Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem

Analysis 75 (4):615-627 (2015)
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Abstract

I argue that Epistemic Disjunctivism doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical strategy. I contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Duncan Pritchard puts forward on behalf of Epistemic Disjunctivism is unsatisfactory.

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José L. Zalabardo
University College London

References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
The significance of philosophical scepticism.Barry Stroud - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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