The Boundary Stones of Thought: An Essay in the Philosophy of Logic

Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2015)
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Abstract

Classical logic has been attacked by adherents of rival, anti-realist logical systems: Ian Rumfitt comes to its defence. He considers the nature of logic, and how to arbitrate between different logics. He argues that classical logic may dispense with the principle of bivalence, and may thus be liberated from the dead hand of classical semantics.

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Ian Rumfitt
Oxford University

Citations of this work

Metaphysical and absolute possibility.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):1861-1872.
Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
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Generality Explained.Øystein Linnebo - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (7):349-379.

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