Abstract

I sketch a theory of personal identity which is Reductionist in Parfit's sense, and inquire into the place of personal identity in our values. I focus on our concern to survive, which is, in large part, a concern for a life which we may anticipate. When we anticipate, we often imagine "from the inside" what a period of life will be like, and look forward to experiencing and doing things. I argue that it need not be irrational to engage in such thinking, even if the life to which one looks forward is not one's own. ;Our patterns of anticipation and concern depend partly upon habit, but remain open to rational criticism. Relying on psychological research as well as philosophical analysis, I develop an account of when prudential concern is rational for us, given the norms we accept, and the facts about our nature and our persistence through time. I then consider how my conclusions may influence our notions of a person's long-term interests, and our moral beliefs.