Property dualism without substance dualism?

Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116 (2001)
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Abstract

Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (1) requires accepting (2) as well

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Robert Francescotti
San Diego State University

Citations of this work

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Property dualists shouldn't be nominalists about properties.Daniel Giberman & David Mark Kovacs - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Quining qualia.Daniel Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & Edoardo Bisiach, Consciousness in Contemporary Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.

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