Some Epistemological Trends in Philosophy of Science

Diogenes 32 (128):77-102 (1984)
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Abstract

Some of the relatively significant contributions to epistemology, in recent times, have been made by Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Hans Reichenbach. All these authors seem to make some radical departures from the inherited theories of knowledge. A common characteristic of their epistemologies is that they try to tackle the problem of growth of knowledge; that is to say, what is meant by saying that theories of science, as they get more and more refined, increasingly approach the truth and what the nature of relationship is between the earlier theory and the more refined. later, and present theory. Philosophy in the past hardly grappled with these issues, and therefore it would be of interest to critically examine these new dimensions in Epistemology, which is the concern of this paper.

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