Consciousness in Locke

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2016)
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Abstract

Shelley Weinberg argues that the idea of consciousness as a form of non-evaluative self-awareness helps solve some of the thorniest issues in Locke's philosophy: in his philosophical psychology, and his theories of knowledge, personal identity, and moral agency. The model of consciousness set forth here binds these key issues with a common thread.

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Shelley Weinberg
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

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