Substance Dualism: A Defense

In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 41–60 (2018)
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Abstract

This chapter aims to separate the caricatures of dualism from a serious philosophical and theological view of human, and nonhuman animal nature. It addresses one of the key sources for discontent with substance dualism: the assumption that people have a clear, problem‐free understanding of what it is to be physical. The chapter discusses author's argument for why people should believe that human persons are not numerically identical with their bodies. It also offers reasons why materialism is unacceptable in terms of mental‐physical identity. The chapter defends the possibility of persons ceasing to be while their bodies survive, and persons surviving death despite the annihilation of their bodies. It proposes that the way forward is to consider whether there is a reason to believe that what people know in their experience is the very same thing as what most physicalists claim is physical: their brains and brain processes or their bodies as a whole.

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Coherence of Substance Dualism.Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad - 2023 - International Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):33-42.

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