claims to the “self grounded”, “self-featured” and “self-located” tradition of Chinese culture jointed with the post-modernism, neo-leftist movement of anti-globalization in the West, are not only harmful in practice, but also impotent in theory. The propaganda against the hegemony of Western discourse should be analyzed with questioning which hegemony and whose discourse. (shrink)

This paper presents a naturalistic response to the challenge of epistemic relativism. The case of the Azande poison oracle is employed as an example of an alternative epistemic norm which may be used to justify beliefs about everyday occurrences. While a distinction is made between scepticism and relativism, an argument in support of epistemic relativism is presented that is based on the sceptical problem of the criterion. A response to the resulting relativistic position is then provided (...) on the basis of a particularist response to scepticism combined with a naturalistic approach to the warrant of epistemic norms. It is argued that it is possible to comparatively assess the ability of epistemic norms to lead to epistemic aims. As against the epistemic relativist, it is possible to provide an objective basis for the choice between alternative epistemic norms. (shrink)

In previous work, I have sought to show that the basic argument for epistemic relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy, it is possible to respond to relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the basis for (...) a satisfactory response to epistemic relativism. In this paper, I outline this particularist response to relativism, and provide further commentary on the relationship between naturalism and particularism. In addition, I set the approach in contrast with reflective equilibrium approaches in epistemology. I also briefly explore the connection between the particularist response to relativism and G. E. Moore’s defense of an external world. (shrink)

Part 1 of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement—in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism—and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely cognitivist account of moral (...) judgments. Such a conclusion could be staved off if it could be held that a sufficient condition for commonality of cognitive content in moral judgments could consist, despite the presence of radical moral disagreement, in the parties’acceptance of a common set of fundamental moral principles. Part 1 begins, and Part 2 further develops, a destructive critique of that idea, leading thereby to a skeptical appraisal of the important role sometimes assigned, in metaethical theorizing, to moral rules. Inter alia the paper is intended to suggest the possibility of overlap between relativist and particularist agendas. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Classical Invariantism and the Ho ‐ Hum View Relativism and Contexualism: Clarifications and Distinctions Relativism and Contexualism: A Quick Look at Some Sample Views Flexibility and Disagreement, Charity and Error: A Common Motivating Idea, and a Common Objection Conclusion References.

This paper explores the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in the context of recent history and philosophy of science. More specifically, it seeks to show that significant treatments of epistemic relativism by influential figures in the history and philosophy of science draw upon the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The paper begins with a presentation of the problem of the criterion as it occurs in the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is then shown that significant treatments (...) of epistemic relativism in recent history and philosophy of science (critical rationalism, historical philosophy of science and the strong programme) draw upon the problem of the criterion. It is briefly suggested that a particularist response to the problem of the criterion may be put to good use against epistemic relativism. (shrink)

This paper responds to criticism presented by Steven Bland of my naturalistic approach to epistemic relativism. In my view, the central argument for epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. This opens relativism to an anti-sceptical response. I combine Roderick Chisholm’s particularist response to the problem of the criterion with a reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant. A distinction is made between epistemic norms which provide genuine warrant and those which do not. On the (...) basis of this distinction, we may reject the relativist claim that all epistemic norms have equal standing. I consider three points made by Bland against my position. These relate to epistemic pluralism, the relevance of evolution to epistemic pluralism, and empirical evidence as a basic source of knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter proposes a version of epistemic contextualism, called inferentialist contextualism, as a promising research program within African epistemology. My suggestion should be seen against the background of the earlier debate between the seemingly incompatible positions of universalism and particularism. Whilst universalism has been charged with not allowing for diversity, of forcing African culture into the Procrustean bed of Western thought, particularism seems to block cross-cultural dialogue. A compromise is therefore called for. I argue that inferentialist contextualism (...) can fill this need. One promising feature is that whilst traditional epistemology always places the burden of justification on the subject of knowledge, inferentialist contextualism distinguishes between three different contexts: except for the traditional one, a second where the burden of proof is shared by both the subject and any fellow who might challenge the belief and a third context where the burden lies solely on the inquiring fellow. The notion of default entitlement depicts beliefs falling within this third context and will be elaborated in some detail here. I argue that inferential contextualism permits greater contextual variety than traditional epistemology without collapsing into relativism. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive relativism, such as truth relativism, (...) conceptual relativism and ontological relativism. An argument from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion to epistemic relativism is presented, and is contrasted with three other arguments for epistemic relativism. It is argued that the argument from the criterion is the most fundamental argument for epistemic relativism. Finally, it is noted how the argument of the present paper fits with the author’s previous suggestion that a particularist response to the Pyrrhonian sceptic may be combined with a naturalistic view of epistemic warrant to meet the challenge of epistemic relativism. (shrink)

