Distinguishing Non-Conceptual Content from Non-Syntactic Propositions: Comment on Fuller

Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):53-57 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I argue that a principal argument in favor of the existence of non-conceptual content (henceforth NCC) fails. That is, I do not accept that considerations regarding the richness of our perceptual experiences support the existence of NCC. I argue instead that the existence of NCC is empirically motivated. Here is an outline of the paper. First, I set out the distinction between conceptual content and NCC as we understand it. Second, I consider the richness argument (RA), and argue that it fails. I argue in particular that RA (or RA-style arguments) are either self-defeating or confl ict with reasonably established accounts of early perceptual processing. Third, I tackle a residual phenomenological puzzle and offer a solution to it. Fourth, I argue that the existence of NCC enjoys empirical support. I argue in particular that states associated with early stages of visual perceptual processing have NCC.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,486

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-08-23

Downloads
118 (#187,751)

6 months
4 (#864,415)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Y. Tsou
University of Texas at Dallas

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Nonconceptual content and the "space of reasons".Richard G. Heck - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.
Perception and conceptual content.Alex Byrne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 231--250.
The connectionist construction of concepts.Adrian Cussins - 1990 - In Margaret A. Boden, The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Scenarios, concepts, and perception.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - In Tim Crane, The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Structured propositions.Jeffrey C. King - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 7 references / Add more references