Two eight-century Jaina contemporaries, a Śvetāmbara philosopher Siddhasena Mahāmati and a Digambara Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa revolutionised Jaina epistemology, by radically transforming basic epistemological concepts, which had been based on canonical tradition. The paper presents a brief historical outline of the developments of basic epistemological concepts in Jaina philolosophy such as the cognitive criterion and logical faculties as well as their fourteen typological models which serve as the backdrop of important innovations in epistemology introduced by Siddhasena, Pātrasvāmin and Akalaṅka. An important contribution (...) of these Jaina thinkers was to economize Indian logic and the rules of inference, first, by devising only one kind of logical reason called ‘inexplicability otherwise’, based on the single inseparable connection of the proving property with the inferable property, and, second, by limiting the necessary number of the members of the proof formula merely to two. These two innovations were related to the thinkers’ intention to devise a logic which would not primarily be based on empirical verification but its structural patterns would be valid irrespective of external observation. Further, the paper focuses on the nature of the epistemological shifts which Siddhasena and Akalaṅka introduced independently of each other and on the question how Siddhasena’s and Akalaṅka’s ideas were partly anchored in Buddhist concepts of the pramāṇa school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. With the Buddhist background, Siddhasena sought to define the criteria essential to distinguish true from false cognitions and to provide a novel classification of the pramāṇas. He can further be accredited with formulating the first Jaina descriptive definition of the cognitive criterion. The final section of the paper explains how Akalaṅka applies novel epistemological ideas, first, to construct realistic ontology and objectivity of both the external world and the cognising subject, and, secondly, to combat fundamental Buddhist concepts such as idealism and momentariness. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between the theory of many-sidedness (_anekāntavāda_), the theory of viewpoints (_nayavāda_), and the theory of sevenfold conditional predication (_syādvāda_) in the philosophical monographs of the Jaina philosopher Akalaṅka (c. 720-780 CE). Despite being celebrated as novel Jaina contributions to Indian philosophy, the mutual relationship between these three theories is poorly understood. Do these three theories represent three distinct frameworks with distinct purposes? Or do these three theories ultimately synthesise to form a single unified framework? Through (...) a careful study of the _Laghīyastraya_ and the _Nyāyaviniścaya_, this paper shows how Akalaṅka understands _syādvāda_ as the central organising framework for integrating the theory of many-sidedness and the theory of viewpoints. On the one hand, _syādvāda_ is analysed as the synthesis of multiple viewpoints because each of the seven conditional predications, when taken individually, represents a genuine viewpoint. On the other hand, the seven conditional predications of _syādvāda_, when taken collectively and iterated with respect to different characteristics, represent the linguistic formalisation of many-sided (_anekānta_) Jaina ontology. This paper shows how _syādvāda_ as the grand synthesis of the theory of many-sidedness and the theory of viewpoints creates new possibilities as well as new problems within Akalaṅka’s philosophical system. (shrink)

Natalia Zheleznova’s unique contribution to Jaina studies in Russia, this time with her translation of the enormous Akalaṅka’s subcommentary (8th century C.E.) to the basic text of Jaina philosophy, the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra by Umāsvāti (3rd–4th centuries C.E.), is emphasized in this review. At the same time, two core formats of the whole Indian philosophizing are being conceptualized, i.e. the polemical building of Indian theoretical discourse as a whole, which is incorporated into the dialogical texture of any commentary aspiring at any importance (...) (controversy with both real and speculative opponents) and commenting itself as the main mode of intellectual self-expression (up to self-commenting). In conclusion, some “technical” сensures are passed upon the translator and an alternative interpretation of the term tattva, crucial for understanding the very title of Umāsvāti’s work, is offered. (shrink)

In Jaina philosophy, pramāṇa is accepted as a definitive knowledge of an object and knowledge itself. There are many treatises on Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra which include epistemology and logic according to Jainism. Since Siddhasena’s Nyāyāvatra more than forty texts and commentaries are available on this subject. Five types of knowledge i.e. matijñāna (knowledge through sense organs and mind), śrutajñāna (scriptural of verbal knowledge), avadhijñāna (clairvoyance), manaḥparyayajñāna (knowing the modes of others’ minds) and kevaljñāna (knowledge of all substances and modes) as mentioned (...) in the canonical literature are the basis of the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. Contributions of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (720–780), Vidyānanda (775–840), Ananatavirya (950–990), Vādiraj (1025), Abhayadevasuri (10th century), Prabhācandra (980–1065), Vādi devasśūri (1086–1169, Hemacandra (1088–1173), Dharmabushaṇa (15th century), Yaśovijaya (18th century) are very important in the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra, the Tattvārthasūtra and its commentarial literature has also a significant role in developing the Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. This development has three aspects-conceptual, analytical and logical. The Tattvārthasūtra is the first text which established the classification of knowledge as two types of pramāṇa – pratyakṣa (perception) and parokṣa (indirect pramāṇa). An intensive discussion on Jaina epistemology or pramāṇa-śāstra is seen in the commentarial literature of the Tattvārthasūtra. (shrink)

