The Normative Autonomy of Logic

Erkenntnis 87 (6):2661-2684 (2022)
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Abstract

Some authors have called into question the normativity of logic, using as an argument that the bridge principles for logical normativity (MacFarlane, In what sense (in any) is logic normative for thought, 2004 )? are just by-products of general epistemic principles for belief. In this paper, I discuss that suggestion from a formal point of view. I show that some important bridge principles can be derived from usual norms for belief. I also describe some possible ways to block this derivation by modifying the epistemic norms or weakening the bridge principles. Finally, I discuss different philosophical interpretations of these results.

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Citations of this work

A simple solution to the collapse argument for logical pluralism.Diego Tajer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Disjoint Logics.Federico Pailos - 2021 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 30 (1):109-137.
Derivative normativity and logical pluralism.Diego Tajer - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-14.

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References found in this work

Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Reasons as Defaults.John F. Horty - 2012 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.

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