Abstract

In this article the mirror is considered as a model of the adequacy of the world and mind, which to some extent dominated the European history of ideas. This idea of relationship and mutual perception in the field of intersubjectivity is problematic enough when the concrete collision of two corporeal entities, two personalities as two bodies, is at stake. According to author, the metaphor of the mirror serves in the history of culture as an analog of the relationship of a person to himself, to others, to the world, thereby placing the topic of anthropology, the human self and worldview at the center of the research. In the author's view, the mirror metaphor is not so much about how strong the mirror metaphor is in this context, but primarily about the social limit of physical perception reflexes. The other person's social reflection on us contains a personal dimension that is equivalent to matching mutual reflections, including the rejection of contact with each other. The mirror can only confirm the psychophysical side of my being, while the other person mirrors my social side behind this side, where he also has the ability through his subjectivity and spontaneity to deny me in the mirror image, i.e. to deny me any recognition. The author describes various asocial forms of view that refuse to allow symmetry between us and others with reference to the metaphorical theories of Ralf Konersmann and Hans Blumenberg. Using metaphor we can address pre-conceptual expectations, needs, and experiences that conceptual language does not have access to.