This paper deals with a specific version of metaethical moral relativism, known as “speaker-relativism”. It starts by explaining the position, focussing on the views of two prominent contemporary relativists, Gilbert Harman and James Dreier. Both authors draw an analogy between ethics and modern physics: just as Einstein showed that judgments about time or mass were always relative to a specific frame of reference, Dreier and Harman argue that “absolutist” judgments about moral rightness or wrongness need to be (...) reinterpreted as relative to some particular moral system. They also claim that this analogy allows us to salvage ordinary moral talk. I consider a number of possible objections to their argument, beginning with one, concerning the possibility of moral disagreement, which I think can be successfully answered, and then presenting two criticisms that I take to be more problematic for the relativist. I argue that despite its initial appeal, Harman and Dreier’s suggestion regarding our use of moral language seems to be a source of confusion in certain cases of moral disagreement, and does not appear able to preserve specifically moral normativity – which leads me to conclude that it is best viewed as a variant of an error theory about morality, rather than as the distinct metaethical position it purports to be. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the problem of epistemological relativism, which I take to be the problem of providing epistemic norms with an objective rational justification, rather than the problem of arguing for universality. I illustrate the idea of an alternative epistemic norm by means of Evans-Pritchard's discussion of the Azande poison-oracle. Though I take there to be a sharp distinction between relativism and scepticism, nevertheless I present an argument for relativism at the level of epistemic (...) norms which employs the Pyrrhonian sceptic's problem of the criterion. I then attempt to show how a particularist response to the sceptic along the lines outlined by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalized view of epistemic warrant to ward off the threat of relativism posed by the problem of the criterion. (shrink)

In an attempt to be rational and objective, and, possibly, to avoid the charge of moral relativism, ethicists seek to categorise and characterise ethical dilemmas. This approach is intended to minimise the effect of the confusing individuality of the context within which ethically challenging problems exist. Despite and I argue partly as a result of this attempt to be rational and objective, even when the logic of the argument is accepted—for example, by healthcare professionals—those same professionals might well respond (...) by stating that the conclusions are unacceptable to them. In this paper, I argue that an interpretative approach to ethical analysis, involving an examination of the ways in which ethical arguments are constructed and shared, can help ethicists to understand the origins of this gap between logic and intuition. I suggest that an argument will be persuasive either if the values underpinning the proposed argument accord with the reader’s values and worldview, or if the argument succeeds in persuading the reader to alter these. A failure either to appreciate or to acknowledge those things that give meaning to the lives of all the interested parties will make this objective far harder, if not impossible, to achieve. If, as a consequence, the narratives ethicists use to make their arguments seem to be about people living in different circumstances, and faced with different choices and challenges, from those the readers or listeners consider important or have to face in their own lives, then the argument is unlikely to seem either relevant or applicable to those people. The conclusion offered by the ethicist will be, for that individual, counterintuitive. Abortion, euthanasia and cadaveric organ donation are used as examples to support my argument. (shrink)

