On the Moral Status of Artificial Cognition to Natural Cognition

Journal of Human Cognition 8 (2):17-28 (2024)
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Abstract

Artificial Cognition (AC) has provoked a great deal of controversy in recent years. Concerns over its development have revolved around the questions of whether or not a moral status may be ascribed to AC and, if so, how could it be characterized? This paper provides an analysis of consciousness as a means to query the moral status of AC. This method suggests that the question of moral status of artificial cognition depends upon the level of development of consciousness achieved. As a means by which to distinguish among different levels of technological capabilities, we propose a scale of AC statuses in the relationship with natural cognition of humans: no status, low status, equal status and high status. This research draws from classical theories of ethics, in particular utilitarianism and deontology, to explain the differences and shortcomings of the four propositions. The philosophical arguments presented serve to challenge common assumptions about natural cognition of human relationships with AC as well as to suggest that future technological advances should be directed toward the achievement of a position of equality in those relationships. This shows that artificial cognition has no moral status at present, but could have the same moral status as natural cognition of human beings in the future.

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