Complementary explanations

Synthese 120 (1):137-149 (1999)
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Abstract

Scientific explanations arc subject to the occurrence of inconsistencies. To rule them out in many cases demands the construction of new theories. As the examples of complementary explanations show, that may take a while. Furthermore, even if possible in principle, it is not always reasonable to eliminate inconsistencies immediately, e.g., by bringing in a more sophisticated formal language. After all, under some circumstances a provisional, not fully coherent explanation may be better than none. In any case, we need a logically controlled approach to such inconsistencies. Modern logic provides the tools which are necessary to solve this task. We will mention two alternative approaches.

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Citations of this work

An Adaptive Logic Based on Jaśkowskiˈs Approach to Paraconsistency.Joke Meheus* - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):539-567.

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References found in this work

Inconsistency and scientific reasoning.Joel M. Smith - 1988 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 19 (4):429-445.
Contradiction.Dale Jacquette - 1992 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 25 (4):365 - 390.

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