Abstract

The pairing of Hegel with skepticism may seem at first to be an “odd couple.” But such a mistaken first impression dissipates upon a closer examination of Hegel’s early essay, “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy: Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One.” Far from the standard picture of someone oblivious to critical epistemological issues, this essay reveals a Hegel who is not only a student, but also a defender of ancient skepticism against its modern Humean counterpart. Authentic skepticism, he tells us, has no positive side. By this measure, modern skepticism is not authentic, for while it attacks rationalist metaphysics, it is itself dogmatic in taking sense impressions, facts of consciousness, and immediacy as truth. In contrast, ancient skepticism attacked sense perception and immediacy first of all, and knew how to demonstrate that immediate certainty is nothing.