Abstract

Intuition-based accounts of the a priori are criticised for appealing to a “mysterious” faculty of rational intuition to explain how a priori knowledge is possible. Analyticity-based accounts are typically motivated by opposition to them, offering a purportedly “non-mysterious” account of the a priori. In this paper, I argue that analyticity-based accounts are in no better position to explain the a priori than intuition-based accounts, and that we have good reason to doubt the explanation they offer. To do this, I focus on recent analyticity-based accounts of the a priori, which appeal to understanding alone to explain the a priori. First, I argue that the appeal to understanding as the source of the a priori is no less mysterious than the appeal to rational intuition. Second, I argue that analyticity-based accounts of the a priori do not provide an alternative to intuition-based accounts as the fundamental explanation they offer of the a priori is one that could equally be endorsed by a friend of rational intuition—and that they fail for reasons that do not undermine intuition-based accounts.