This book compares the respective concepts of the law of nations put forward by the Spanish theologian Francisco Suárez and by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. This comparison is based on the fact that both thinkers developed quite similar notions and were the first to depart from the Roman conception, which persisted throughout the entire Middle Ages and the early Renaissance. In Rome, jus gentium was a law that applied to foreigners within the Empire, and one which was often mistaken (...) for Natural Law itself. These two features can be found even in the works of writers such as Francisco de Vitória and Alberico Gentili. In Suárez and Grotius, the law of nations is applicable to an extra-national domain and inarguably becomes positive law. Yet, it also contains an ethical element that prevents it from transforming into a mere reflection of state interests. This work argues that this resemblance is hardly a coincidence: Grotius has read Suárez, and that influence has modified the foundations of his early thoughts on jus gentium. This should not be taken to imply that the Dutch jurist wasn't original: in both authors, the definition of the law of nations pursues his own internal logic. Nevertheless, Suárez's oeuvre allowed Grotius to solve a fundamental problem touched on in his early writings that had remained unanswered. Accordingly, his oeuvre promises to clarify one of the most significant moments in the History of International Law. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that Grotius views on customary law are compatible with the concept of a ‘Grotian Moment’. However, the idea of accelerated customary international law is developed by Van Vollenhoven, who interpreted Grotius in a questionable way. Whereas Grotius qualifies as a thinker in the tradition of natural law, Van Vollenhoven should be seen as an interactionist. This is especially visible in his publications on adat law, in which he visibly belongs to a romantic, Germanist, and (...) rather pluralist tradition of law. The idea of a Grotian Moment also fits better with this starting point than with natural law. For this reason, the ‘Grotian Moment’ should be renamed ‘Van Vollenhoven’s Moment’. It is argued that this legal theoretical position explains some of Van Vollenhoven’s rather peculiar interpretations of Grotius. (shrink)

In light of recent reevaluations of the work of Hugo Grotius, this essay analyzes the respective roles of Francisco de Vitoria and Grotius in the construction of the “Grotian tradition” of international law and human rights. In contrast to conventional accounts which understand the two within a progression, this essay argues that Vitoria and Grotius can alternatively be understood as representing two distinct strains of international law and ethics, forms of which persist to this day. The first is that strain (...) which privileges local governance based on the natural law and which insists that international law must have a moral or equitable valence (represented today by liberal internationalism). The second, competing strain which, with its focus on “neutral” rules of commerce and international order, presumes that it need not have such a valence (essentially, neoliberalism). In the process, this essay examines the role of the natural law in Vitoria’s thought, which for him was most often a reason against interference or intervention, not for. The essay also highlights the role of the Eighty Years’ War between the Dutch United Provinces and Spain in the development of Grotius’s understanding of sovereignty, in contrast to the Thirty Years’ War which is given more prominence in conventional accounts. (shrink)

This chapter would have liked to invite its readers on an exciting but breath-taking journey through the historical landscapes of international law, since ‘time immemorial’ a male-centred and, until the 1990s, almost exclusively male intellectual tradition and professional practice – at least in the eyes of the currently dominating historiography. Helas, the ambition had to be downscaled into a few rapid zooms, touristic snapshots in an impressionistic mode, on seven contexts in time and space in a hasty timeline from the (...) eighteenth century to 2021. They reflect, merely as examples, women’s status in international law in diverse political, social and legal transformations or crisis. Some are representing moments of codification or the break-through of certain interpretations of women’s rights. Others are selected for their role in enabling women’s participation in decision-making or entry to international legal positions, or because they provide an example of women’s international activism for women’s rights. All of them might have preceded, followed, or in fact themselves constituted ‘Grotian Moments’ for ‘women’s rights’ – did they, and if not, why? Should they have? If yes, which ones and how, to what effect for ‘women’? (shrink)