Recently there has been a revival of philosophic interest in, and discussion of, ‘relativism’. Debates concerning relativism, however, tend to have an odd air of unreality. It is odd that while most everyone wants to refute relativism, just about no one wants to be identified as a relativist. There is even a tendency to use ‘relativist’ as an epithet of abuse. But, if relativism is universally acknowledged to be refuted, even self-refuting, then why is there so (...) much discussion of it, and why is there such a temptation to accuse opponents of this sin? The answer to this question which I wish to propose in this paper is that there are two sources for this situation. First, the fact that while no one sees themselves as relativists, many are seen as relativists suggests that there is a fair amount of current confusion in regard to what precisely ‘relativism’ is. Whenever there is a high degree of disagreement about the extension of a term, especially a term used to describe a philosophical position, it is reasonable to investigate whether there is some equivocation in the use of that term. Such an equivocation by itself, however, would not account for the present state of affairs. That ‘relativism’ is only applied to opponents suggests that there is some similarity between ‘relativist* positions, in at least some senses of that word, and some other positions that people are interested in defending. (shrink)

The debate about the direction, coherence and possible imperialism of universal norms in global bioethics has been going on for years. Proponents of universal norms have fiercely stated their cases focusing on human rights, autonomy and/or further principles in bioethics. Equally forceful has been the opposition to such universal principles arguing mainly on grounds of cultural diversity. The alternative is commonly presented as one between moral relativism and moral imperialism; solutions that are equally unattractive. This paper suggests a (...) way forward for global bioethics by focusing on techniques of moral deliberation as well as on the specific social context from which moral dilemma arises. Such focus will show that the alternative between moral relativism and imperialism only arises when an unreflected notion of medical ethics is applied. The way forward for global bioethics is to acknowledge the way medical ethics is connected to a specific medical practice and to examine its cultural and conceptual foundation rather than insisting on context independent principles.If it is already doubtful whether bioethics exists, it is even more dubious for global bioethics. For almost two decades, discussion over such issue has been going on with hardly any progress. Some uphold the famous four principles as the universal standard; others would like to modify them while still hoping for universality; still others challenge the very notion of universality in the field of medical ethics. The discussion is trapped in a variety of antagonisms: between universalism and particularism, between liberalism and communitarism, between principalism and case-based-bioethics. This paper suggests a way forward beyond these antagonisms by asking about the very nature of medical ethics. First, however, we need to take a closer look on the issue at stake: the quest for a global bioethics and the debate over the identity of medical ethics. (shrink)

Recent research gives perspectivism the status of a stand-alone epistemological research program. As part of this development, it must be distinguished from other epistemologies, especially relativism. Not only do relativists and perspectivists use a similar vocabulary—even the supposed tenets (features of the doctrine) seem to partially overlap. To clarify the relation between these programs, I suggest drawing two important distinctions. The first is between the (1) terminological and (2) doctrinal components of epistemologies, the second between the (...) (2a) analytical and (2b) synthetical doctrinal elements. The method of the originalistic linguistic analysis that I introduce in this article shows that both relativism and perspectivism are using the same matrix of interconnected linguistic expressions that belong to what I call the universal epistemic language. Furthermore, this method reveals which doctrinal components necessarily follow from this linguistic basis and the terms “relativism” and “perspectivism” and which are a result of deliberate philosophical constructions. As for the linguistic basis and analytical doctrinal components, relativism and perspectivism are complementary members of one epistemology. Doctrinal additions that transform the original meaning of the terms “relativism” and “perspectivism”, such as “indifferentism” and “non-absolutism”, should be always explicitly mentioned to avoid confusion and strawmen debates in philosophy. (shrink)

