Preferential Semantics using Non-smooth Preference Relations

Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):903-942 (2014)
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Abstract

This paper studies the properties of eight semantic consequence relations defined from a Tarski-logic L and a preference relation ≺. They are equivalent to Shoham’s so-called preferential entailment for smooth model structures, but avoid certain problems of the latter in non-smooth configurations. Each of the logics can be characterized in terms of what we call multi-selection semantics. After discussing this type of semantics, we focus on some concrete proposals from the literature, checking a number of meta-theoretic properties and elaborating on their intuitive motivation. As it turns out, many of their meta-properties only hold in case ≺ is transitive. To tackle this problem, we propose slight modifications of each of the systems, showing the resulting logics to behave better at the intuitive level and in metatheoretic terms, for arbitrary ≺.

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Christian Straßer
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Frederik Van De Putte
Erasmus University Rotterdam

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References found in this work

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Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Agency and deontic logic.John Horty - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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