The legal order of the oceans has seen rapid developments and paradigm shifts. At least one of them has been described as a textbook example of a Grotian Moment: the emergence of the customary international law on the continental shelf, stemming from increased demand for oil and gas, coupled with technological advances and the Truman Proclamation of 1945. Now, eighty years later, the law of the sea is again faced with fundamental changes as the basis for maritime limits is eroded (...) by sea level rise. State practice, going back at least a century, has demonstrated that maritime limits normally fluctuate with physical changes to the coast. This understanding has not caused significant changes to the extent or location of maritime entitlements in a historical context. However, sea level rise stands to have catastrophic impacts as the submergence of individual coastal features can cause the loss of maritime areas spanning hundreds of thousands of square kilometres. This realisation has ignited a movement to change the law on maritime limits. Around 2010, the first States began to declare that their maritime limits would be stable, notwithstanding subsequent sea level rise. Several States and a coalition of States have since made similar declarations and the study of the ila Committee on International Law and Sea Level Rise indicates that the practice is in a phase of crystallisation. That suggests that new customary international law may be developing and the events leading to these developments might justify the use of the term Grotian Moment, leading to accelerated formation of customary international law or revised interpretation of the current law. The traditional requirements of State practice and opinio juris are not satisfied at present. However, the impacts of sea level rise on maritime limits may represent a moment of discovery that unveils a hidden truth about the law, overriding the traditional interpretation that renders maritime limits ambulatory. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 129 - 147 The essay investigates elements of sixteenth-century scholastic thought that have played a role in Grotius’s doctrine of necessity: the nature of the rights of the person in extreme need; the relation of the right of necessity to self-preservation; the compact that lies at the origin of property rights; and finally the obligation of restitution once the emergency is over. Grotius did not develop the doctrine of necessity as an abstract principle (...) about the relationship between private property and subsistence rights. Instead, he used it primarily as a normative principle on permissible behavior in times of war. The comparison with sixteenth-century thought and the practical purposes for which he developed the principle help to understand better the Grotian conception about the subjective nature of the right of necessity and its normative foundation. (shrink)

This article compares two philosophical traditions and their attitudes to war and violence within the context of international relations. The first refers to Hobbes’ political realism, the second to the Grotian idea of international community. Each of these traditions understands the role of violence and war at an international level differently. From the perspective of political realism, violence is part of anarchistic relations between states and a means for achieving their goals. From the perspective of international community, violence is a (...) factor that needs to be minimized via the mechanisms of peaceful international cooperation between states. Based on the analysis of these two approaches, it is claimed that the Hobbesian perspective can be partly included in the perspective of the English School, which is based on the Grotian tradition. (shrink)

This book offers the first comprehensive account and re-appraisal of the formative phase of what is often termed the 'Grotian tradition' in international relations theory: the view that sovereign states are not free to act at will, but are akin to members of a society, bound by its norms. It examines the period from the later fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries, focusing on four thinkers: Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius himself, and is structured by the author's concept of international society. (...) Erasmus' views on international relations have been entirely neglected, but underlying his work is a consistent image of international society. The theologian Francisco de Vitoria concerns himself with its normative principles, the lawyer Alberico Gentili - unexpectedly, the central figure in the narrative - with its extensive practical applications. Grotius, however, does not re-affirm the concept, but wavers at crucial points. This book suggests that the Grotian tradition is a misnomer. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 36, Issue 1, pp 28 - 39 This article reviews Andrew Fitzmaurice’s recent book _Sovereignty, Property and Empire 1500–1800_ with a critical examination of the author’s analysis of Hugo Grotius. Unlike other works of intellectual history that focus on the relationship between empire and political theory, this book offers a refreshing account of how Western political thought also provided a critique of empire. Using the law of occupation to explain the origin of property and political society, Fitzmaurice (...) demonstrates how ‘occupation’ was used to both justify and criticise extra-European imperial expansion. His analysis of Grotius is centred on ‘occupation’, explaining that even though Grotius’s political thought supports an imperialistic thesis, there is also evidence of anti-imperialist sentiments running through his works. I argue, however, that whilst Fitzmaurice provide a sound and interesting account of the role occupation plays in explaining Grotius’s two different accounts of property in _De Indis_ and _De jure belli ac pacis_, he disregards the broader philosophical implications this has for Grotius’s theory of property. (shrink)