With the passing of disputations between Jewish and Christian thinkers as to whose tradition has a more universal ethics, the task of Jewish and Christian ethicists is to constitute a universal horizon for their respective bodies of ethics, both of which are essentially particularistic being rooted in special revelation. This parallel project must avoid relativism that is essentially anti-ethical, and triumphalism that proposes an imperialist ethos. A retrieval of the idea of natural law in each respective tradition enables (...) the constitution of some intelligent common ground for ethical cooperation in both theory and practice between the traditions. This essay also suggests how the constitution of this common ground could include Muslims as well. The constitution of this common ground enables religious ethicists to present more cogent ethical arguments in secular space, but only of course, when those who now control secular space are open to arguments from members of any religious tradition. (shrink)

Different views on the connection between relativism and feminist epistemologies are often asserted but rarely are these views clearly argued for. This has resulted in a confusingly polarised debate, with some people convinced that feminist epistemologies are committed to relativism (and that this is a reason so be suspicious of them) whilst others make similar criticisms of anti-feminist views and argue that relativism has no place in feminist epistemologies. This chapter is an attempt to clarify this (...) debate. I begin by asking the question “are feminist projects and goals best served by relativism, or by absolutism?” I then sketch out four broad positions one could take on the answer to this question, and evaluate arguments for each one. In the end I conclude that feminist projects can, at least sometimes, be served by relativism, and that the claim they can be served by anti-relativism is under-supported. (shrink)

Despite the fact that business people and business students often cast doubt on the relevance of universal moral principles in business, the rejection of relativism is a precondition for business ethics to get off the ground. This paper proposes an educational strategy to overcome the philosophical confusions about relativism in which business people and students are often trapped. First, the paper provides some conceptual distinctions and clarifications related to moral relativism, particularism, and virtue ethics. More particularly, (...) it revisits arguments demonstrating that virtues in business are not in contradiction with the relevance of universal principles, despite the fact that virtue ethics is often identified with particular relationships and contexts. It goes on to show how students and managers, but also researchers, often mix up radically different conceptions of moral relativism. It is also argued that this confusion is in part created by the cross-cultural management literature in which the methodological stance of the value-freedom of the social sciences is, in a perplexingly mistaken way, transformed into a rejection of all normative discussion and a plea for relativism. The remainder of the paper presents some tools that may be helpful in steering people toward less simplistic views about moral relativism and virtue ethics. It further argues that it is equally important to spell out that moral universalism can be understood in a humble way, without implying either arrogant ethnocentrism or omniscience, as part of an ongoing debate that progresses gradually. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a moderate form of epistemic relativism that is inspired by the work of Thomas Kuhn fails. First of all, it is shown that there is evidence to the effect that Kuhn already in his 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' proposes moderate relativism. Second, it is argued that moderate relativism is confronted with a severe dilemma that follows from Kuhn’s own argument for his relativistic conclusion. By focusing on the work of moderate (...) relativists like Bernd Schofer and Gerald Doppelt this dilemma as well as the ultimate failure of Kuhn’s moderate relativism are exhibited. (shrink)

The need for explicit theoretical reflection on cross-cultural bioethics continues to grow as the spread of communication technologies and increased human migration has made interactions between medical professionals and patients from different cultural backgrounds much more common. I claim that this need presents us with the following dilemma. On the one hand, we do not want to operate according to an imperialist ethical framework that denies and silences the legitimacy of cultural values other than our own. On the other (...) hand, we do not want to backslide into a form of cultural relativism that is unable to critically appraise cultural practices that are harmful, unjust, or oppressive. I examine two prominent attempts – the principlism of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and the Contractarianism of Robert Baker – to frame cross-cultural bioethics between these two extremes and argue that both approaches have significant flaws. The principlist approach fails to provide a non-question begging way to identify cross-cultural norms that does not already assume the universal legitimacy of moral principles dominant in North American society. Baker's contractarianism cannot grapple with the realities of political power imbalances that often characterize cross-cultural moral disputes. I suggest that a naturalized feminist framework, though not free of its own theoretical difficulties, provides the best alternative for approaching moral diversity respectfully and critically. (shrink)

