Generalized change and the meaning of rationality postulates

Studia Logica 73 (2):299 - 319 (2003)
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Abstract

The standard theory of belief revision was developed to describe how a rational agent should change his beliefs in the presence of new information. Many interesting tools were created, but the concept of rationality was usually assumed to be related to classical logics. In this paper, we explore the fact that the logical tools used can be extended to other sorts of logics, as proved in (Hansson and Wassermann, 2002), to describe models that are closer to the rationality of a real agent.

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2009-01-28

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Citations of this work

The AGM theory and inconsistent belief change.Koji Tanaka - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):113-150.
On AGM for Non-Classical Logics.Renata Wassermann - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):271 - 294.
Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology.Amalia Amaya - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):429-447.

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References found in this work

Theory contraction through base contraction.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.
Kernel contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (3):845-859.
New operators for theory change.Svenove Hansson - 1989 - Theoria 55 (2):114-132.
Local change.Sven Hansson & Renata Wassermann - 2002 - Studia Logica 70 (1):49 - 76.

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