Among Catholic philosophers, Saint Augustine was the first boldly to propose and defend the absolute view that all lies are wrong. Under no circumstances can a lie be licit. This absolute view held sway among Catholics until the sixteenth century with the introduction of the doctrine of mental reservation. In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius introduced another way to uphold the absolute view by changing the definition of lying: If the right of another is not violated, then there is no (...) lie. One could thus tell the murderer at the door “Nobody is home” without lying, as he has no right to know the whereabouts of his potential victim. By the late nineteenth century, Grotius’s definition of lying began gaining a following among Catholic philosophers and theologians, and continues to be held today by some Catholic philosophers. This article argues that adopting the Grotian definition of lying is a mistake. (shrink)

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] During the last few years, it has become usual to turn to some seventeenth century readings of the traditional idea of an original common possession of the earth for philosophical aid to explain and support the rights of persons in situations of extreme need, including refugees. Hugo Grotius’s conception of this idea is one of the most cited ones. In this paper, I hold that a Grotian reading of the idea of an (...) original common possession of the earth is not a fruitful principle if we want to elaborate a solid defence of the rights of the ones in need. I reconstruct and analyse the role this idea has in Grotius’s theory of private property and present objections to it from a Kantian perspective. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel egalitarian answer to the question: what initial distribution of the world’s resources could possibly count as just? Like many writers in the natural rights tradition, I take for granted that distributive justice consists in conformity to pre-political principles that apply to property regimes. Against the background of that assumption, the paper distinguishes between broadly Lockean and broadly Grotian conceptions of distributive justice in the state of nature. After an extended critique of various versions of the (...) Lockean approach, it argues for a particular, egalitarian version of the Grotian view. My position is based on what I call the common ownership formula, which says: each human being, as an equal co-owner of the world’s resources, may use those resources provided that the terms of their use are in conformity with principles that no co-owner could reasonably reject as the basis of an informed, unforced general agreement between all of the world’s co-owners who sought to find equitable principles of resource division. Using this principle, I suggest how an unequivocally egalitarian view of pre-political entitlement can be justified without recourse to any alleged duty to ameliorate the effects of brute bad luck on people’s lives. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.4 (2000) 617-634 [Access article in PDF] Edmund Burke and Reason of State David Armitage Edmund Burke has been one of the few political thinkers to be treated seriously by international theorists. 1 According to Martin Wight, one of the founders of the so-called "English School" of international theory, Burke was "[t]he only political philosopher who has turned wholly from political theory to (...) international theory." 2 The resurgence of interest in Burke as an international theorist has not, however, generated any consensus about how he might be classified within the traditions of international theory. Wight variously divided thinkers into trichotomous schools of Realists, Rationalists, and Revolutionaries, Machiavellians, Grotians, and Kantians, or theorists of international anarchy, habitual intercourse, or moral solidarity; 3 more recent international theorists have refined or supplemented these categories to construct similar trinitarian traditions of Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, and of Empirical Realism, Universal Moral Order, and Historical Reason. 4 Burke's place within any of these traditions remains uncertain. Debate over whether he was a realist or an idealist, a [End Page 617] Rationalist or a Revolutionist, has concluded variously that he was a "conservative crusader" or an "historical empiricist," a belated dualist or a Cold Warrior before the fact, or, most egregiously, "a proto-Marxist, or more precisely proto-Gramscian" theorist of hegemony. 5 The fact that Burke so obviously eludes definition may put in doubt the analytical utility of closely-defined "traditions" of international theory. 6Burke's relationship to conceptions of reason of state provides a more precise example of the confusion within such taxonomies. According to one recent historian of international theory, Burke "laid the foundations" of the "conservative approach to International Relations informed by the two modern notions of state interest and necessity, by raison d'état"; however, in the words of another, "Burke... was vehemently opposed to the idea of Reason of State and did not subscribe to the view that national interests override moral laws." 7 The assumptions on which each of these judgments rests are clearly incompatible: on the one hand that a "conservative approach" in the realm of foreign affairs implies an espousal of reason of state defined as the primacy of "state interest and necessity," that Burke did indeed acknowledge; on the other hand that reason of state is defined more exactly as "the view that national interests override moral laws" and that Burke did not hold such a view, so could not be defined as a reason-of-state theorist. It might of course be possible that Burke held various views on such matters at various points in his long literary and political career or that he argued for differing conceptions of reason of state in differing contexts. To test such a hypothesis demands a historical account of Burke's relationship to the theories of reason of state held by his contemporaries and predecessors. [End Page 618]To place Burke within traditions of reason of state might seem to be a simple category error. After all, he famously scorned "dashing Machiavellian politicians," deplored "the odious maxims of a Machiavellian policy," condemned "the dreadful maxim of Machiavel that in great affairs men are not to be wicked by halves," and identified the Discorsi as the inflammatory textbook of French republicanism. 8 His strictures on Machiavelli and Machiavellianism affirmed avant la lettre the classic modern account of reason of state offered by Friedrich Meinecke, which counterposed "raison d'état on the one hand, and ethics and law on the other" and traced the emergence of this separation to the heathen Florentine who had given the tradition its familiar nickname. 9 Such accounts of reason of state and of Machiavelli reinforced the long-standing interpretation of Burke as the last of the medieval theorists of natural law, for whom no merely human calculations of advantage or interest could override the dictates of divine reason. If reason of state represented the doctrine that political expediency should supersede moral law, then Burke could only have been its (and Machiavelli's) enemy: his "politics... were grounded... (shrink)