The first part of this work analyses the universalist and the particularist conceptions of reasons. The second part projects this analysis to the legal domain. The author stresses that universalism and particularism regarding reasons are mutually exclusive theories linked to incompatible conceptions of norms, i.e. norms as strict universal conditionals and norms as defeasible conditionals. In giving an account of this tenet, different meanings of universality and defeasibility are explored. A parallel debate regarding reasons can be found in the (...) legal domain, where two contrasting categories of norms are usually distinguished: rules and principles. On this issue the author argues that the conception of legal reasons depends on the way in which this contrast between different kinds of legal norms is shaped. (shrink)

There is a consensus among philosophers that some “I”-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. In some recent papers, this property has been formulated in the following deflationist way: an “I”-thought is immune to error through misidentification when it can misrepresent the mental or bodily property self-ascribed but cannot misrepresent the subject possessing that property. However, it has been put forward that the range of mental and bodily states that are immune in that limited sense cannot include nonconceptual forms of (...) self-representation. In this paper, I claim the opposite. I argue in favor of a theoretical framework inspired by semantic relativism that solves the problem of immune nonconceptual self-representations. In order to do so, I refute an argument against the relativist account which is based on the existence of shared representations. This argument, I contend, rests on a confusion between two conditions to which a relativist may appeal when considering whether a certain mental content is relative to the self: a strong invariance condition and a weak invariance condition. I then argue that even if we acknowledge the existence of shared representations, the weak invariance condition is still satisfied, and consequently the relativist framework can make sense of INSRs. I argue that this weak invariance condition is satisfied by a representational function that self-relativizes certain representations. I then provide an empirical instance of such a function by discussing some of the recent literature on motor representations and the sense of agency. In the last part of the paper, I answer several potential objections. These potential objections lead me to distinguish two fundamental kinds of error relative to the self: error through misidentification and error through misapplication. This distinction allows me to answer a fundamental question raised by the very idea of de facto immunity to error through misidentification. (shrink)

Is it possible to confuse one’s own memories with imaginings? And what about confusing one’s own imaginings with memories? The extensive literature in psychology on memory errors and confabulation suggests positive answers to these questions. However, things are more complicated, and the notion of confusion deserves a more detailed analysis. In this paper, we will do so and provide several scenarios showing that these two types of confusion can occur on two different levels: reflective (the level of self-ascription) (...) and phenomenological (the level of what it is like to be in a certain mental state). To strengthen our case, we will relate at least some of our hypothetical scenarios to known conditions affecting memory or imagination. The genuine possibility of these conditions opens the door to a systematic exploration of the implications of the falsity of the impossibility claims for the adequate account of the relationship between memory and imagination. (shrink)

This paper is based on the assumption that critical rationalism represents a middle position between absolutist and relativistic positions because it rejects all attempts of ultimate justification as well as basic relativistic claims. Even though the critical-rationalist problem-solving-approach based on the method of trial and error leads to an acknowledgment of the plurality of theories and moral standards, it must not be confused with relativism. The relativistic claims of the incommensurability of cultures and the equality of all views (...) of the world and all moral systems can be challenged by two basic critical‐rationalist arguments:(1) Popper’s critique of ‚the myth of the framework’; (2) the criticalrationalist conception of different levels of rationality (Albert, Agassi and Jarvie). In ethics moral standards and norms can be interpreted from a critical‐rationalist perspective as undogmatic suggestions for the regulation of social behaviour and as attempts to answer different problems, resulting from social life. This allows for the comparison of different moral standards, norms, practices and institutions with reference to the underlying problem situation and the search for culturally overlapping moral standards. (shrink)

