Projective Explanation: How Theories Explain Empirical Data in Spite of Theory-Data Incommensurability

Synthese 145 (1):111-129 (2005)
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Abstract

In scientific explanations, the explanans theory is sometimes incommensurable with the explanandum empirical data. How is this possible, especially when the explanation is deductive in nature? This paper attempts to solve the puzzle without relying on any particular theory of reference. For us, it is rather obvious that the geometric idea of projection plays a key role in Keplers explanation of Tycho Brahes empirical data. We discover that a similar mechanism operates in theoretic explanations in general. In short, all theoretic explanations are projective explanations. If so, there should be no logical reason why explanans theories cannot be incommensurable with explanandum data. For illustration, we analyse Einsteins explanation of the results of the Michelson–Morley experiment in some detail.

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Citations of this work

Logic in reality.Joseph E. Brenner - 2008 - Dordrecht: Springer.

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References found in this work

The logic of scientific discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Hutchinson Publishing Group.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Explanation and scientific understanding.Michael Friedman - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):5-19.
Explanatory unification.Philip Kitcher - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (4):507-531.

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