There is no substantive agreement about the philosophical views of analytic philosophers. Nevertheless, for much of them logical analysis is widely recognized to be important. It is true that Poincare used no logical analysis but refused nevertheless the old metaphysics. Indeed, the analytic tradition of philosophy of science is perhaps better characterized by several overlapping similarities, which are the clincher for my main thesis: Analytic philosophy of science has one of its origins in the philosophical network in France around 1900 (...) and, especially, in Poincare. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine aspects of Walzer's exposition of The Jewish Political Tradition (=the title of a multi-volume work of which he is leading editor) as they intersect with his work on political theory more generally. The Jewish tradition seems to present a radical example of "anti-politics": of a people existing outside the political realm. This is due both to the historical fact of their long exile, and to the shadow cast upon human politics by the prophetic ideology of (...) Divine Sovereignty. Despite their long-lasting lack of sovereignty, Jewish communities sustained a significant political life and a rich political discourse; this can serve to illustrate the primacy of the people's common life over the state, whose function is to support this life. As for divine sovereignty, it need not negate human political agency; instead, it can furnish – as in the case of the biblical prophets – the grounding for effective social criticism; though it is far from clear who, if anyone, is heir to the prophetic-critical mantle in post-biblical Judaism. (shrink)

DIE BESTIMMUNG DER PHILOSOPH IE 1M DEUTSCHEN I. IDEALISMUS I 2. VERNUNFT UND SPRACHE 2I VERNUNFT UND LEBENSWELT 3· 45 LEBENSWELT UND LEBENSWELTEN 63 4· DIE BESTIMMUNG DES ANDERSANFANGLICHEN 5· DENKENS 8 7 6. DIE WELT 1M ANDEREN ANFANG - DIE ROLLE DES DICHTERS UND DAS "DICHTERISCHE WOHNEN" 8 9 VORWORT In der heutigen Zeit, in der auf vielen Gebieten die iiberkommenen Gedanken ihre Geltung und Wirkungskraft verloren haben, liegt vielleicht die Aufgabe der Philo sophie darin, bewahrend auf die iiberlieferten (...) Prinzipien und die in ihnen liegenden Bestim­ mungen und Grundprobleme zuriickzuschauen und dabei zu­ gleich zu beachten, was in ihnen "iibergangig" auf Neues hin­ weist, um so fiir aIle Versuche eines "anderen Anfangs" kritisch offen zu sein. Ein Philosophieren, das sich dergestalt " zwischen" Tradition und anderem Anfang bewegt, hat sein Dilemma durch­ schaut: Es bleibt auf der Suche nach dem Wahren, obwohl es keinen giiltigen Wahrheitsbegriff hat. Ein allein aus transzen­ dentaler Subjektivitat begriindeter Wahrheitsbegriff iiberzeugt es nicht mehr, und Wahrheit, wie sie dem erfahrenden Ver­ stehen "geschieht," ist in ihrem Wesen noch nicht zureichend bestimmt worden. Hat sich das Philosophieren so erkannt, wird es sich nicht einseitig auf die eine oder die andere Position fest­ legen; vielmehr wird es seine Aufgabe gerade darin sehen, den Gedanken in Bewegung zu halten. Diese Auffassung eines heutigen Philosophierens soIl die hier vor­ gelegte Sammlung von Aufsatzen bezeugen. (shrink)