Controversies concerning the religious implications of science have grown increasingly strained in recent years. Creation scientists have deployed new strategies to eliminate the teaching of evolution in public schools; right-to-life groups have obstructed fetal tissue research; and clerical groups have criticized genomics and genetic testing. Meanwhile, the Templeton Foundation has begun promoting the idea that there is no conflict between science and religion. In this paper, I explore emerging efforts to reconcile religion and science. I focus particularly on the (...) use of religious imagery and metaphor by scientists as they seek to convince the public of the power of genes or to allay concerns about new technologies. I suggest that their use of Godtalk may reflect both its wider prevalence in political rhetoric in the United States and its instrumental utility in light of the religious implications of contemporary biology. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to lay out a meta‐ethical position that is inspired by the framework of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. To achieve this goal, this paper is divided into two parts. First, I explore recent attempts to tie Wittgenstein's epistemology in On Certainty to moral epistemology. I argue that there can be a meaningful parallel drawn between the epistemic certainties discussed in On Certainty and what I consider to be moral certainties. These moral certainties are unjustified fundamental moral (...) attitudes that underlie our moral practices. Then, I show how the debate over moral certainty has branched into two directions. One direction presents the concept of moral certainty as a naturalistic concept. On this reading, moral certainties transcend time and place since they are rooted in our natural tendencies to act or not act in certain ways. The other direction presents moral certainty as a distinctly relativistic concept. On this reading, we have our moral certainties because we belong to communities that agree on these certainties. In the second section, I argue that we have both natural, universal certainties and localized, relative certainties. I also argue that our localized certainties are constrained by non‐moral facts about ourselves and about the world. To make this argument, I rely on Wittgenstein's concept of “general facts of nature.” The result of the paper is a meta‐ethical position that can be located in between moral relativism and moral realism. (shrink)

This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories (...) does not mean we cannot define a problematic subclass of conspiracy beliefs, while avoiding the problems of generalism. We hope this reply helps conspiracy theory researchers recognize the differences between studying conspiracy theories and conspiracy beliefs and appreciate the possibilities for fruitful, integrative, and interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

The early work of Alasdair MacIntyre aims to provide resources to “fragmented” modern selves for adjudicating “incommensurable” claims of rival moral traditions and for committing to one with full allegiance. But MacIntyre seems to undermine rational choice through his thesis of Rational Particularism, namely, that there is no tradition-independent, universally acceptable rational standpoint from which to evaluate competing claims of rival traditions. In this paper I combat a prevalent argument that his Particularism thesis render the choice of tradition (...) allegiance by fragmented selves wholly arbitrary, hence committing MacIntyre to relativism about practical rationality and moral theory. This argument founders on a false analogy between the self-avowed relativist and MacIntyre’s target reader. Thus, MacIntyre can retain strong particularism without yielding to relativism. I also show how MacIntyre can consistently offer rational, historical, imaginative, and personal narrative resources to fragmented selves who seek a coherent moral tradition. (shrink)

It is argued that anthropologists become moral relativists by mistake typically in two ways: (1) by confusing moral with factual discourse (dubbed the Normativist Fallacy) which derives in turn from a failure to distinguish adequately between direct and indirect discourse in the description of moral systems and preferences; or (2) by confusing definitive with hypothetical statements in descriptive ethics (the Definitivist Fallacy). Two representative arguments illustrating these errors are analyzed and some morals drawn from the results regarding the status (...) of relativist arguments in descriptive ethics and the prerogatives of applied anthropologists. (shrink)

The key argument of Hilary Putnam for conceptual relativism, his so-called mereological argument, is critically evaluated. It is argued that Putnam’s reasoning is based on confusion between languages and theories.

A formulation of quantum mechanics (QM) in the relativistic configurational space (RCS) is considered. A transformation connecting the non-relativistic QM and relativistic QM (RQM) has been found in an explicit form. This transformation is a direct generalization of the Kontorovich–Lebedev transformation. It is shown also that RCS gives an example of non-commutative geometry over the commutative algebra of functions.

This chapter contains section titled: Wisdom: Theory of Dialectical Logic: Theory Transformed into Method Freedom: Theory Transformed into Virtue.

