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Why Variable-Population Social Orderings Cannot Escape the Repugnant Conclusion: Proofs and Implications
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Citations of this work
The impossibility of a satisfactory population prospect axiology (independently of Finite Fine-Grainedness).Elliott Thornley - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3671-3695.
References found in this work
An impossibility theorem for welfarist axiologies.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):247-266.
Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics.Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert & David J. Donaldson - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
Might Theory X Be a Theory of Diminishing Marginal Value?Theodore Sider - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):265 - 271.
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