The Hypothesis of Nash Equilibrium and Its Bayesian Justification

In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl, Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala: Papers From the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 245--264 (1994)
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Abstract

How does Bayesian reasoning support participation in a game's Nash equilibrium? This paper provides an answer.

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Paul Weirich
University of Missouri, Columbia

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