Investigation into the True Teaching by Jens W. Borgland is a translation of the 10th century Jain philosophical Sanskrit text Satyasasanapariksa, composed by Vidyanandin. The text, which is incomplete, presents and refutes 12 Indian philosophical systems, the most important of which are Sautrantika and Yogacara Buddhism, Advaita Vedanta, Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya, Mimamsa and Carvaka. Criticizing these from the standpoint of the Jain anekantavada (theory of manysidedness), Vidyanandin aims to establish the superior status of Jain philosophy. In addition to providing an English (...) translation of this text from the Sanskrit, with explanatory notes, the study places it in the context of Jain philosophy and investigates the arguments Vidyanandin employs in his refutations of his rivals. The doctrines Vidyanandin ascribes to his rivals are also examined and compared to presentations of their doctrines in secondary literature on Indian philosophy and in some cases to how these doctrines are presented in the original literature of the schools in question. Some issues are highlighted as requiring further research. Furthermore, the investigation shows considerable influence from Vidyanandin's predecessors Samantabhadra and Akalanka on Vidyanandin's argumentation. The clearest example of this influence is shown on comparing the sections of the Satyasasanapariksa in which Vidyanandin quotes the Aptamimamsa of Samantabhadra (ca 600 CE) with Akalanka's (ca 770 CE) commentary to these verses in his Astasati. (shrink)

Samavaya, the sixth category in the Kanada-sutra, the corner stone of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system of philosophy, on which the grand edifice of the said school has been assiduously built by the followers, from Prasastapada to Sridhara, Uddyotakara to Udayana and Gangesa, has been dealt with in this work, in its entirety and established that the theory of causality depends on Samavaya.The criticism against the concept of Samavaya by the other schools of philosophy, more particularly the attack mounted on it by (...) Buddhist logicians Dharmakirti, Asoka Pandita, Santaraksita, et al. and the Jain scholars such as Akalanka, Manikyanandin and Prabhacandra have been presented in their full vigour. The arguments in defence of Samavaya marshalled by scholars of the Navya-Nyaya school are also put forward, maintaining their flavour, strength and sharpness. By presenting the strength and weakness of all arguments for and against the concept of Samavaya, the present work establishes the concept of Samavaya in its true perspective. This comprehensive work on Samavaya, published for the first time, helps to understand the basic theory of creation and the emergence of the world order as propounded and upheld by the Nyaya-Vaisesika school of philosophy. This is a significant contribution to the modern review of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

I have attempted here to trace the development of Haribhadra's biography. My contention throughout has been that there is a basic incongruity between what one can discern from the actual works about the author Haribhadra and the legends that came to be associated with him. I have argued that the legends initially came from elsewhere in part from the legends of the arrogant monk who challenges the schismatic Rohagutta, and in part from the stories told of Akalanka, who probably was (...) Haribhadra's contemporary. The question must inevitably arise as to why these stories were attached to Haribhadra, when they so poorly match what we can clearly know to be the attitudes displayed by the writer of the works associated with his name. That is a question I cannot satisfactorily answer, although I suspect that in general the hostile attitude of the prabhadhas and related texts towards Buddhism is a late, deliberately contrived and very political stance.30 It would seem that these legends of Haribhadra and the stories told of others which are also replete with examples of Jain hostility to the Buddhists came to take shape around the 12th century A.D., during a period when Jainism was making significant Hindu conversions, particularly among royalty. We know that the prabandhas were primarily written for royal audiences or for ministers close to the kings. A natural question is then whether we can discern anything specific in the relationship between Buddhism and royal power during the 12th century in India that might have led Jain writers deliberately to cast the Buddhists in an unfavourable light and portray Jains as the extirpators of the Buddhist menace and thus as champions of the true faith. In fact the mid -12th century was a low period for the fortunes of Buddhism in its final stronghold in Bengal. Valāllasena of the Sena dynasty came to power c. 1158 A.D. His Dānas-agara was completed in 1169 A.D. and gives ample evidence of the strong emphasis on orthodox Hinduism and promotion of the cause of the Brahmins that historians have associated with the Senas.31 It is tempting to see in the prabandhas, which were addressed to the ruling class, and in the legends of Jain religious and intellectual leaders which emphasize the conflict between Jainism and Buddhism, a continued attempt to separate Jainism radically from Buddhism which was anathema to these kings in Bengal. Hindus had historically regarded Jains and Buddhists as equally outside the Hindu fold and outside the fold of civilization. That Jains in the 12th century devise biographies with a distinct emphasis on the Jain triumph over a Buddhist enemy requires some explanation. That the collections of these biographies were usually addressed to kings and their ministers suggests that courting the royal court may have had something to do with the tone of the biographies. The most obvious historical circumstance that suggests itself by way of explanation for the anti-Buddhist tone of medieval Jain biographies is the contemporary Hindu revival in Bengal with its decidedly anti-Buddhist stance. Perhaps Jain writers in seeking to win royal patronage for their faith and indeed royal converts felt the need to divorce Jainism from the religion with which it had been so closely associated and which became so obviously out of royal favour elsewhere in the country. I offer this only as a suggestion which must await further research for confirmation. (shrink)