Corporate intention and corporate action

Analyse & Kritik 15 (1):11-21 (1993)
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Abstract

This paper comments on Coleman's account of group action , and his view is compared with the present author's largely complementary view . Some criticisms concerning Coleman's linear system of action are presented. One of the main points made is that a viable theory of social action must make use of a notion of joint intention and that Coleman's theory is deficient on this score

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2009-01-28

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Raimo Tuomela
Last affiliation: University of Helsinki

Citations of this work

The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency.David Rönnegard (ed.) - 2015 - Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Collective intentionality and the social sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
Collective epistemic virtues.Reza Lahroodi - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297.
Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit.I.—Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):185-208.
CSR - the Cuckoo’s Egg in the Business Ethics Nest.Matthias P. Hühn - 2018 - Humanistic Management Journal 3 (2):279-298.

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