On epistemic conceptions of meaning: Use, meaning and normativity

European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):416-434 (2008)
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Abstract

A number of prominent philosophers advance the following ideas: (1) Meaning is use. (2) Meaning is an intrinsically normative notion. Call (1) the use thesis, hereafter UT, and (2) the normativity thesis, hereafter NT. They come together in the view that for a linguistic expression to have meaning is for there to be certain proprieties governing its employment.1 These ideas are often associated with a third

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Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton

Citations of this work

Inferentialism.Florian Steinberger & Julien Murzi - 2017 - In Steinberger Florian & Murzi Julien, Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language. pp. 197-224.
What is the Normativity of Meaning?Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):219-238.
Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?Daniel Whiting - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):535-555.

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References found in this work

How to do things with words.John L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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