Abstract

This study investigates several recent philosophical positions concerning the phenomena of speaking and the speaking subject. Through discussions of thinkers deemed representatives of the theories of speech acts , grammatology , and the phenomenology of speech , the essay presents a picture of the speaking subject in order to develop an understanding of the fundamental manner in which speaking expresses man's being-in-the-world and the way in which this sheds light upon concerns such as the relationship between speech and intention and the origin of ambiguity. ;It is argued that the 'concrete' speech act which underlies Austin's work provides a strong foundation for a phenomenological account of speaking in a way that the more 'abstract' account of Searle's theory cannot. This distinction is then found important in the face of the major criticisms against speech act theory developed by Derrida. In overlooking the difference between concrete and abstract speech acts, Derida misses important reasons for retaining a theory of speech acts. Such reasons are reinforced when Austin's views are considered within the context of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of speech, where the importance of the speaking subject for human self-realization and philosophy itself receives emphatic endorsement. ;The essay closes with some summary remarks about the themes of intention and ambiguity, as well as some suggestions aimed toward an idiolectic theory of speech and the development of the distinction between speaker-hearers and pure-hearers