The cosmopolitan tradition begins with Diogenes, who claimed as his identity "citizen of the world." Martha Nussbaum traces the cosmopolitan ideal from ancient times to the present, weighing its limitations as well as merits. Using the capabilities approach, Nussbaum seeks to integrate the "noble but flawed" vision of world citizenship with cosmopolitanism's concern with moral and political justice for all.--.

The aim of this paper is to provide some acquaintance with the exegetical history of ἐξαίφνης inside the Platonic Tradition, from Plato to Marsilio Ficino, by way of Middle Platonism and Greek Neoplatonism. (Since this is only a draft, several modifications should be made later, notably in order to improve the English.) Some part has been presented in Los Angeles: “Damascius’ Theodicy: Psychic Input of Disorder and Evil into the World”, 16th Annual ISNS (International Society for Neoplatonic Studies) Conference, Loyola (...) Marymount University, 14th June 2018. (shrink)

This paper argues that jurisprudential inquiries can be profitably analysed as oriented towards either the explanatory paradigm of discourse or the explanatory paradigm of tradition. The first part of the paper offers a map of the discipline of jurisprudence in accordance with the above two different explanatory orientations. It does so at two levels: 1) ontological ; and 2) epistemological. In the second part the paper, the tension and interaction between the explanatory paradigms of discourse and tradition in the work (...) of five different theorists is considered: 1) Elizabeth Mertz's anthropological linguistics; 2) Nicola Lacey's revision of the relationship between analytical jurisprudence and descriptive sociology; 3) Roger Cotterrell's call for a sociology of legal ideas; 4) Neil MacCormick's concept of law as institutionalised normative order; and 5) Patrick Glenn's notion of a legal tradition. Finally, in the third part, the paper addresses certain implications of the analysis of jurisprudential inquiries by reference to the above two explanatory orientations for comparative and international legal scholarship. The two explanatory orientations are offered as one of many paradigms thanks to which one can recognise the limitations of any one picture of law or legal work. At the metaphilosophical level, the analysis of the paper indicates that there are three options available to jurisprudence, i.e., 1) seek to provide a picture of law or legal work on the basis of one explanatory orientation; 2) maintain pluralism about concepts of law or legal work given their limitations in light of their explanatory orientations; or 3) attempt to combine the elements of both explanatory paradigms in a unified account. The paper argues that insofar as jurisprudence seeks to provide normative resources for responses to certain challenges in the public sphere, it ought to go for option two, namely, for maintaining pluralism about concepts of law and legal work. (shrink)