This book analyzes a rich and diverse body of philosophical and theological literature concerning the import of narrative for the understanding of morality. Nelson begins by examining the theses that to understand oneself, a tradition, and history as a whole, they must be understood in the context of a narrative. Recent philosophical writings on the relation of narrative to the moral concepts of social groups and individuals—including Alasdair MacIntyre's proposal for the rehabilitation of an ethic of virtue shaped by narrative—are (...) explored. Issues discussed include the freedom of moral agents in relation to their narratives, the relation between narrative and universal moral rules, and the problem of relativism. Next, Nelson classifies theological uses of narrative as belonging to either a liberal-universalistic or postliberal-particularistic tradition and considers the implications of construing scripture as narrative for the problematic relation between scripture and ethics. The work of Stanley Hauerwas, the foremost narrativist in Christian ethics, is analyzed at length. Nelson argues that while narrative is a necessary focus, it does not exhaust the methodological agenda. Narrative is not, as its advocates sometimes suggest, a universal solvent for every theological problem and disagreement. An adequate Christian ethics must not lose sight of the universal, narrative-independent features of morality. Since the realm of the moral is an interweaving of narrative-dependent and narrative-independent features, Christian ethics stands to profit from both narrativist and rationalist insights. The role of narrative is demonstrably a major topic of conversation across several fields in religious studies today. Particularly designed for scholars in ethics, theology, and the philosophy of religion, the book is a reliable guide to an expanding literature and a judicious introduction to these interdisciplinary discussions. (shrink)

Regarding the exhaustive discussions of the fundamentality of existence versus the fundamentality of quiddity, it is a necessary preliminary to examine and analyze the first documented statement of the fundamentality of existence. Following this, we must inquire how the concept is obtained on the basis of which such a judgment could be formed. Then we must illuminate the meaning of propositions that state only that an object is or exists (ontological propositions). Finally, by explaining the meaning of the words “quiddity” (...) and “existence” and comparing them, indications are found of confusion between epistemological and ontological issues. (shrink)

Chronic and current epistemological controversies, with particular attention to the development of pragmatist/historicist/constructivist reconceptions of knowledge and science in the 20th century and the scandalized responses to them by defenders of more traditional rationalist/objectivist/realist conceptions. Individual chapters deal with complex and confused relations among epistemic skepticism, relativism, and constructivist epistemology ; 20th-century "postmodern" relativism and anti-relativism; Ludwik Fleck and constructivist views of truth, science, and knowledge; attacks on and disavowals of constructivism and/or relativism by established and (...) feminist philosophers; the Science Wars and fraught relations between the humanities and the sciences; the problematic claims of Evolutionary Psychology; and chronic problems and contemporary views of animal-human relations. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the role of moral principles, specifically the Fundamental Principles of Olympism, in the judgements of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) on matters of performance enhancement. The article begins with two pairs of distinctions, that between moral judgements and morally-laden judgements, and that between the moral judgement of cases and the ethical environment of a society. The article is concerned with working through the implications of those distinctions in the context of the IOC's judgements (...) on performance enhancement. The article favours a particularist account of the moral judgement of cases, while preserving a place for meaningful general moral statements as contributions to the ethical environment of a society, but not as general action-guiding statements or principles that can be applied to judgements in specific cases. The article illustrates the implications of this conclusion in the context of the decision-making of the IOC on performance enhancement (the case of Alain Baxter is considered). It is argued that there is a danger of the decision-making of the IOC suffering deep confusion over the difference between general and particular statements, the nature of reasons and the logic of what it is to apply a general action-guiding statement. (shrink)

