Enlarging One's Stall or How Did All of These Sets Get in Here?

Philosophia Mathematica 21 (2):157-179 (2013)
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Abstract

Following historical developments, this article traces two basic motives for employing sets within a physical setting and discusses whether they truly pose a problem for ‘mathematical naturalism’

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