Between Eternities deals with the future of the tradition of political philosophy. The author argues that this tradition can only progress after the postmodernist fragmentation of political philosophy has been realized as part of the grander scheme of the history of Western thought.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Sikhism between Tradition and "Assemblage":Reflections on Arvind Mandair's Sikh PhilosophyAnanda Abeysekara (bio)Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World. By Arvind-Pal Singh Mandair. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022.My central concern in this essay is how to think about the relation between genealogy and tradition in Arvind Mandair's Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (London: Bloomsbury, 2022). I begin with a brief discussion of a lecture titled (...) "A Genealogy of Liberty" delivered by Quentin Skinner at the University of California, Berkeley in 2008, which he would give again, with minor changes, in 2015 at the University of Chicago and in 2017 at Stanford University. At the outset of the lecture, joining forces with Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, he says, "Here I am a Nietzschean, and it is reflected in my title"—contending that "concepts [like liberty] that have histories cannot have definitions." In giving a concise history of the rival "polemical" claims made by Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Mill, Arendt, Taylor, and others about the concept of liberty, Skinner concludes that, contrary to what Anglo-American philosophy claims, there is not one "coherent way of thinking about liberty" in its contested genealogy. And "while each of these accounts is coherent in its own terms, you cannot combine them. This is genealogy. You can't get this to be the concept of liberty. You are going to have to make some choices, because they don't fit together. So what choice should you make? As to the answer, I leave that up to you" (Skinner 2016).The puzzle of how to think about such a genealogy was palpable in the questions from the audience that followed Skinner's lecture. Noteworthy was one question, about how the thinkers—for example from Hobbes to John Stuart Mill—in the history of the debate about liberty seem to "move around," their views seeming to "bleed into one another" (Skinner 2015). That is, isn't John Stuart Mill's view of liberty—as something that one can voluntarily renounce by internalizing the external views or customs—more or less the same as Hobbes' view of liberty as something free from external interference? And hence don't these competing views after all "fit together" within a single narrative? Ultimately, the concern here boils down to a question about the definition of liberty. [End Page 333]But what the presupposition in the question misses is that each of these positions—as Skinner carefully argues—is "ideological," "polemical," and "contested"; that is, these positions—even though Skinner does not say this explicitly—are marked by distinct forms of historical sensibility. That each of the historical positions, again as Skinner rightly argues, is "coherent" already grants that the sensibilities that define them within their specific conditions cannot be reproduced. That is, to extend Skinner's argument, these sensibilities cannot simply be "combined" within a seamless narrative because they presuppose relationships of power in which they have the force of intelligibility that they do in particular historical contexts. But the presumption about the meaning of a concept—for example the concept of "creativity" or "emptiness"—that can be readily and universally identified in a historical narrative is prevalent in other disciplines like Buddhist studies and South Asian studies, where, despite scholars using the term, genealogy remains poorly thought through (Abeysekara 2023; Walser 2018).1Largely absent in Skinner's genealogy is any discussion of the concept of "tradition" itself even though at times he alludes to "the tradition of liberty." This may not be a simple oversight on Skinner's part, but its very absence raises the question of whether liberalism itself is a discursive, embodied tradition in the ways a religious tradition works, as conceptualized by Talal Asad and others. Asad has described liberalism itself as a certain kind of "tradition" constituted by historical disputes (Asad 2009).2 And the broader implication of that argument is that, because it is a tradition animated by the very debates about what constitutes it, those who make claims about it are already situated within that tradition. And so it is unsound to speak of multiple traditions of liberty and, by extension, "multiple modernities... (shrink)

Examines the arguments and changes in the tradition of justified war.

In this article, conviviality is examined as a constitutive part of human life. On the basis of (ethnographic) examples and discussion, it is maintained that it is a fundamental good, necessary for the valuation of most other goods. The role and function of conviviality, however, are often obscured in theory. Aristotle’s view of the virtues still allowed room for it. Most modern scientific and philosophical approaches ascribe a thinkable motive to interactions that stimulate our spontaneity and faith in life, such (...) as the motive of solving problems that can be construed in objective terms (as in neo-Darwinism), or of seeing reality correspond to reflexive representations of life (as in hermeneutics). Maurice Blondel’s critique of intellectualism and his view of tradition are invoked. By accepting conviviality as a prerequisite for human spirituality, we can focus on aspects of Christianity – like a respect for concrete traditions – that tend to disappear into the background when we frame its teachings and promises in intellectual terms. The argument also points to dangers connected with the fact that instrumental logic largely determines the shape of modern life: we easily forget one of the key conditions for experiencing human life as fulfilling and worthwhile. (shrink)

This major publication is a history of the semantic tradition in philosophy from the early nineteenth century through its incarnation in the work of the Vienna Circle, the group of logical positivists that emerged in the years 1925-1935 in Vienna who were characterised by a strong commitment to empiricism, a high regard for science, and a conviction that modern logic is the primary tool of analytic philosophy. In the first part of the book, Alberto Coffa traces the roots of logical (...) positivism in a semantic tradition that arose in opposition to Kant's theory that a priori knowledge is based on pure intuition and the constitutive powers of the mind. In Part II, Coffa chronicles the development of this tradition by members and associates of the Vienna Circle. Much of Coffa's analysis draws on the unpublished notes and correspondence of many philosophers. The book, however, is not merely a history of the semantic tradition from Kant 'to the Vienna Station'. Coffa also critically reassesses the role of semantic notions in understanding the ground of a priori knowledge and its relation to empirical knowledge and questions the turn the tradition has taken since Vienna. (shrink)

