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The Subscript View: A Distinct View of Distinct Selves
In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 126-323 (2020)
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Citations of this work
Personal Identity and Dual Character Concepts.Joshua Knobe - 2022 - In Kevin Tobia (ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self. London: Bloomsbury.
Structural Racism Within Reason.Alisa Bierria - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (4):355-368.
The identity of what? Pluralism, practical interests, and individuation.Vilius Dranseika, Shaun Nichols & David Shoemaker - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (3):757-773.
Does Cognitive Psychology Imply Pluralism About the Self?Christopher Register - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-18.
References found in this work
Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life.Marya Schechtman (ed.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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