Revisiting variable-value population principles

Economics and Philosophy 39 (3):468-484 (2023)
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Abstract

We examine a general class of variable-value population principles. Our particular focus is on the extent to which such principles can avoid the repugnant and sadistic conclusions. We show that if a mild limit property is imposed, avoidance of the repugnant conclusion implies the sadistic conclusion. This result generalizes earlier observations by showing that they apply to a substantially larger class of principles. Our second theorem states that, under the limit property, the axiom of mere addition also conflicts with avoidance of the repugnant conclusion. This result is a consequence of a similar observation that appears in the earlier literature.

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Citations of this work

Sufficientarianism and incommensurability.Susumu Cato - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (12):3439-3458.
A Dissolution of the Repugnant Conclusion.Roberto Fumagalli - 2024 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 41 (1):85-105.
Acyclic population ethics and menu-dependent relations.Susumu Cato - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-13.

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References found in this work

Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Population axiology.Hilary Greaves - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12442.
In defence of repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.
An impossibility theorem for welfarist axiologies.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):247-266.
Population Ethics under Risk.Gustaf Arrhenius & H. Orri Stefánsson - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.

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