The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency

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Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands (2015)
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Abstract

This section aims to summarize and conclude Part I in the form of a taxonomy of legitimate and illegitimate corporate moral responsibility attributions. I believe we can categorise four types of corporate moral responsibility attributions two of which are legitimate and two which are illegitimate with regard to our concept of moral agency and our moral intuition of fairness

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9789401797559   9401797552   9789401797566   9402401466

DOI

10.1007/978-94-017-9756-6

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Chapters

Conclusion: Legitimate and Illegitimate Corporate Moral Responsibility Attributions.David Rönnegard
Corporate Actions.David Rönnegard
Corporate Autonomy.David Rönnegard
Corporate Collective Moral Agency.David Rönnegard
Corporate Intentions.David Rönnegard
Necessary Conditions for Moral Agency.David Rönnegard
Summary of Why Corporate Moral Agency Is a Fallacy.David Rönnegard
The Importance of Corporate Moral Agency.David Rönnegard
The Reference of Corporate Proper Names and Responsibility Attributions.David Rönnegard
The Role of the Corporation in Society: The Descriptive View.David Rönnegard

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The Importance of Corporate Moral Agency.David Rönnegard - 2015 - In David Rönnegard, The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
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Corporate Autonomy.David Rönnegard - 2015 - In David Rönnegard, The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Corporate Actions.David Rönnegard - 2015 - In David Rönnegard, The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.

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Citations of this work

I, Volkswagen.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):283-304.
Does the Machine Need a Ghost? Corporate Agents as Nonconscious Kantian Moral Agents.Kendy M. Hess - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1):67-86.
Business Ethics.Jeffrey Moriarty - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Justice as fairness: a restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.

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