The Critique Of Kant’s Conception Of Aesthetical Feeling From H. Cohen’s Perspective
Abstract
Kant has carried out transformation of rational tradition, he has begun the new current of European culture in which the art was highly appreciated and the task of understanding the human nature was provided by means of aesthetical terms. Cohen in his work Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls undertook the problems of Kant’s conception of aesthetical experience. He analyzed the conception of feeling which was basic for Kantian project thoroughly and he concentrated his analysis on its theoretical inconsistency. From Cohen point of view this inconsistency was produced by receptivity of feeling which was assumed by Kant; he — on the other hand — assumed that creativity of feeling is fundamental. This paper is critical presentation of Cohen’s argumentation; the crucial aspects of Kant’s conception of feeling are concerned: the question of intentionality, the problem of relation between the cognitive consciousness and aesthetical consciousness, the problem of relation between aesthetical taste and morality and the problem of symbol. Key words KANT, COHEN, AESTHETICS, CONSCIOUSNESS