Abstract

In his Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer argues that society can be understood as a compound of a number of different segments, where each of them has its own distinct meanings and values of social goods. He calls these segments ‘spheres of distributive justice’, and, as distinct meanings and values point to different procedures of distribution, spheres are separated by criteria and arrangements which are considered appropriate for distribution of certain goods. We should seek to ensure that inequalities in one sphere do not spread into other spheres. Different goods should be distributed for different reasons and according to different procedures, and that is the consequence of cultural relativism and pluralism. Walzer also states that distribution can be just or unjust and that is relative to the social meanings of the goods. Thus, we can define injustice as applying the distributive principle from one sphere of social life to another – such a definition follows from the idea of spheres of distributive justice. In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer claims that states possess rights more or less as individuals do; therefore, it is possible to imagine a society among states more or less like the society of individuals. This relies on what is called a ‘domestic analogy’. The primary form of the theory of aggression, which rests upon a domestic analogy, is called the ‘legalist paradigm’ by Walzer, and it can be summed up in a number of statements where it is claimed, among other things, that aggression justifies the war of law enforcement against the aggressor state, which can be punished once it has been militarily repulsed. According to Walzer, the implication of the paradigm is clear: if states are members of international society and thus the subjects of rights, they must also be the objects of punishment. In this paper, however, I will try to show that if we accept Walzer’s idea of spheres of distributive justice, maybe we should not accept domestic analogy at the same time. Namely, if the aggressor state is the object of punishment justified by legalist paradigm, then is it the case that distribution of punishment, which is a “negative” distributable good, is an example of applying a distributive principle from one sphere of justice (interpersonal relations) to another (international relations)? If that is the case, then the punishment of the aggressor state is unjust, according to definition of injustice which follows from Spheres of Justice. As the punishment is justified by legalist paradigm, which is, on the other hand, based on domestic analogy, I conclude that a domestic analogy is not compatible with Walzer's idea of spheres of distributive justice in social life