Appeals to a ‘tradition’ stretching back to Thucydides have been central to the recent emergence of realism in political theory. This article asks what work these appeals to tradition are doing and whether they are consistent with contemporary political realism’s contextualist commitments. I argue that they are not and that realists also have independent epistemic reasons to attend to contextualist worries. Ultimately, I make the case for an account of the realist tradition that is at once consistent with moderate contextualist (...) commitments and that preserves the classificatory and analytical value of tradition-building. (shrink)

Après avoir évoqué le caractère dérangeant, voire scandaleux, pour le croyant, des réponses de l'Ecriture et de la tradition juive au dramatique problème de la souffrance humaine, en général, et à celui de la maladie, en particulier, l'auteur procède à un inventaire sommaire des conceptions relatives à la maladie, telles qu'elles s'expriment dans les écrits bibliques canoniques (I), dans le Nouveau Testament (II) et dans la littérature rabbinique des premiers siècles (III), en les illustrant par des textes de référence, choisis (...) parmi ceux qui font autorité tant pour le judaïsme que pour le christianisme. Dans la dernière partie de son étude, l'auteur brosse, à grands traits, un panorama des opinions et des croyances des penseurs juifs orthodoxes, du Moyen-Âge à l'époque moderne, et des comportements qu'ils préconisent face à la maladie et aux souffrances qui en découlent. Il précise que, s'adressant à un public non versé dans les sciences juives, il a choisi de donner à son exposé "un caractère plus descriptif que spéculatif". (shrink)

In the Ukrainian reality of the twenty-first century. The search for the dominant spiritual and national identity is one of the leading places. The dialogue between Catholicism, which is represented by the spiritual phenomenon of the Vatican, and by Ukraine, one of the countries not only of the Greek Catholic, but also of the Orthodox tradition, with a distinct national-cultural specificity, is, in our opinion, the semiosphere where the answers to many challenges of the present and the future. But such (...) answers are difficult to find if the sine era et studio does not analyze the key trends in the development of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by examining it, without looking back at the stereotypes of the identification of Ukrainian spiritual thinking and being with the imperially secular tradition. The most suitable method for this task is the comparative methodology, which examines the basic ideological characteristics of the ideological world of Orthodox thinkers - from Ivan Vyshensky and to thinkers and spiritual prophets of the Second Cathedral of the UAOC. (shrink)

According to Marxist philosophy, everything in the world is universally connected and in perpetual motion. Chinese society has gone through a long history of civilizational development. Since the modern era (1840-1919), great changes have taken place in the civilizational development of China. The transformation of social forms depends on the transformation of culture, and the approximation of culture to modernity is a prerequisite for the modernization of society. Thus, the development of society inevitably causes changes in art and culture; and (...) vice versa, the progress of art and culture, in turn, contributes to the progress of society. A clear and complex line has been traced in the development of Chinese painting over the centuries: from a high degree of integration to gradual differentiation leading to conflict, and then to integration. The development of Chinese painting as a whole shows a transformational trend from tradition to modernity, developing in a tortuous way. In this paper, a combination of research methods is used for research, mainly documentary research, descriptive research, comparative research and case study. Considering the features and trends of Chinese painting at different stages of development, we can more accurately judge the direction of development of modern Chinese painting and find ways to integrate tradition and modernity. (shrink)

