Abstract

Michel Foucault’s thoughts on truth have been controversial from the start, and not just for those who routinely charge him with relativism without reading him—once again a prominent exercise in contemporary public and philosophical debates, especially when taking up the diagnosis of a “post-truth era”. While Daniele Lorenzini confronts these “interpretations” several times in his book, he has wisely decided not to let them frame his attempt to clarify Foucault’s actual philosophical conception of truth. Instead, he elucidates Foucault’s lifelong project of a history of truth, situates Foucault’s late analysis of parrhesia within that project, and demonstrates how this yields a different understanding of Foucault’s genealogical critique. Along the way, he argues vehemently against readings of Foucault that turn him into a relativist and against Nancy Fraser’s and Jürgen Habermas’ criticism that Foucault’s critique lacks normative foundations.