Open-Mindedness, Rational Confidence, and Belief Change

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 12 (2):33–44 (2023)
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Abstract

It’s intuitive to think that (a) the more sure you are of something, the harder it’ll be to change your mind about it, and (b) you can’t be open-minded about something if you’re very sure about it. If these thoughts are right, then, with minimal assumptions, it follows that you can’t be in a good position to both escape echo chambers and be rationally resistant to fake news: the former requires open-mindedness, but the latter is inimical to it. I argue that neither thought is true and that believing them will get us all mixed up. I show that you can be open-minded and have confidently held beliefs, and that beliefs in which you are less sure are not, thereby, more fragile. I close with some reflections on the nature of rational belief change and open-mindedness and a brief sketch about what might actually help us in the fight against misinformation and belief polarization …. [please read below the rest of the article].

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Katia Vavova
Mount Holyoke College

Citations of this work

Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Guidance and mainstream epistemology.Jeremy Fantl - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2191-2210.

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