Die Philosophie des Barockscotismus war einerseits durch die rückwärtsgewandte Anknüpfung an den mittelalterlichen Denker Johannes Duns Scotus, andererseits durch die Anknüpfung an die Entwicklung in der zeitgenössischen Scholastik, vor allem der Jesuitenscholastik, geprägt. Welche Art von Metaphysik hat diese besondere philosophiehistorische Konstellation hervorgebracht? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, analysiert die vorliegende Arbeit das Metaphysikwerk des wichtigsten Repräsentanten des frühneuzeitlichen Scotismus, Bartholomaeus Mastrius (1602-1673); sie erschließt außerdem eine Vielzahl von kaum bis gar nicht erforschten Metaphysikwerken aus der Franziskanerscholastik des 17. und (...) 18. Jahrhunderts. Das eigenartige, erstaunliche Vielfalt einschließende Profil einer in Vergessenheit geratenen philosophischen Tradition wird deutlich. Durch den Fokus auf ein philosophiehistorisches Phänomen außerhalb des Mainstreams leistet die Arbeit einen Beitrag zu einer differenzierteren Sichtweise der intellektuellen Kultur der europäischen Frühmoderne. Baroque-age Scotist philosophy was, on the one hand, characterised by recourse to the Medieval thinker John Duns Scotus and, on the other hand, by an adaptation to trends in contemporary scholasticism, first of all that of the Jesuits. What kind of metaphysics did this particular constellation within the history of philosophy produce? In order to answer this question, the present book analyses the work on metaphysics by the most important representative of early modern Scotism, Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673). In addition, the book investigates a multitude of scarcely or never studied works on metaphysics from the Franciscan scholastic tradition of the 17th and 18th centuries. The peculiar profile of a forgotten philosophical tradition with its astonishing plurality becomes apparent. By focusing on a phenomenon from the history of philosophy outside the mainstream, this work contributes to a more differentiated view on the intellectual culture in early modern Europe. (shrink)

Robert Brandom’s notion of historical rationality seeks to supplement his inferentialism thesis by providing an account for the validity of conceptual contents. This account, in the shape of a historical process, involves the same self-integration of Brandom’s earlier inferentialism and is similarly restricted by reciprocal recognition of others. This article argues that in applying the synchronic social model of normative discourse to the diachronic axis of engaging the past, Brandom premises a false analogy between present community and past tradition, which (...) obscures the important differences between the two axes. This is explored by looking closely at how Brandom’s own engagements with the past exemplify his historical rationality. Taking its cue from Brandom’s critics, the article shows that Brandom’s own discourse with tradition is not, and cannot be, dialogical and, in accordance, that historical rationality is not, and cannot be, governed by the same social structure of inferentialism. The article concludes with the implications of such a claim on Brandom’s thesis as a whole and on the role of tradition in the process of normative change, in light of it. (shrink)

This article sketches how the debate over divine predications should be informed by the medieval Islamicate tradition. We emphasize the focus not only on the metaphysics and language of divine predications by al-Ghazali, Maimonides, and others, but also on the epistemology of divine predications. In particular, we emphasize the importance of a theory that explains not only what it takes to make a divine predication true, but also whether these predications are knowable. The epistemological element is central, because traditional views (...) of theology aim to avoid theological skepticism, which is the view that, even if there are theological truths, these truths are unknowable. We pursue this point by emphasizing the role of substantives in al-Ghazalı’s theory of divine predicates, and Maimonides’s discussion of negative predications. In closing we apply these lessons to some recent discussions of theological predication. (shrink)

Epicureanism after the generation of its founders has been characterised as dogmatic, uncreative and static. But this volume brings together work from leading classicists and philosophers that demonstrates the persistent interplay in the school between historical and contemporary influences from outside the school and a commitment to the founders' authority. The interplay begins with Epicurus himself, who made arresting claims of intellectual independence, yet also admitted to taking over important ideas from predecessors, and displayed more receptivity than is usually thought (...) to those of his contemporaries. The same principles of autonomy and openness figure importantly in the three major areas of focus in these essays: theology, politics and the emotions. (shrink)

Beginning with Sir William Hamilton's revitalisation of philosophy in Scotland in the 1830s, Gordon Graham takes up the theme of George Davie's The Democratic Intellect and explores a century of debates surrounding the identity and continuity of the Scottish philosophical tradition. Gordon Graham identifies a host of once-prominent but now neglected thinkers - such as Alexander Bain, J. F. Ferrier, Thomas Carlyle, Alexander Campbell Fraser, John Tulloch, Henry Jones, Henry Calderwood, David Ritchie and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison - whose reactions to (...) Hume and Reid stimulated new currents of ideas. Graham concludes by considering the relation between the Scottish philosophical tradition and the 20th-century philosopher John Macmurray. (shrink)

'During the course of the seventeenth century, within the scholastic tradition itself, commentaries on Aristotle's natural philosophical works increasingly gave way to textbooks and compendia organized along thematic lines' (Dear 1985, 161).