There’s nothing to beat a backward clock: A rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke

Logos and Episteme 7 (3):363-378 (2016)
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Abstract

Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. Fred Adams, John Barker and Murray Clarke argue that Backward Clock is no such counterexample. Their argument fails to nullify Backward Clock which also shows that other tracking analyses, such as Dretske’s and one that Adams et al. may well have in mind, are inadequate.

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John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

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References found in this work

Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield, Skepticism: Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske, Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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