Rethinking the unfair advantage argument

Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (1):63-81 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Athletes who flout doping bans are generally thought to have gained an unfair advantage. In this paper, I critically examine this view. I begin by defending an effort-based account of desert in sport, explaining why it is preferable to the hybrid account that is favoured in the literature. Drawing on the effort-based account, I construct the Unfair Advantage Argument formally, in what I take to be its most plausible form. I then argue that the Unfair Advantage Argument should be rejected, for two main reasons. First, I challenge its assumption that dopers have put in less effort than their opponents. Second, I explain why, even if dopers have put in less effort, they have still exerted a sufficient amount. Though doping is problematic from an institutional perspective, it is not – from a pre-institutional perspective – cause for moral concern.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,757

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-09-04

Downloads
54 (#403,706)

6 months
8 (#605,434)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1861 - Cleveland: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Roger Crisp.
What is the point of equality.Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
Equality and priority.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Ratio 10 (3):202–221.

View all 24 references / Add more references