Davidson and non-trivial t-sentences

Erkenntnis 10 (1):87 - 97 (1976)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Davidson on singular causal sentences.David Widerker - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (3):223 - 242.
The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning.Kari Middleton - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
False triviality of truth.Lucas Ribeiro Vollet - 2023 - Cognitio 24 (1):e60571.
Glanville’s ‘Black Box’: what can an Observer know?Lance Nizami - 2020 - Revista Italiana di Filosofia Del Linguaggio 14 (2):47-62.
Davidson's Criticism of the Proximal Theory of Meaning.Dirk Greimann - 2005 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2):73–86.
Truth theories, competence, and semantic computation.Peter Pagin - 2012 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on truth, meaning, and the mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 49.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
39 (#577,026)

6 months
10 (#407,001)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The trouble with extensional semantics.Nicholas Asher - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (1):1 - 14.

Add more citations

References found in this work

On truth and meaning.Alan Reeves - 1974 - Noûs 8 (4):343-359.

Add more references