ResumenBasado en elementos de la filosofía clásica, el common sense británico y la Escuela de Frankfurt, el autor postula un sentido común guiado críticamente, que serviría para evaluar las tendencias históricas y los modelos de modernización en el Tercer Mundo. Evitando extremos, este teorema rechazaría tanto las pretensiones de verdad de muchos enfoques racionalistas como el relativismo epistemológico y ético. La existencia de leyes y etapas obligatorias de la historia es uno de esos extremos; otro es la opción teórica que (...) afirma que los modelos culturales son incomparables e inconmensurables entre sí. La existencia de un solo paradigma normativo-positivo de desarrollo es insostenible, pero igualmente la posición que decreta la diversidad e incomparabilidad totales de los regímenes civilizatorios. Es conveniente adoptar una línea intermedia entre universalismo y particularismo y alcanzar una síntesis fructífera de ambos.Palabras claveEscuela de Frankfurt, Habermas, Kant, particularismo, sentido común, universalismoAbstractBased on elements of classical philosophy, the British common sense and the Frankfurt School, the author proposes a critically guided common sense, which could be used to evaluate historical tendencies and specially the modernization efforts in the Third World. Avoiding extremes, this theorem rejects the pretensions of truth of rationalist theories and also the epistemic and ethic relativism. The existence of obligatory laws and periods of historical development is one of these extremes; the other one is the position which states that cultural models are incomparable and immeasurable. It is reasonable, for instance, to take a middle way between universalism and particularism and also to reach a fruitful synthesis between both currents.KeywordsCommon sense, Frankfurt School, Habermas, Kant, particularism, universalism. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to draw attention to the position of psychoanalysis regarding the opposition between the quest for truth and relativism. It is a conventional opposition of contemporary thought. On one hand, the quest for truth, and on the other, relativism, as the fundament of our intellectual and political life. I do this by means of Lacanian teachings. My objective is to take on the theoretical tools of psychoanalysis and the consequences of clinical facts, (...) in order to enable a critical reflection on this topic. Before proceeding to the precise argument, I briefly introduce the historical ground correlated to modern subjectivity, characterized by the vanishing of the guarantee of both truth and knowledge. Then I then go into the topic by means of a survey of Lacan’s reading of the path of modern logic. Lacan interprets the whole history of logic as a bungled action, “every bungled action is a successful discourse.” In fact, it points to the cardinal place of lack, which is the topic of psychoanalysis. It opens towards a deeper understanding of the role of the signifier of signification – the Bedeutung des Phallus. Lacan’s interpretation of the whole history of logic transforms the achievements of modern logical thought into the writings of a point de capiton for collective rationality. The key here is to focus on the capital role of what I call in conclusion “an inaccessible point” for both individual and collective life. This is the issue I address in the last point. The article is divided into five points: 1. the relativistic drift; 2. the guarantee of knowledge; 3. the guarantee of truth; 4. logic and point de capiton; and 5. the signification (Bedeutung) of the Phallus. (shrink)

A growing number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are considering legalizing the growth of genetically modified organisms. Furthermore, several projects are underway to develop transgenic crops tailored to the region. Given the contentious nature of GMOs and prevalent anti-GMO sentiments in Africa, a robust ethical analysis examining the concerns arising from the development, adoption, and regulation of GMOs in sub-Saharan Africa is warranted. To date, ethical analyses of GMOs in the global context have drawn predominantly on Western philosophy, dealing with (...) Africa primarily on a material level. Yet, a growing number of scholars are articulating and engaging with ethical theories that draw upon sub-Saharan African value systems. One such theory, Ubuntu, is a well-studied sub-Saharan African communitarian morality. I propose that a robust ethical analysis of Africa's agricultural future necessitates engaging with African moral theory. I articulate how Ubuntu may lead to a novel and constructive understanding of the ethical considerations for introducing GMOs into sub-Saharan Africa. However, rather than reaching a definitive prescription, which would require significant engagement with local communities, I consider some of Ubuntu's broader implications for conceptualizing risk and engaging with local communities when evaluating GMOs. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of using local moral theory in bioethics by considering how one might negotiate between universalism and particularism in the global context. Rather than advocating for a form of ethical relativism, I suggest that local moral theories shed light on salient ethical considerations that are otherwise overlooked. (shrink)