Compensation for Historical Emissions and Excusable Ignorance

Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (3):258-274 (2014)
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Abstract

This article defends the idea of applying principles of corrective justice to the matter of climate change. In particular, it argues against the excusable ignorance objection, which holds that historical emissions produced at a time when our knowledge of climate change was insufficient ought to be removed from the equation when applying rectificatory principles to this context. In constructing my argument, I rely on a particular interpretation of rectificatory justice and outcome responsibility. I also address the individualism objection by showing why we should view states as relevant agents of climate change. This argument is built on the assumption that states are institutions set up to coordinate and regulate human interaction, so as to protect their citizens from the unwanted consequences of such interaction

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Citations of this work

Climate Justice and the Duty of Restitution.Santiago Truccone-Borgogno - 2023 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 10 (1):203-224.
Compensation Duties.Kian Mintz-Woo - 2023 - In Gianfranco Pellegrino & Marcello Di Paola, Handbook of the Philosophy of Climate Change. Springer. pp. 779-797.
Individual Compensatory Duties for Historical Emissions and the Dead-Polluters Objection.Laura García-Portela - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (4):591-609.

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