Transferable Exclusivity Vouchers and Incentives for Antimicrobial Development in the European Union

Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 51 (1):213-216 (2023)
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Abstract

The European Commission’s proposal to address antimicrobial resistance using transferable exclusivity vouchers (TEVs) is fundamentally flawed. European policymakers and regulators should consider alternatives, such as better funding for basic and clinical research, use of advance market commitments funded by a pay-or-play tax, or enacting an EU Fund for Antibiotic Development.

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