Rumfitt on truth-grounds, negation, and vagueness

Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2079-2089 (2018)
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Abstract

In The Boundary Stones of Thought, Rumfitt defends classical logic against challenges from intuitionistic mathematics and vagueness, using a semantics of pre-topologies on possibilities, and a topological semantics on predicates, respectively. These semantics are suggestive but the characterizations of negation face difficulties that may undermine their usefulness in Rumfitt’s project.

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10.1007/s11098-018-1114-7

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Richard Zach
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

Mathematics and Metaphilosophy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
What is Logical Monism?Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian (eds.), Normative Realism.
Reply to Crispin Wright and Richard Zach.Ian Rumfitt - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2091-2103.

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References found in this work

True, Truer, Truest.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1):47-70.
Pretopologies and completeness proofs.Giovanni Sambin - 1995 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (3):861-878.

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