Personal Identity and Dual Character Concepts

In Kevin Tobia (ed.), Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self. London: Bloomsbury (2022)
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Joshua Knobe
Yale University

Citations of this work

Does Cognitive Psychology Imply Pluralism About the Self?Christopher Register - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-18.
Are there really any dual‐character concepts?David Plunkett & Jonathan Phillips - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):340-369.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The essential moral self.Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols - 2014 - Cognition 131 (1):159-171.
Water is and is not H 2 O.Kevin P. Tobia, George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (2):183-208.

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