Beat the (Backward) Clock

Logos and Episteme 7 (3):353-361 (2016)
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Abstract

In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.

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Author Profiles

Fred Adams
University of Delaware
Murray Clarke
Concordia University
John A. Barker
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

References found in this work

Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reply to hawthorne.Fred Dretske - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 43--46.
Resurrecting the tracking theories.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.

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