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Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?
Ratio 26 (4):450-470 (2013)
Abstract
Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the worldAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
The tale of a moderate normative skeptic.Brendan Cline - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):141-161.
References found in this work
Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
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