Dogmatic Withholding: Confessions of a Serial Offender

In Verena Wagner & Zinke Alexandra, Suspension in epistemology and beyond. New York, NY: Routledge (2025)
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Abstract

This chapter provides an account of what dogmatism is, why the term matters, and how it applies to withholding judgment. Roughly, a person is dogmatic about P when a certain problematic personal investment—a superiority complex, broadly construed—biases their judgment concerning whether P. The term dogmatism and its cognates matter because of their social function. To accuse you of dogmatism is to signal how you are to be treated: your judgment or behavior needs to be “brought down to earth,” so that you have a more accurate view of yourself or so you stop treating others as less important or less than. Withholding judgment can be dogmatic in the same way that belief is dogmatic. Belief (withholding) is dogmatic just when the relevant problematic personal investment results in biases that keep a person stuck in that belief (withholding).

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Chris Tucker
William & Mary

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References found in this work

Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.
Dispositions.Sungho Choi - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bias: A Philosophical Study.Thomas Kelly - 2023 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The excellent mind: intellectual virtues for everyday life.Nathan L. King - 2021 - New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
Closed-mindedness and arrogance.Heather Battaly - 2020 - In Alessandra Tanesini & Michael P. Lynch, Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. London, UK: Routledge.

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